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THE UNION OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS



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The union of european federalists

From the foundation to the decision on
direct election of the european parliament
(1946-1974)

Sergio Pistone

PREFACE

The Union of European Federalists was founded in 1946 and is a supranational organisation of men and women who are committed to the struggle for a European federation, intended as the fundamental first step along the road towards world federation. This commitment has so far continued for over sixty years and has always featured the common thread of mobilising the public in favour of popular participation in the construction of European unity. The context within which the UEF is currently carrying out its initiatives is that of transforming of the European Union in a fully federal sense by establishing a Federal European Constitution through entirely democratic methods and excluding all forms of national veto. Familiarity with the history of the UEF and therefore the deep roots and continuity of the struggle for European federation is essential for those who are directly involved in the fight as well as for those who follow it with interest. I thus take great pleasure in acknowledging the release of this book and I hope that it will meet the favour of many readers.

MERCEDES BRESSO

President of the Union of European Federalists

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INTRODUCTION

The Union of European Federalists (UEF) (1) was founded in Paris on December 15th 1946 and held its first congress in Montreux from August 27th-30th 1947. Since then, sixty years have passed and European federation, the objective which the UEF was created to achieve and which has shaped all of its activities, has not yet been accomplished, although the European integration process has made significant progress in such a direction. Today, this process is dominated by a confrontation between those who pursue the transformation of the European Union (EU) into a full federation and those who wish to go no further than a confederal system in which national governments maintain their right to veto on fundamental issues.

At the centre of the discussion and of the political fight in relation to European unification is the project for the European Constitution signed by the twenty-five governments of the member states of the EU (which became twenty-seven with the addition of Romania and Bulgaria on January 1st 2007) on October 29th 2004 in Rome, after being formulated on the basis of project proposed by a Convention formed by representatives of the European Parliament, national parliaments, national governments and of the European Commission.

The draft Treaty of Rome, which contained important steps forward in a federal direction, was ratified by eighteen of the twenty-sev-

(1) It should be specified that at the moment of its foundation, the name “Union Européenne de Fédéralistes” was used, as at the time, integral federalism was the dominant school of thought. The English title “Union of European Federalists”, however, shifted the emphasis onto the objective of European unity on a federal basis rather than the integral federalist doctrine. When, as we will see, this doctrine became a minority element in the supranational organisation of European federalists, the name “Union des Fédéralistes Européens” was utilized, while maintaining the acronym UEF in all languages.

en countries of the EU, but was blocked by the negative results of the referendums in France and the Netherlands on May 29th and June 1st 2005 respectively. The governments therefore decided to approve a text which, while maintaining the majority of reforms contained in the Treaty of Rome, was stripped of any constitutional significance. The struggle currently in progress on the part of the federalists aims to re-launch the constitutional initiative based on a genuinely democratic method. The crux of the matter is to overcome the rule of unanimity, and thus establish a federal constitution among those states willing to adhere to it, and willing to allow the subsequent adhesion of those states who initially do not intend to participate. The body called upon to formulate the constitution project must, on the other hand, be formed by representatives of the citizens of Europe — surpassing therefore the method of intergovernmental conferences that decide according to unanimous voting — and the resulting proposal must be ratified by a majority through a European referendum.

The struggle for European federation (and therefore the process of European unification) is currently at a point which is both critical and decisive. It should also be underlined that 2007 was the year of the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Altiero Spinelli — the founder of the European Federalist Movement in Italy — and of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. In this evocative context, other than one of a particularly intense practical commitment, for the purposes of informed debate, it appears as necessary as ever to achieve widespread knowledge of the problems of European unification under all aspects, including the historical one.

In the history of European unification, an essential component is constituted by the role of the movements for European unity and specifically by one which is considered the most important, and whose very existence is justified by the aim of European federation and the participation of the European people in the entire process. Hence the usefulness of the reconstruction of the history of the UEF, to which this book intends to provide a contribution. This work is dedicated to the organisation's foundation, which has its roots in the era of the world wars and particularly the European Resistance, and covers the first twenty-eight years of the UEF's activities which culminated in

the decision, adopted by the Conference of the Heads of States and Governments held in Paris on December 9th and 10th 1974, to begin the implementation of direct elections to the European Parliament.

This is the first part of a project which will subsequently be completed by a second volume bringing the reader right up to the present day. The idea of choosing the decision made in Paris in December 1974 as a moment of articulation between the two sections of the project is founded on the conviction that the opening of the way towards European elections represented a historical turning point in the development of the European unification process and, at the same time, a milestone for federalist actions, which contributed decisively, as I will strive to demonstrate, to the achievement of such a goal.

That said, I believe that two points must be clarified. The work presented here is a reconstruction of the essential lines of UEF history. Other younger scholars will have the task of performing a decidedly more extensive and detailed analysis which, through a more systematic use of public and private archives, will be able to document more comprehensively the role of the federalists in the development of the European unification process. With respect to this prospective work, I hope that my contribution will be able to provide some useful guidelines, not least because it comes from someone who has directly experienced a large part of this movement's history, being a militant of the UEF since 1954. With this, I come to my second clarification. The perspective from which I have reconstructed the essential points of the history of the UEF — historical reconstructions are always influenced by theoretical and ideological point of view peculiar to the historian — is that of a militant belonging to this movement. If this fact implies a personal involvement in the object of this study which is obviously lacking in those who are not militant federalists, it can on the other hand present the advantage of inside knowledge of the issues under study that only first hand experience is able to acquire.

I

FROM THE WORLD WARS TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE UNION OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISTS

SUMMARY: 1.1. The collapse of the European system of states, the birth of European unity movements and the first Europeanist government initiatives. — 1.2. The Resistance and European Unity. — 1.3. The Foundation of the UEF.

1.1. *The collapse of the European system of states, the birth of European unity movements and the first Europeanist government initiatives.*

The era covering the two world wars represented on one hand an outlet for a process of involution connected to the assertion and exasperation of nationalism, but on the other hand constituted the incubation phase of the European unification process. Indeed, the said process has its foundations and factual premise in the definitive crisis of the European system of states which was triggered by the two world wars.

The European system, founded on the absolute sovereignty of the nation states, has constituted throughout modern times the framework for the continent's grandiose development, but at the same time has also been the cause of its structural contentiousness. In particular, this framework saw the development of serious crises unleashed by the hegemonic tendencies of its most powerful states (first, Charles V and Philip II's Spain, followed by Louis XIV and Napoleon's France), and which concluded with the reestablishment of a precarious equilibrium.

The world wars, with the common denominator being Germany's hegemonic ambitions (first under William II and then under Hitler), were part of this general tendency of the history of modern Europe, but at the same time they marked the conclusion of such a tendency

due to the uniqueness of such events. Above all, they were terribly destructive in their nature because they were fought by modern nation states capable, with the technical equipment supplied by industrial production methods, not just of manufacturing increasingly effective weapons, but also of mobilising all parts of society with a view to war.

This tendency was further emphasised and reached fever-pitch following the establishment of fascist totalitarianism, which while constituting a manifestation of deep crisis in European civilisation, was translated into an exasperation of the material and moral destructiveness of war. The culmination of all this was represented by the atrocities of Auschwitz.

Even more decisive was the fact that for the first time Europe showed itself to be incapable of restoring equilibrium with its own strength and resources. Indeed, when previous hegemonic attempts had been thwarted, those decisive in their defeat were powers who were relatively peripheral to the European system, such as Great Britain and Russia, although they were actually part of the said system. The defeat of German hegemony on the other hand was largely dependent on the strength of a power which was completely external to the European system, the United States, and a Euro-Asiatic power, the Soviet Union, whose totalitarian system was a modernised version of oriental despotism.

The previous reconstructions of European equilibrium had had to pay the price of a slow but sure transmigration of power from the centre of the system towards to the peripheral powers. However, this time, the weakening of Europe reached such a point that it led to the end of its own autonomy, and therefore to the absorption of the European system into the new world system of states, founded on the bipolar equilibrium between the USA and the USSR (1).

(1) The most enlightening reconstruction of the history of the European state system until its definitive crisis, seen as the premise for the beginning of the European unification process, is that provided by LUDWIG DEHIO in *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie. Betrachtungen über ein Grundproblem der neueren Staatengeschichte*, Krefeld, Scherpe, 1948 (Italian translation: *Equilibrio o egemonia. Considerazioni sopra un problema fondamentale della storia politica moderna*, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1954, new edition., with a presentation by Sergio Pistone, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; French translation: *Equilibre ou hégémonie*, Paris, Seuil, 1959; English translation: *The Precarious Balance. Four Centuries of*

Closely linked to this scenario, the period comprising the two world wars saw a qualitative leap in the development of the idea of European unity. Here resides a decisive factor in the initiation of the process of European unification after the second world war.

The idea of European unity has a longstanding history. One can go right back to *De Monarchia*, written by Dante Alighieri between 1310 and 1313 (in which he imagines a strong imperial authority which limits the authority of individual kingdoms and imposes their pacific collaboration with a method which could be considered to approach federalism) and to *De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*, written by Pierre Dubois around 1308, orientated more towards a confederal league of princes. Since then and right up to contemporary times, the idea of European unity has had its main thread in the need to respond to a crucial problem linked to the formation of modern sovereign states, which occurred between the end of the middle ages and the beginning of the modern age.

On the one hand, the sovereign states have brought enormous progress, in that the monopoly of force permitted the central authority to gradually eliminate feudal anarchy and therefore to guarantee an increasingly effective internal juridical order, which constituted the basis for unparalleled economic, social and cultural development. Within this framework, subsequent liberal, democratic and social conquests were made possible, conquests which provided an essential integration of the internal pacifying function carried out by the modern state through a monopoly of force (which progressively became a tool subject to the control of society as a whole).

On the other hand, the constitution of absolute state sovereignty, which led to the definitive crisis of the universal authority of the Catholic Church and the Empire (who were never actually able to impose peaceful coexistence), despite overcoming the problem of feu-

European Power Struggle, New York, Knopf, 1962; English translation: *The Precarious Balance. Politics of Power in Europe 1494-1945*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1963) and *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20 Jahrhundert*, München, Oldenbourg, 1955 (English translation: *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1959; Italian translation: *La Germania e la politica mondiale del XX secolo*, Milan, Comunità, 1962). See also S. PISTONE, *Ludwig Dehio*, Napoli, Guida, 1977 and ID., *Ludwig Dehio: Ein Klassiker des Weltföderalismus*, in "Integration", 1988, n. 4.

dal anarchy, simultaneously gave rise to a structural situation of international anarchy, with decidedly problematic implications.

The mechanism of equilibrium, which governed the European system of states, in reality showed itself to be capable of frustrating the hegemonic initiatives undertaken from time to time by the continent's most powerful states, but not of preventing continual wars which subsequently became increasingly destructive and resulted in endangering the progress and strength of Europe as a whole. The reason for this was that the modern sovereign state had produced an uninterrupted strengthening of military power.

The idea of European unity, which proposes the aim of overcoming international anarchy and, therefore, the limitation of absolute state sovereignty, contains the answer to this problem and it is no coincidence that it saw its most significant expression in conjunction with the most serious crises which affected the European system of states (2).

If the common denominator throughout the history of the idea of European unity is clear, it can be easily understood why the idea, during the period of the world wars, ceased to belong to the utopian stream of political thought. Indeed, it began to become the answer to the concrete political problem constituted by the self-destructive degeneration of the anarchic coexistence of the European states.

In essence, what was sensed by Immanuel Kant — one of the greatest exponents of the idea of European and world unity — towards the end of the 18th century in his political writings came true (3), and can be summarised in the following points: democracy can develop fully and lastingly only by structurally eliminating war

(2) For the history of the idea of European unity, see: DENIS DE ROUGEMONT, *Vingt-huit siècles d'Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les textes d'Hésiode à nos jours*, Paris, Payot, 1961; JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE, *L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*, Paris, Denoël, 1965; BERNARD VOYENNE, *Histoire de l'idée européenne*, Paris, Payot, 1964; CLAUS SCHÖNDUBE-CHRISTEL RUPPERT, *Eine Idee setzt sich durch*, Hangelar bei Bonn, Warnecke, 1964. HEIKKI MIKKELI, *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Publishers, 1998; GEORGES CHABERT, *L'idée européenne. Entre guerres et culture: de la confrontation à l'union*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2007.

(3) Cfr. IMMANUEL KANT, *Political writing*, edited by Hans Reiss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 and SERGIO PISTONE, *Peace as a condition of democracy*, in "The Federalist", 2005, n. 12.

which imposes the priority of security over and above all other values; lasting peace requires the absolute sovereignty of states to be surpassed by means of a federation, whose constitution must be commenced in Europe and be gradually extended to the entire world; that which reason demands will become a firm commitment following on from the progress of economic interdependence and the increasingly destructive nature of war.

In reality, in the period of the world wars there was not only one decisive factor of progress, on both a quantitative and qualitative level, with regard to stances in favour of European unity (4). The most significant event was the creation of the first organisations whose sole aim was to fight for European unity, and the launch of the first concrete, if not at the time successful, government initiatives in favour of European unification.

The first of the movements for European unity born in this period that we must remember here is that of Paneuropa founded in 1923 in Vienna by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (5). It was an organisation that did not group together individual members, but essentially consisted of a committee of major personalities in the areas of politics, economics, science and culture. Such a committee included the likes of Aristide Briand, Edouard Herriot, Leon Blum, Joseph Caillaux, Edvard Benes, Eleuterios Venizelos, Konrad Adenauer, Francesco Saverio Nitti, Ernest Mercier, Albert Einstein, Paul Claudel, Paul Valery, Thomas Mann, Guglielmo Ferrero, Josè Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno. The objective pursued by the pan-European movement was a union which was supposed to include the whole of Europe, with the exception of Great Britain, given its position at the centre of a world empire, and the Soviet Union, in consideration of its Euro-Asiatic nature and its totalitarian regime. The institutional nature of this European union was in reality rather vague, given that the

(4) See: S. PISTONE (edited by), *L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale*, Torino, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, 1975; CARL H. PEGG, *Evolution of the European Idea 1914-1932*, Chapel Hill (N.C.), The University of N.C. Press, 1983.

(5) RICHARD COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, *Pan-Europe*, Paris, PUF, 1988, and ID., *Ein Leben Für Europa. Meine Lebenserinnerungen*, Köln-Berlin, 1966.

terms “federation” and “confederation” were used indiscriminately and the participation of fascist Italy was not excluded. The historical importance of the actions performed by Coudenhove-Kalergy and his movement lies in the fact that they inspired the first government initiative in favour of European unity. This was constituted by the proposal presented by Briand on September 5th 1929 in front of the assembly of the Society of Nations in Geneva, which was then clarified in a memorandum presented by the French government on May 17th 1930 and elaborated by Alexis Léger (general secretary of Quai d’Orsay and better known by the name of Saint-John Perse, one of the great contemporary poets) (6). It was certainly a rather contradictory proposal, given that it spoke of a federal union that did not diminish the sovereignty of the participating nations. However, with its heartfelt plea to Europe to unite in order to survive, it gave an indication that in governmental spheres, awareness was increasing with regard to the seriousness of the crisis afflicting the European system of states. The initiative, which was boycotted by fascist Italy and by Great Britain, was finally left high and dry against the backdrop of the economic depression that began in October 1929 and following the crisis and collapse of the Republic of Weimar.

The 1930s saw gradual aggravation of the European crisis but at the same time the birth of further movements in favour of European unity. There are three examples highlighted here.

In Switzerland, in connection with the launch of the Briand Plan, a number of Europeanist initiatives began to emerge from the bottom up (7), particularly the Union Jeune Europe (launched in Geneva in 1930 by Simon Gauthier and Robert Guye), whose objec-

(6) Cfr.: FONDATION ARCHIVES EUROPÉENNES, *Le Plan Briand d’union fédérale européenne. Documents*, edited by Odile Keller and Lubor Jilek, Geneve, 1991; SALVATORE MINARDI, *Origini e vicende del progetto di unione europea di Briand*, Caltanissetta, Salvatore Sciascia Editore, 1994. It should be remembered that Briand agreed his initiative with German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann and that this convergence pre-empted that what would later occur between Schuman and Adenauer for the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. Unfortunately, Stresemann died at the beginning of October 1929 and soon afterwards the crisis of the Republic of Weimar began, which ultimately led to the advent of Hitler’s coming to power.

(7) Fr.: LUBOR JILEK, *L’esprit européen en Suisse de 1860 à 1940*, Cahiers d’histoire contemporaine, 1990.

tive was a European federation to be constructed through a constituent assembly. Despite being a short-lived movement, it proved to be the decisive step in the process which culminated in the foundation in Basel in June 1934 of the Swiss Europa-Union by Hermann Aeppli, Heinrich Schiess and Hans Bauer (who became president of the new alliance). This organisation, which exists to this day, would then go on to be one of the founding members of the UEF.

In Paris in 1927, the Comité d'Action pour une Union Economique et Douanière Européenne was set up, the most significant exponent of which was Gaston Riou (author of two books of immense value: *Europe ma patrie*, Paris, Valois, 1928, and *S'unir ou mourir*, Paris, Valois, 1929), who was one of the greatest influences on the Briand Plan and who would also become one of the founders of the UEF (8). That select group would also be joined by Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont, who together with Robert Aron, Armand Dandieu, Daniel Rops and Claude Chevalley, gave life in the 1930s to a movement known as Ordre Nouveau, whose main source of inspiration was Pierre Joseph Proudhon. Here, the formulation of integral federalism began to get underway, or rather a brand of federalism which would be implemented on a domestic as well as an international level, and which was intended to create connectivity of communities not only of a territorial nature but also of a professional and functional nature (9). Together with the institutionalist conception of the

(8) Cfr. JEAN-PIERRE GOUZY, *Les pionniers de l'Europe communautaire*, Lausanne, Centre de recherches européennes, 1968.

(9) Cfr. B. VOYENNE, *Le fédéralisme de P.J. Proudhon, Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste. Les sources, Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste. Les lignées proudhoniennes*, published in Paris-Nice, Presses d'Europe, 1973, 1996, 1981; AA.VV., *Le Fédéralisme et Alexandre Marc*, Lausanne, Centre du recherches européennes, 1974; A. MARC, *Europa e federalismo globale*, Firenze, Il Ventilabro, 1996; BERTRAND VAYSSIERE, *Alexandre Marc. Personalism in favour of Europe*, in "The Federalist", 2002, n. 2. From the magazine "L'ordre nouveau", published between 1933 and 1938, there exists an anastatic reprint produced by the Fondation Emile Chanoux, Aosta, Le Chatau, 1997. It should be remembered here that the current of integral federalism had pre-empted two ideas of great importance in the 1930s, namely obligatory community service and a guaranteed social minimum, which are part of the concept that would be developed within the context of the UEF on the specifics of the European socioeconomic model with respect to American capitalism and Soviet collectivism.

Hamiltonian school (10) (for which the constituent units of the federal system can only be institutions of a territorial nature: local and regional authorities, states, unions of states), the integral federalist conception would go on to form one of the fundamental components for the theoretic framework of the UEF.

In Great Britain, in the 1930s, a prestigious federalist school emerged which identified with great clarity an alternative to the system of national sovereign states (which was sliding towards unprecedented catastrophe (11)) in supranational federalism, inspired by the United States model. The main exponents of this school, whose most significant writings are indicated as follows: Lord Lothian (*Pacifism is not enough nor patriotism either*, London, Oxford University Press, 1935), Lionel Robbins (*Economic Planning and International Order*, London, Macmillan, 1937), Barbara Wootton (*Socialism and Federation*, London, Macmillan, 1941), K.C. Wheare (*What Federal Government is*, London, Macmillan, 1941), William Beveridge (*Peace by Federation?*, Federal Union, 1940), R.W.G. Mackay (*Federal Europe*, London, Michael Joseph, 1940). Also worthy of mention is the book by American journalist Clarence K. Streit (*Union now*, London and New York, Jonathan Cape and Harper, 1939), which proposed a federation between western democracies. The extensive federalist reflection of the time was translated into the foundation, in September 1938, of the Federal Union movement by Charles Kimber, Derek Rawnsley and Patrick Ransome, also one of the founding members of the UEF (12). The vast and far-reaching campaign carried out by Federal Union provided

(10) Alexander Hamilton is the founder of the theory of the federal state. See the collection of writings on the American federal constitution of ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON and JOHN JAY, *The Federalist*, New York, McLean, 1788 (Italian translation: *Il Federalista*, with an introductory essay by Lucio Levi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997). See also ALDO GAROSCI, *Il pensiero politico degli autori del "Federalist"*, Milan, Comunità, 1954.

(11) The pioneer of the British federal school was John Robert Seeley (particularly famous for his book *The Expansion of England*, 1883), who, in a conference on *The United States of Europe* in 1871, provided the most lucid contribution on the theme of European unity during the 19th century. This text is published in "*The Federalist*", 1989, n. 2.

(12) See RICHARD MAYNE and JOHN PINDER, *Federal Union: The Pioneers. A History of Federal Union*, London, Macmillan, 1990.

an essential basis for the second significant governmental initiative in favour of European unity to be launched in the period spanning the two world wars.

On June 16th 1940, at the moment in which France was about to capitulate under the German offensive, and two days before an appeal for resistance launched by De Gaulle from Radio London, Churchill made a revolutionary proposal: an Anglo-French union, including the institution of a common parliament, government, army and citizenship, around which the rest of Europe would be subsequently able to gather (13). This initiative, which the Federal Union provided with invaluable political support, was largely inspired by Jean Monnet (14), the future founder of the European Community, who was in London to organise Anglo-French collaboration, and who could boast de Gaulle among his allies in his influence on Churchill. The idea of union between France and Great Britain was adopted by the British Prime Minister mainly for tactical reasons, and thus to strengthen the resistance of the French forces against the Nazis, and was dropped by Paul Reynaud's French government (subsequently replaced by Marshal Petain's collaborationist government), unprepared to accept such a revolutionary idea. Its great importance and its novelty, however, lay in the fact that for the first time, a proposal for unification of a substantially federal nature, and therefore qualitatively distinct from the Briand Plan, had been put forward by a national government. This indicates that the historical crisis of the European system of states had reached such a depth that it put the question of European unity on the agenda of government policy, and the said governments really did find themselves ahead of a "federate or perish" alternative, as Clement Attlee, future British Foreign Minister, put it. From then on, this requirement, even in times which fluctuated between deep crisis and apparent yet precarious stability, would remain a permanent fixture in the European situation and would go on to constitute a decisive factor in the development of post-war European inte-

(13) See ANDREA BOSCO, *Federal Union and the Origins of the "Churchill Proposal"*. *The Federalist Debate in The United Kingdom from Munich to the Fall of France 1938-1940*, London, Lothian Foundation Press, 1992.

(14) Cfr. J. MONNET, *Mémoires*, Paris, Fayard, 1976.

gration. The progress of this process would decisively depend on the capability of autonomous centres of initiative (such as federalist groups and Monnet) to actively intervene in moments of extreme crisis, exploiting the critical situation of governments at such times with appropriate proposals and actions.

1.2. *The Resistance and European Unity.*

If the idea put forward on a governmental level by Churchill did not achieve any concrete success, and the British Prime Minister himself would subsequently return to the issue (particularly with the proposal of a “European Council” contained in his radio message on March 21st 1943) with far less radical proposals of a clearly confederal nature, the orientation towards a strong European unification policy was given fresh and exceptional impetus by the resistance movements. On a quantitative level, the crucial fact is that practically all parties and groups (both pre-existing and newly founded) active in the resistance movements, with the exception of the communists (then strictly subordinate to the Soviet leadership), took a stance in their manifestos in favour of a European federation. On a qualitative level, it should be underlined that in the different national resistance movements, and taking into account the most important and in-depth stances, certain fundamental observations which emerged on the necessity to surpass the absolute sovereignty of the nation states were amazingly similar, despite their substantial and reciprocal isolation until at least 1944 (15). They can be summarised into the following four arguments.

1. The central justification, proposed by nearly all authors, for

(15) On the debate on European unity in the Resistance, see: WALTER LIPGENS (edited by), *Documents on the History of European Integration Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945*, Berlin-New York, W. De Gruyter, 1985; ID. (edited by), *Documents on the History of European Union. Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939-1945*, Berlin-New York, W. De Gruyter, 1986; ID., *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-1945*, München, Oldensbourg, 1968; Hubert Halin, *L'Europe unie objectif majeur de la Résistance*, with a preface by P.H. Spaak, Paris-Bruxelles, Editions de l'URPE, 1967. See also *Lettere dei condannati a morte della Resistenza Europea*, edited by Piero Malvezzi and Giovanni Pirelli, foreword by Thomas Mann, Turin, Einaudi, 1995 (latest edition).

the proposals for European federation was founded on the identification of the real reason for exaggerated nationalism, Nazi totalitarianism and the implicit tendency to glorify the state in the historical crisis of the European system of nation states. In order to protect and develop the fundamental values of European civilisation, individual freedom, civil rights, the need for social justice, and in order to eliminate the very roots of totalitarian nationalism, it was essential to overcome absolute state sovereignty, which periodically plunged European people into periods of war and imposed a system of armed peace between one war and another which was increasingly incompatible with civil, economic and cultural development. Only within this framework, as many such arguments specified, would it be possible to offer a fair and effective solution to the “German problem”, thus creating a substantial limitation of German state sovereignty, accompanied by similar limitations regarding the other states.

2. As a central indication regarding the institutional mechanisms aimed at eliminating totalitarian nationalism and war, bearing in mind the experience of the right of veto of the League of Nations, all the arguments highlighted the necessity of a supranational federal government with real and effective powers. Not a renewal of a disjointed League of Nations, but only a single federal authority, instituted and controlled by the people by means of direct election, would be able to commonly manage those competences which could be effectively exerted only on a European scale: foreign policy, national security and economic policy. European centralism, however, was not foreseen, quite the opposite in fact, with other responsibilities being transferred from central national/state authorities to smaller regional and local authorities, whose autonomy would as such have to be guaranteed by a global federal structure founded on the subsidiarity principle — according to which that which can be better decided, implemented and controlled on a local, regional and member state level must be reserved for such institutions and not allocated to higher-level organisations.

3. In all documents, the economic need for a common European market was highlighted, capable of surpassing fragmentation into several small and closed economies which caused economic decadence

in Europe ahead of the emerging world powers and fed expansionist, hegemonic and fascist tendencies.

4. Finally in 1944, towards the conclusion of the 2nd world war, an additional motivation was formulated. Europe would only be able to preserve its specific form of civilisation (which also included a socio-economic model founded on the integration of economic competitiveness and social solidarity), its right to contribute to political decision making and also its ability for political mediation between the new world powers constituted by the USSR and the USA, between east and west, if it united on a federal basis. This latter subject, which could also lend itself to interpretations in terms of “power politics”, was only expressed sporadically and even then with some caution, since the exponents of the resistance movement were essentially aiming at overcoming “power politics” (and within this framework, the more advanced among them indicated that the gradual dismantling of colonialism was an obvious consequence of a European federation). Therefore, almost all the documentation produced highlighted in this sense the need for a peaceful political organisation on a world scale, within which a European federation would be positioned as a necessary condition and support. Indeed, it seemed evident that the creation of an effective peaceful global organisation needed to approach a system of world equilibrium, in whose context the most important asymmetries would be eliminated. In this regard, alongside the existing continental unions of the USA and the USSR, equally important unions would be created in regions such as the Far East and Europe, which were still fragmented and conveyors of war and disorder.

In the overall framework outlined above, new movements for European unity began to emerge and were supported by the work of individual personalities whose role in the foundation of the UEF after the war would be of fundamental importance.

One organisation that should be remembered above all is the Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE - the European Federalist Movement). The conception of the MFE was inspired by the “Manifesto di Ventotene”, which was elaborated by Altiero Spinelli (16), Er-

(16) See: A. SPINELLI, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio*, Bologna, Il Mulino,

nesto Rossi (17) and Eugenio Colorni (18) in the island-prison of Ventotene and distributed, starting in August 1941, among the resistance movements first in Italy and then throughout Europe. From that moment on, continuous activities began to develop, and from May 1943 the movement was available to communicate through the underground periodical “L’Unità Europea” (19), largely the fruit of the hard work carried out by the future general secretary of the UEF, Guglielmo Usellini. The MFE, which was officially founded during the course of a clandestine meeting held in Milan on the 27th and 28th August 1943 at the home of Mario Alberto Rollier, actively participated in armed resistance (which in Italy began after September 8th 1943), and was one of the main promoters of supranational federalist contacts which took place during the 2nd world war (20).

Bearing in mind the central role that it would play in the life-span of the UEF, it is worth remembering here the two fundamental

1992; ID., *Diario Europeo, 1948-1969, 1970-1976, 1976-1986*, edited by Edmondo Paolini, 3 voll., Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989-1991-1992; EDMONDO PAOLINI, *Altiero Spinelli. Appunti per una biografia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; ID., *Altiero Spinelli. Dalla lotta antifascista alla battaglia per la federazione europea 1920-1948: documenti e testimonianze*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996; LUCIO LEVI (edited by), *Altiero Spinelli and Federalism in Europe and in the World*, Milano, F. Angeli, 1990; JOHN PINDER (edited by), *Altiero Spinelli and the British Federalists*, London, Federal Trust, 1998; S. PISTONE, *Altiero Spinelli and European Unification*, in *U.E.F. Newsletter*, 2007, n. 40; PIERO S. GRAGLIA, *Altiero Spinelli*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008.

(17) Cfr.: GIORGIO ARMANI, *Ernesto Rossi, un democratico ribelle*, Parma, Guanda, 1973; GIULIO FIORI, *Una storia italiana. Vita di Ernesto Rossi*, Einaudi, Turin, 1997; LORENZO STRIK LIEVERS (edited by), *Ernesto Rossi. Economista, federalista, radicale*, Venezia, Marsilio, 2001; ANTONELLA BRAGA, *Un federalista giacobino. Ernesto Rossi pioniere degli Stati Uniti d’Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007.

(18) Cfr. LEO SOLARI, *Eugenio Colorni. Ieri e sempre*, Venezia, Marsilio, 1980.

(19) Of “L’Unità Europea” (1943-1954) today, an anastatic reprint exists, edited by Sergio Pistone, produced by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont, Turin, Scaravaglio, 2000. It is useful to remember that the September 1943 edition (when armed resistance began in Italy) contained an appeal for “War Against Nazism”, emphasising that the fight was against the Nazis rather than the Germans as such.

(20) Cfr.: L. LEVI and S. PISTONE (edited by), *Trent’anni di vita del Movimento Federalista Europeo*, Milano, F. Angeli, 1973; C.F. DELZELL, *The European Federalist Movement in Italy: first Phase 1918-1947*, in “*The Journal of Modern History*”, Chicago, 1960, XXXII; CINZIA ROGNONI VERCELLI, *Mario Alberto Rollier, Un valdese federalista*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1991.

guiding principles that the MFE and in particular Spinelli defined during the course of the Second World War and which would consistently form the foundations of its actions.

The first guiding principle consisted of an argument according to which European federal unification — intended as a first stage on the road to world unification — had become in the 20th century the supreme objective of the political struggle in the sense that it was the essential condition required in order to achieve peace, and therefore, the development of freedom of democracy and social justice. This idea had already emerged in 1918 with the reflections of Luigi Einaudi (who, during the Resistance would later forge a collaborative relationship with the MFE, and who would become President of the Italian Republic after the war (21)), and was further developed in the analyses offered by the British federalist school, and was even present in many of the Europeanist positions adopted by the Resistance. The MFE, however, managed to translate it into an extremely rigorous concept founded on the concept of the historical crisis of the nation states.

This expression is intended to highlight the contradiction between, on the one hand, growing interdependence over and above the nation states, which was generated by the advanced stage of the industrial revolution, and required the creation of state entities of continental dimensions, and eventually the political unification of the human race, and on the other hand, the dimensions historically surpassed of the national European states. This contradiction is seen as the profound root of the world wars, which represent an attempt to provide a hegemonic and imperialist solution to the problem of the decadence of the nation states, and the root of racist totalitarianism which is an indispensable tool for a policy of exasperated expansionism and of permanent dominion of one nation over others. The only valid alternative to totalitarian imperialism is federalism, which is the only institutional system capable of implementing a democratic and pacific government of interdependence. Federalism therefore was conceived as the radical overcoming of internationalism, or rather the tendency to see the elim-

(21) Cfr. LUIGI EINAUDI, *La guerra e l'unità europea*, edited by Giovanni Vigo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986 and UMBERTO MORELLI, *Contro il mito dello Stato sovrano. Luigi Einaudi e l'unità europea*, Milano, F. Angeli, 1990.

ination of violence on international level and, therefore, the international collaboration and finally the pacific unification of nations as a virtually automatic consequence of the transformation of the states in a liberal, or social-Christian, or democratic or socialist sense. The overcoming of the internationalist point of view led to the identification — which constituted the longest-lasting and most innovative message conveyed by the Manifesto di Ventotene — of a new dividing line between the forces of progress and those of conservation. It was no longer identified according to the traditional parameters of greater or lesser extents of freedom, democracy or social justice to be achieved within the framework of a nation state, but with a dividing line between the defenders of the absolute sovereignty of the nation state and the supporters of overcoming such sovereignty through federation (22).

The second guiding principle of the MFE specifically regarded strategy, and was based on the conviction that national democratic governments are simultaneously both instruments and obstacles with respect to European unification (23). They are instruments in the sense

(22) It should be underlined that, apart from the central thesis according to which only by constructing a European federation would it be possible to implement fully and permanently the fundamental values indicated by the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies, the Ventotene Manifesto acknowledged the fundamental theses of Carlo Rosselli's liberal socialism, oriented towards the search for synthesis between the liberal-democratic system, which in the United States had found its most important expression, and the need for solidarity and social justice highlighted by various strains of socialism. In essence, it is maintained that, in order to allow general interest to prevail rather than the unleashing of corporative interests, and to therefore resist the tendency on the part of the masses to seek apparent stability in totalitarianism, the highroad consists of the integration of a more advanced liberal-democratic regime (above all as far as public participation and local authorities are concerned) with one characterised by a mixed economy. This implies attributing to the public sector the economic functions necessary for the creation of an *equality of opportunities* for all (socialisation of monopolies, redistribution of land ownership, the creation of an education system that focuses on ability rather than wealth, obligatory social insurance etc.), granting and promoting for the rest the development of free competition and the spirit of individual initiative. The idea developed by the Ordre Nouveau of guaranteed social minimum was therefore present in the Ventotene Manifesto and it would be developed further together with obligatory community service by ERNESTO ROSSI in *Abolire la miseria*, Milano, La Fiaccola, 1946. With regard to liberal socialism, see CARLO ROSSELLI, *Socialismo liberale* (vol. I of *Opere scelte*), Turin, Einaudi, 1973.

(23) Cfr. A. SPINELLI, *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, edited by S. Pistone, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989 and S. PISTONE, *Spinelli and the Strategy for the United*

that a federation can only be achieved following freely taken decisions by democratic governments, who are, on the other hand, driven towards a policy of international cooperation by the historical crisis of the national states, leading to the “unite or perish” alternative. At the same time, national governments are obstacles because they are the holders of national power, and even within the framework of democratic systems, they are objectively driven — in conformance with the law of self-preservation of power already clarified by Machiavelli — to impede the irreversible transfer of a part of national sovereignty to supranational organisations, and they structurally tend towards solutions of a confederal nature.

The existence of this structurally contradictory attitude of national democratic governments ahead of the problem of European unification gives rise to three fundamental implications for the federalist struggle. In the first place, the existence of a federalist political force independent of governments and national political parties is essential, one which is able to exploit the contradictions in which governments are bound to fall due to the irreversible crisis of the nation states (and the inadequate forms of international cooperation with which they will try to combat such a crisis), and therefore able to democratically force them to do what they are unable to do spontaneously. Secondly, the federalist force must assume the form of a movement and not one of a party in competition with others for power, because the objective of a European federation can be pursued by a transversal grouping with respect to the political parties and the socio-economic forces that identify themselves in a democratic regime, and not by groupings founded on the traditional dichotomy between pro-

States of Europe, in BRENT F. NELSEN and ALEXANDER STUBB (eds), *The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Boulder/London, Rienner Publishers, 2003. NORBERTO BOBBIO — in the essay *Il federalismo nel dibattito politico e culturale della Resistenza*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale* cit. — notes that Spinelli was the first European federalist to organically connect the theory of the necessity for European unity with the concept of the political organisation and the necessary strategy to be able to effectively pursue such an objective. It should be emphasised that the definition of the governments or nation states as instruments and obstacles would be explicitly formulated after the war, but the concept was already clearly present in the strategic reflections of wartime.

gress and conservation. The federalist force must naturally have a supranational structure, so that it is able to pursue a unitary commitment of federalists from different countries and it must also be able to mobilise public opinion, even though it will not participate in elections. Thirdly, the construction of a genuine European federation can only be achieved by means of a constituent democratic process. It is necessary, as such, that the task of defining the institutions of European unity, to be subjected to the approval of the people and their democratic representations, is entrusted to an entity of a parliamentary nature, making majority decisions in public sittings, and not to national diplomacies making unanimous decisions in secret. In the former case, the unitary will of the European citizens can prevail, fed by the concrete experience of the impotency of the nation states ahead of crucial issues. In the latter, nationalistic resistance is destined to prevail and to prevent nations from going beyond the inadequate solutions of confederation (24).

It should be observed that the idea of a European constituent assembly was not new. It had already been formulated, however vaguely, by Giuseppe Mazzini. We have seen that it had been proposed with greater clarity by the Swiss federalists in the 1930s and we must also remember that in 1935 the leader of the anti-fascist movement *Giustizia e Libertà* (Justice and Liberty), Carlo Rosselli, indicated (in his article entitled *Europeanism or Fascism*) the concept of a United States of Europe and a European constituent assembly as the

(24) The connection between theory and strategy proposed by Spinelli is also a product of some ideas learned during his communist political militancy, which preceded his conversion to federalism. In particular, the dialectic approach present in the *Manifesto di Ventotene* should be highlighted, clearly inspired by the model of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, even if its ideological orientation is obviously different. Of the nation states, one can see the progressive function carried out in a certain historical period (like capitalism for Marx), the historical crisis due to them being surpassed by production methods, the contradictions that emerge in the crisis (hegemonic imperialism and the irreconcilability between absolute national sovereignty and progress in a liberal, democratic and social sense), the possibility on the part of a political revolutionary actor to exploit these contradictions in order to implement supranational federalism. Cfr. L. LEVI, *Altiero Spinelli, fondatore del movimento per l'unità europea*, an appendix of A. SPINELLI and E. ROSSI, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, Milan, Mondadori, 2006.

fundamental cornerstones of the struggle against nazi-fascism (25). That said, it must be emphasised that it was the MFE who outlined the idea of a European constituent assembly in an extremely rigorous theoretical and strategic argument, and it would become the movement's fundamental contribution to the political activities of the UEF.

Let us come to the other most significant manifestations of European federalism within the Resistance movement.

In the French Resistance movement (26), the most important supporter of European federalism was Henri Frenay, who would go on to become the president of the UEF. Here, we must remember in particular the words that he wrote in the newspaper "Combat" in Algiers on December 12th 1943: "The men of the French Resistance reach out to those of the other nations. With them, they want to rebuild their own country and then Europe in the same spirit as in 1789, now applied to the other nations: liberty, equality and fraternity." Frenay's ideas were also shared by writer Albert Camus, as well as Alexandre Marc, René Courtin, Maurice Rolland and Francis Gérard (future president of the executive committee of the Universal Movement for World Federation). The European federalism of the French Resistance was also expressed in the constitution of the Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne, which took place in Lyon in 1944 thanks to the initiative of the Franc-Tireur resistance movement. The committee, in June of the same year, distributed a document which was in substantial agreement with the Manifesto di Ventotene, especially with regard to the position which establishes the priority of the struggle for European federation with respect to the struggle for freedom, democracy and socialism within individual states.

(25) Cfr. PIERO GRAGLIA, *Unità europea e federalismo. Da "Giustizia e Libertà" ad Altiero Spinelli*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996. It should be remembered that in 1938, the Jeune Europe movement published in Brussels a small volume by H. STARK, *Europe d'Abord*, in which the European constituent assembly is claimed to be the only adequate tool for implementing a European federation.

(26) See J.P. GOUZY, *op. cit.*. Jacques Maritain's book, *De la Justice Politique* (Paris, 1940) should also be remembered, in which, apart from the necessity of European federation, the argument that this was the only way to resolve the German problem was presented. The most important French neoscholastic theologian, who from his admiration of Maurras converted to European federalism, introduced in this work one of the most characteristic positions present in the French resistance programmes.

In the Dutch Resistance (27), the most significant federalist stance was that contained in the manuscript *Die Wiedergeburt Europas*, which appeared in 1944 thanks to the work of an economist-manager of Prussian origin Hans-Dieter Salinger, who used the pseudonym Hades. The idea of rebuilding Europe based on regional groupings in turn united within the structure of a European framework, designed to permanently resolve the problem of German nationalism, should be remembered in particular. And it should also be remembered that immediately after the war, in the office of Salinger, the *Europaesche Actie* was founded, which was to become one of the constituent groups of the future UEF.

As far as the German Resistance (28) is concerned, one of the most important figures to highlight is Karl Friedrich Goerdeler, the ex-mayor of Leipzig, who would have become Chancellor if the assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20th 1944 had been successful. He declared his position in favour of European federation on more than one occasion, and was hung by the Nazis in February 1945. Others who should be remembered are brother and sister Hans and Sophie Scholl, who founded with their professor Kurt Huber the clandestine group *Die Weisse Rose*. Before being arrested and beheaded by the Nazis in 1943, they launched in one of their manifestos an appeal for the constitution of a federal Germany within a federal Europe in order to eradicate Prussian militarism. It should also be remembered that one of the German victims from the concentration-camp scenario was Eugen Kogon, who would play a pivotal role in the post-war constitution of the UEF in Germany. He would go on to be the first president of the German Europa Union and president of the central committee of the UEF.

With regard to the Polish Resistance, M. Joseph Retinger is cer-

(27) See HENRI BRUGMANS, *L'idée européenne 1920-1970*, Bruges, De Tempel, 1970.

(28) See: HANS ROTHFELS, *Die Deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler*, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 1958, English translation, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, London, O. Wolff, 1961; KLAUS VOIGT, *Friedenssicherung und europäische Einigung - Ideen des deutschen Exils 1939-1945*, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 1988. W. LIPGENS, *L'idea dell'unità europea nella Resistenza in Germania e in Francia*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *L'idea dell'unità europea dalla prima alla seconda Guerra mondiale*, cit.

tainly worthy of mention, and was the principal collaborator of the head of the Polish government in exile in London, General Sikorski. Retinger had close relations with Churchill and after war he became the general secretary of the European League of Economic Cooperation and the first secretary of the European Movement (29).

As I mentioned previously, the first supernational contacts between federalists were established within the framework of the Resistance. There were two initiatives of particular importance. The first was the organisation of a series of meetings in Geneva between March and July of 1944 on the part of Spinelli and Rossi, which were attended by representatives of the resistance movements of Denmark, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. The meetings were held at the home of Willem A. Visser't Hooft, general secretary of the World Council of Churches and intermediary between the Dutch Resistance and the government in exile in London. Among the participants we should highlight, other than Spinelli, Rossi and Visser't Hooft, Jean Marie Soutou and Jean Laloï from France Libre, Switzerland's François Bondy, and Germans Hanna Bertholet and Hilda Monte. With opposition from only the Danish and Norwegian representatives, a European Project for the Declaration of Resistance was approved, containing the most significant points of the Ventotene Manifesto (30). After the Geneva Declaration, the second important supernational initiative during the second world war was promoted by the Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne. In Paris, from March 22nd-25th 1945, with the invaluable collaboration of Spinelli and his wife Ursula Hirschmann, the committee organised an International Federal Conference (31). It was attended by, among

(29) Cfr. W. LIPGENS, *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol. II, cit. p. 362 and, for a general overview, RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Westport (Conn.), Greenwood, 1970.

(30) The declaration is published in *L'Europe de demain*, edited by Centre d'Action pour la Fédération Européenne (in substance by Ernesto Rossi), Neuchâtel, Editions de la Bacconnière, 1945); W. LIPGENS (edited by), *45 Jahre Ringen um Europäische Verfassung. Dokumente 1939-1984. Von den Schriften der Widerstandsbewegung bis zum Vertragsentwurf des Europäischen Parlaments*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1986. ID., *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol. II, cit..

(31) Cfr. A. SPINELLI, *La rivoluzione federalista. Scritti 1944-1947*, a cura di Piero Graglia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996.

others, Albert Camus, Jacques Baumel, Francis Gérard, George Orwell, Lewis Mumford, Emmanuel Mounier, André Philip, André Ferrat, Robert Verdier, and labour Member of Parliament John Hind. The Paris Conference approved a resolution which echoed the fundamental arguments put forward by the Manifesto di Ventotene and the Declaration of Geneva. It was held that European federation was the first step on the road to world federation, and that only in the framework of a European federation it would be possible to resolve the German question in the spirit of European Resistance, which had to oppose the policy of antagonistic blocs. It was therefore stated that “the European Federation will have to possess:

1. A government answerable not to the governments of the various member states, but to the citizens themselves, upon whom, within the limitations of its powers, it must be able to exercise immediate jurisdiction and from whom it must directly obtain the resources for its own budget.

2. Armed forces responding to the orders of the aforementioned government and excluding any other national army.

3. A supreme court which will deliberate on all questions relating to the interpretation of the federal constitution and which will regulate any subsequent disputes between member states or between the member states and the federation”.

The Comité International pour la Fédération Européenne (CIFE) was also constituted, proposing to establish permanent links with parties, movements and organisations of the various countries in favour of a European federation, to organise with them a federalist European congress, to strive to obtain the formation of federalist majorities in the sovereign national assemblies of the democratic European states and to force their governments to proceed towards the constitution of federal European institutions.

The meetings in Geneva and Paris laid the foundations for the constitution of the UEF.

1.3. *The foundation of the UEF.*

The hope that had emerged within the Resistance movement

that the end of the war would bring immediate action to begin the process of European political union was soon dashed. The national European states, despite having been formally reconstituted (with the exception of Germany) lost any real autonomy they had and a policy of European unification was only able to begin following pressure from the United States, limited to western Europe. In this context, the parties put aside the Europeanist positions adopted during the struggle for liberation, and it was only the federalists who kept alive the idea of European unity, which had emerged within the Resistance movement, until conditions became more favourable. This confirmed the validity of the argument according to which the fight for European federation required the existence of a political force independent of parties and governments and whose only objective was European unification.

The action of the federalists, despite being in an extremely difficult situation, but in which it was finally possible to operate in the open, at least in western Europe, was uninterrupted. The problem, posed very clearly by the CIFE, of the constitution of a unitary organisation of supporters of European federation was thus confronted with determination. The process which led to the creation of the UEF developed during the course of 1946 in a number of stages.

On May 27th 1946, fourteen months after the federalist conference in Paris, a meeting was held in Basel between Hans Bauer, president of the Swiss EU, the French journalist (and member of the same association) Léon van Vassenhove and Umberto Campagnolo, secretary of the provisional national committee of the MFE. During the meeting, an agreement was signed which aimed at the constitution of an international federalist movement designed to unify the principles and coordinate the actions of affiliate members. To such an end, it was decided to organise for the following September in Switzerland a meeting of federalist groups from various European countries.

It was not possible to contact all the federalist organisations which existed in Europe at the time, and those federalists living in Germany and Austria, although they received the invitation, did not obtain the visa required to enter Switzerland. However, from September 15th-22nd 1946 the federalist conference planned in Basel united (for the first two days in Berne, and then in Hertenstein on the shores

of Lake Lucerne) seventy-eight militant federalists from fourteen countries (32). The meeting was dominated by representatives of the Swiss EU (particularly Bauer, Vassenhove, Ernst von Schenck, François Bondy and Adolf Gasser) and the Dutch *Europaesche Actie* (which would later change its name to *Beweging van Europese Federalisten*), particularly the future president of the UEF Henry Brugmans, Salinger, Hans R. Nord and Alfred Mozer. Alongside them were representatives of the Belgian Union Fédérale, the MFE and the CIFE, as well as two Americans, two Greeks, an Austrian, a Hungarian, a Pole, a Spaniard and five Germans who lived in Switzerland.

On September 21st, a twelve-point resolution was unanimously approved and became known as the “The Hertenstein Programme”, subsequently adopted by all the federalist organisations who joined the UEF and is still recognised as one of its fundamental documents. The following arguments contained in the document are outlined here:

— a European Union built on federal foundations — and part of the UN, as one of its regional bodies in accordance with art. 52 — would represent the first step along the road to a real world union of peoples;

— a European Union, open to all European peoples, was not aimed against anyone, and renounced any form of “power politics”,

(32) For the reconstruction of the birth of the UEF and its early years of activity, see: W. LIPGENS, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950. I. Teil: 1945-1947*, Stuttgart, Klett, 1977, (English translation, *A History of European Integration. I, 1945-1947. The Formation of the European Unity Movement*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982); W. LIPGENS-WILFRIED LOTH (Eds), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol. 3, *The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries, 1945-1950*, vol. 4, *Transnational Organisations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950*, Berlin-New York, de Gruyter, 1988, 1991; S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1945-1954*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1992 (particularly the text written by Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli dedicated specifically to the UEF); JEAN-PIERRE GOUZY, *The Saga of the European Federalists during and after the Second World War*, in *The Federalist*, 2004, n. 1; CHRISTOPHE RÉVEILLARD, *Les premières tentatives de construction d'une Europe fédérale. Des projet de la Résistance au traité de C.E.D.*, Paris, François-xavier de Giubert, 2001. The most comprehensive work which has appeared so far is that by BERTRAND VAYSSIERE, *Vers une Europe fédérale. Les espoirs et les actions fédéralistes au sortir de la seconde guerre mondiale*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2006.

but refused to be an instrument for any foreign power to take advantage of;

— the members of the European Union would transfer a part of their economic, political and military sovereignty to the federation instituted in order to peacefully resolve the contrasts which could rise between them and create a common reconstruction and economic, social and cultural collaboration;

— the European Union would adopt a Declaration of Civil Rights for the European citizens, and would be based on respect for the man and its responsibilities towards the various communities to which he belongs.

The Hertenstein Programme reflected a situation in which division into opposing blocs had not yet been clearly established and it was still possible to believe in a lasting alliance between the USSR and the USA, as well as their willingness to accept European autonomy. A united and neutral Europe (including central and eastern European states), acting as a mediator between capitalism and communism was seen as precisely the kind of political platform that could counter the lowering of the “iron curtain”. The federalists who gathered in Hertenstein were convinced of this to such an extent that when on September 20th 1946 they learned of Churchill’s speech given the day before in Zurich they rejected with a large majority the proposal put forward by a number of participants to send him a telegram expressing their solidarity. This speech, despite having a clearly confederal orientation, did contain a number of points of great interest. It acknowledged that the unification of Europe could only begin within a sphere of western influence and maintained that this was the only valid response to the challenge represented by Soviet totalitarianism. Furthermore, it saw reconciliation between France and Germany as an essential condition for a serious European unification policy (33).

(33) Cfr. AVI SHLAIM, *Britain and the Origins of European Unity 1940-1951*, University of Reading, 1978. See also THOMAS JANSEN-DIETER MAHNCKE (edited by), *Persönlichkeiten der Europäischen Integration*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1981, and ROBERTO DUCCI & BINO OLIVI, *L’Europa incompiuta*, Padova, Cedam 1970; CLAUDIO GIULIO ANTA (a cura di), *Winston Churchill. L’idea dell’Europa unita. Scritti e discorsi*, Milano, Bruno Modadori Editore, 2007, which gathers Churchill’s main speeches on European Unity.

The Hertenstein federalists greatly appreciated this latter indication, so much so that at the meeting the Germans had been invited to participate on the same level as the other Europeans. Above all, the conference also approved a resolution according to which the German problem could only be resolved with the admission of Germany to a European federation, and German economic reconstruction would have to be achieved within a context of European reconstruction. On the other hand, a plan to make western Europe an anti-Soviet bloc was unanimously rejected, as it was in radical contrast to the idea of Europe as a third force.

Once agreement on fundamental principles had been reached, the Hertenstein conference confronted the problem of organising the various federalist groups into a single movement. To such an end, a provisional structure called *Aktion Europa-Union* was created, an international movement for the unification of Europe and the world. The provisional executive was composed of Brugmans as president, Mrs Valpière (CIFE), baron Allard (of the Belgian Union Fédérale), Anna Siemsen (for Germany) and Heinrich Schiess (for Switzerland).

While the activities of the *Aktion Europa-Union* were getting underway, an initiative aimed at unifying the various federalist groups was activated, independently from the group that had organised the Hertenstein meeting, by the British Federal Union under the guidance of Miss Frances L. Josephy. In Luxembourg from October 13th to 16th 1946, there was a gathering of seventy-five delegates representing the federalist groups of twelve countries, including some members of the Commonwealth. The Swiss EU and the Dutch *Europeesche Aktie* were not present because the organisers were unable to contact them. There were numerous French groups present, including the *Fédération*, founded straight after the liberation of the country (and largely the heir of the integral federalism of the *Ordre Nouveau*), and having as its principal founders Jacques Bassot, André Voisin, Jean Bareth (future secretary general of the Council of European Municipalities) and Max Richard. Various federalist groups (including the MFE) represented Italy and Belgium. Federal Union, the main organiser of the meeting, included a great number of groups in favour of worldwide federalism from both European countries and countries from other

continents. Therefore, despite a common patrimony of federalist convictions, a number of divergences emerged with regard to which objectives should be given top priority.

It was commonly supposed that the UN, not undermining the sovereignty of the states and maintaining the right of veto of the Security Council's permanent members, was not capable of ensuring peace. It was also a common conviction that only a European federation would be able to keep the peace in Europe, and that only a world federation would be able to prevent war between the blocs. The disagreements regarded the priority that these two objectives should be given. There were those who considered European federation to be the first vital step towards world federation, given that neither the USA nor the USSR were willing to transfer a part of their sovereignty to a world government. Then, there were those who saw an initial European federation as an obstacle, given that the USSR was hostile to such an idea and would therefore aggravate international relations. The confrontation of the two positions, which dominated the agenda of the conference, concluded with a compromise which marked another stage in the creation of the UEF. Indeed, the creation of the following two organisations was decided:

— The Movement for World Federal Government, open to all organisations in favour of a world government, with its headquarters provisionally located in New York;

— The Conseil des Fédéralistes Européens, composed of various European federalist groups, the most important of which was the Fédération, with its headquarters in Paris.

In Luxembourg it was also decided to invite the Aktion Europa-Union to participate in a meeting with the Conseil and to ultimately join it. The meeting took place in Basel on December 9th 1946 and it was attended by the executive and a number of the members of the central committee of the Aktion Europa-Union, Miss Josephy for the Federal Union, Alexandre Marc, representing all French federalist movements and Umberto Campagnolo for the MFE. This was the first time that all the most important federalist organisations had gathered to discuss the operations required to form a single federalist organisation. A further step forward was taken when it was decided to create a

single secretariat, with its headquarters in Geneva, which was entrusted to Marc.

The decisive meeting for the creation of the UEF was held in Paris on December 15th 1946 at the headquarters of the Fédération in rue Auber. The meeting was attended by Brugmans on behalf of Europeesche Actie, Miss Josephy for Federal Union, Allard, for the Belgian Union Fédérale, Campagnolo for the MFE, Henry Koch, for Luxembourg's Union Fédérale, Schiess for the Swiss EU. There were six French associations present: Fédération (Voisin), CIFE (F. Gerard), La République Moderne (Claude-Marcel Hitte), Union Economique et Fédérale Européenne (Riou) (which derived from the Union Economique et Douanière Européenne founded in 1927), Comité pour les Etats Unis du Monde (Jean Larmeroux) and Union Fédérale Mondiale (M. Belley). All the principal federalist associations were present, and therefore the meeting, chaired by Voisin, officially proclaimed the foundation of the UEF, appointing Brugmans as provisional president, confirming Marc as general secretary and agreeing to bring the secretariat's head office to Paris. Moreover, it was also decided to summon an extended central committee to Amsterdam the following April in order to discuss the organisation's programme and organisational structure, as well as to adopt a resolution on the question of Germany, which was the main worry, especially for the French. The meeting also intended to allow the advanced proposals and solutions to be approved by a regular congress which would be held in Switzerland in August 1947. The next day, the city of Paris, represented by the head of the city council, Henri Vergnolle, offered the new-born UEF a reception at the Hotel de Ville.

In the end, the unitary organisation of European federalists aspired to during the Resistance had been finally created. Various components converged in this organisation, the most important of which were constituted by institutional federalism and by integral federalism, the latter of which was present in various families. There were however a number of fundamental cornerstones: the choice of federalism over confederalism, the European federation as a contribution to the construction of world peace and thus world unification (the UEF adapted as its motto "A United Europe in a United World"), Euro-

pean unification as an invaluable framework within which the German question could be resolved. From such a starting point, a strategy for the fight for European federation had to be outlined, one which identified both the tools required to build it, and the geopolitical framework within which it would be possible to effectively make and implement policy.

II

THE ACTION OF THE UEF UP UNTIL THE FALL OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY (1947-1954)

SUMMARY: 2.1. The beginning of the cold war and the congress of Montreux. —
2.2. From the Hague Congress to the Council of Europe. — 2.3. From the
European Defence Community to the European Political Community.

2.1. *The beginning of the cold war and the congress of Montreux*

The political context in which the action of the UEF began was characterised by the beginning of the cold war, the formation of a hegemonic western bloc by the USA set against an eastern hegemonic bloc formed by the USSR, and the development of American policy in favour of European unification (1). We must begin with a description of this context in order to follow the evolution of the UEF.

The starting point of the cold war was the Truman Doctrine of March 12th 1947. With it, the American president launched a programme of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, which at the same time implied a commitment on the part of the USA to limit any extension of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence into Europe or anywhere else in the world. With this decision, the Americans took into their own hands the task of containing the strongest power in continental Europe, a task which had previously been performed, since the end of the 17th century, by Great Britain. This represented a historical shift in the balance of power, and reflected the irreversible decline of Great Britain's status as a world power and the establish-

(1) Cfr. MAX BELOFF, *The United States and the Unity of Europe*, London, Faber and Faber, 1963.

ment of a clearly bipolar structure in the world system of states. The Truman Doctrine gave rise to the formation, within the context of increasing tension between East and West, of a political-military western bloc, which was institutionalised with the Treaty of Washington, constituting the Atlantic Alliance of April 4th 1949. An intermediate step along this road was represented by the Brussels Treaty of March 17th 1948 which, giving life to a Western Union (Western European Union since 1955), extended to the Benelux countries the military alliance signed in Dunkerque on March 4th 1947 between France and Great Britain. Another crucial step was the decision to create a state in those areas of Germany occupied by the western allies.

If the formation of the western bloc was a symmetrical reaction to that of the east, the way the two superpowers structured their respective blocs was very different. The totalitarian nature of the USSR brought with it an extremely strict organisation of its own hegemony. It excluded therefore any possibility for its satellite countries to constitute between them within the bloc any form of unity which could lead to the establishing of more balanced relations with the main power. In this regard, the blocking of the Tito-Dimitrov's project for a Balkan federation and the subsequent breaking of relations with the Yugoslav regime (2) were particularly significant. American hegemony was, on the other hand, not only organised in a less rigid fashion, but also included the development of unity between western European countries and therefore the possibility for the future recovery of lost autonomy. In this regard, the Marshall Plan, launched on June 5th 1947, was decisive, and set collaboration between European countries as a condition for the provision of crucial economic aid for their reconstruction. Before looking at the influence of this external push on the beginning of the European unification process, it is useful to clarify the underlying reasons behind the USA's choices.

Such a strategy was undoubtedly heavily influenced by purely economic reasons. The Americans, in essence, were convinced that only by overcoming artificial national economic barriers and by creat-

(2) Cfr. W. LIPGENS, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik*, cit., pp. 444-460. Also GEORGE CIORĂNESCU, *L'Europe unie. De l'idée à la fondation*, Bucarest, Paideia, 2005.

ing an economic system of continental dimensions could a long-lasting economic recovery in western Europe be possible, a recovery which would be likely to result in the absorption of American production. In a context in which the world capitalist market had significantly shrunk following the formation of an imposing bloc of states with collectivist (and therefore, substantially closed) economies, strong economic development in western Europe appeared to be of great importance. It justified short-term economic sacrifices, linked to aid policy, in view of the certain economic advantages that would occur in the medium and long term (3). The political motivations of the Marshall Plan, however, were far more decisive, without which it would not have been possible for the American political class to overcome the resistance on the part of taxpayers to the acceptance of such sacrifices. The decision to push for European unity, that is to say, constituted a fundamental aspect of the global containment strategy towards the Soviet bloc decided with the Truman Doctrine (4).

On the one hand, economic development linked to the reconstruction of western Europe in unitary terms, lessening social conflict, would consolidate liberal-democratic regimes and consequently weaken the power of communist parties and the influence of the Soviet

(3) The Marshall Plan was in line with the liberalist strategy adopted by the Americans towards the end of the war, and which was expressed in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, as well as in the commercial and tariff agreements of the GATT in 1947. In effect, having taken over from Great Britain as the strongest nation in the industrialised world, the US government abandoned its traditional protectionist policies and turned towards free trade (as did Great Britain during its economic and political supremacy), where it saw, after its experience of 1929, a guaranteed expansion of its enormous productive capabilities. The Marshall Plan, on the other hand, represented a corrective with respect to pure free trade, given that it constituted a regional policy on an international scale, aimed at favouring, with active economic intervention (along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority), the development of western Europe. Cf. David W. ELLWOOD, *Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction 1945-1955*, London-New York, Longman, 1992.

(4) The fact that the aid foreseen by the Marshall Plan was offered to the whole of Europe, including the USSR, appears on the surface to be in contrast with the view that this plan was an instrument of the containment policy directed towards communism. In actual fact, the American proposal, which the USSR could not accept, either for itself or for its satellite states, as would have led to interference in its internal development, also served to show the USSR in a bad light.

Union. On the other hand, a united and economically prosperous western Europe would be able to provide a decisive contribution to the defence of the western bloc, proportionately diminishing America's military commitments in the region which, among other things, in the long term, would exert a negative influence on the evolution of the liberal-democratic regime in the United States. In the American political class most faithful to the principles of the American constitution, it was relatively common knowledge that the abandoning, imposed by the new worldwide climate, of isolationist policy and the related creation of an imposing military force would inevitably push in an authoritarian and centralist direction. At that time, America took the problem of contrasting such tendencies very seriously, limiting as much as possible any increase in worldwide commitments without, however, putting security at risk. The subsequent formation of a strong American imperial mentality, due to the incapability of Europe to fully accept its responsibilities on a world scale, would decidedly reduce the political weight of this preoccupation (5).

Having clarified this, it is a fact that the American initiative was the decisive factor in the activation of the European integration process. The governments of western Europe found themselves in an extremely critical situation, characterised by a growing fear of Soviet expansionism, a serious socioeconomic crisis, and by political difficulties deriving from the collapse, due to the break out of the cold war, of the antifascist coalitions which included communist parties. In a similar context, the Marshall Plan conditions linking aid to the beginning of collaboration between European states found a swift response in the creation, through the Paris Treaty of April 16th 1948, of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. The OEEC was (like the Brussels Pact) a purely intergovernmental organisation partly due to the restrictive presence of Great Britain, which was against even the smallest limitation of its national sovereignty, and thus rigidly imposed the principle of unanimous decision making. Nevertheless, as well as giving rise to the recovery of national economies, the OEEC created a cooperative framework in which the first steps towards European

(5) Cfr. S. PISTONE, *Peace as a Condition of Democracy*, cit.

economic integration were taken, and in particular the beginning of the elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade and European Payments Union. This laid the foundations to proceed towards much more advanced forms of European integration when, as we will see, the evolution of the German question put them firmly on the agenda.

Let us come now to the development and role of the UEF in the context outlined here. The most important moment in the life of the UEF in 1947 was its first ordinary congress. It had been programmed at its constitutive meeting in Paris and it was held in Montreux from August 27th to 30th 1947 (6).

Let us look, first of all, at its organisational development, which found its outlet at this congress. As far as the UEF's diffusion in Europe is concerned, it should be said that in Montreux, about two hundred delegates and observers from sixteen nationalities attended the congress and that the officially accredited delegations came from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and they represented about 100,000 members. One fact of great significance was the organised participation of German federalists. On December 9th 1946, Wilhelm Heile and Wilhelm Hermes had founded the German Europa-Union (EUD) in Syke, and its first conference was held in Eutin from June 21st to 23rd 1947 (7). Apart from the EUD, another four federalist organisations were invited to the Montreux congress, although the German federalists would subsequently unite within the EUD. At the Hamburg congress of the EUD, which would be held between May 19th and 22nd 1949, Eugen Kogon would be elected president, and would go on to chair the central

(6) Cf. UNION EUROPÉENNE DES FÉDÉRALISTES, *Rapport du premier congrès annuel de l'UEF*, printed by the secretariat of the UEF in Geneva in 1947.

(7) With regard to the organisational and political development of the federalists in Germany, see KARLHEINZ KOPPE, *Das grüne "E" setzt sich durch. 20 Jahre Europa Union Deutschland*, Köln, Europa Union Verlag, 1967; ERNST FRIEDLÄNDER, *Wie Europa begann*, Köln, Europa Union Verlag, 1965; GERHARD EICKHORN, *Für ein föderales Europa, Beschlüsse der Bundeskongresse der Europa-Union Deutschland*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1993. From 1950, the EUD had the "Europa-Union" as its own newspaper, which in the 1970s became "Europäische Zeitung", replaced by "Europa Aktiv", in 2004.

committee of the UEF between 1950 and 1953. As far as France is concerned, it was represented in Montreux by the Comité de Coordination des Mouvements Fédéralistes Français (the following year, it changed its name to Union Française des Fédéralistes), containing eighteen different groupings. Among the newcomers, with respect to those who witnessed the foundation of the UEF, we can cite in particular Socialisme et Liberté, founded by Henry Frenay, and the Cercles Socialistes et Fédéralistes, founded by Claude-Marcel Hytte and having exponents such as Bernard Voyenne and Jean-Pierre Gouzy. With regard to the Italian federalists, it should be stressed that Spinelli participated in the Montreux congress and made an important contribution to the debate. He was not part of the official MFE delegation because in the immediate post-war period he had withdrawn from active militancy, as he could see no possibility for incisive action in favour of European federation. He had then decided to fully commit himself to the federalist cause again following the launch of the Marshall Plan which created, in his view, a political context in which European federation became a realistic aim. His efforts to win back the leadership of the MFE lasted until June 1948 when he became secretary general (8). His presence in Montreux therefore was not as a delegate, but was by invitation owing to his own personal prestige.

The fundamental decision taken at Montreux on organisational level was the approval of the statute of the UEF, whose draft had been drawn up by the extended central committee that had gathered in Amsterdam from April 12th to 15th 1947. The statute reiterated the principles and objectives indicated in the declarations of Hertenstein and Luxembourg and in the motions put forward in Amsterdam and Montreux itself. It thus established an organisational structure founded on the adhesion not of individuals but of groups committed to the prevalence of federalism in Europe and throughout the world. More groups

(8) Since then, Spinelli had Luciano Bolis (awarded with a gold medal of the Resistance) as his main and constant collaborator in the leadership of the MFE, cfr.: L. BOLIS, *Il mio granello di sabbia*, with preface by Ferruccio Parri, Torino, Einaudi, 1946 (3rd edition 1997); C. ROGNONI VERCELLI, *Luciano Bolis, Dall'Italia all'Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007. Between 1948 and 1960 the official newspaper of the MFE was "*Europa Federata*" ("EF").

could be accepted from each country and they could (in conformance with the orientation of integral federalism) also be trade unions, cooperatives, or professional or parliamentary groups. The UEF was not intended to be a centralised organisation, it proposed to coordinate and intensify, applying a federalist spirit and method, the activities of the different Europeanist movements or groups, without distinctions of nationality, religious persuasion or political allegiance. Its fundamental statutory bodies were: the board of deliberation, or rather a congress formed by delegates of individual federalist organisations and by delegations representing a collection of movements from each country; the management and control body, or rather a central committee elected by the congress and assigning itself a president; the executive committee, elected by the central committee and including a president, secretary general and other members with specific assignments.

As far as its leadership is concerned, the central committee elected in Montreux, which confirmed Switzerland's Henri Genet, appointed in Amsterdam, as president, chose an executive committee to operate within it, which was composed of: Brugmans (president), Raymond Silva from Switzerland (secretary general), Marc (who had been replaced by Silva as secretary general the previous July, and who became director of the institutional department), Koch (deputy secretary general), Miss Josephy (relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries), von Schenck (relations with the Germanic countries), Usellini (relations with Latin countries).

Having specified the organisational aspects, let us now analyse the most important part of the Montreux Congress, namely the political line which emerged from it and which can be summarised in the sentence "begin in the west".

As we have seen, from the Resistance movement to the foundation of the UEF, a pivotal role in the federalist line was played by the vision of a united Europe, intended as a third mediating force between East and West with the aim of contrasting the formation of opposing blocs within a prospective of world unification and peace. It should be added that this concept had been confirmed by the extended central committee at Amsterdam, where a resolution had expressed a hope that the USSR would adhere to a united Europe.

The political line of the UEF, however, now had to face a reality which was becoming increasingly clear. On the one hand, the USSR was effectively lowering the iron curtain and was opposed to any concept of European unification. On the other hand, the USA was offering, with the Marshall Plan, decisive help and favoured the beginning of a European unification process in their sphere of influence. The federalists found themselves forced to make a rather drastic choice: either accept the idea of beginning the construction of a European federation in the west with American help, or refuse the Marshall proposal, continuing to pursue European unification but running the risk that the USA would return to isolationism and that a great opportunity would be lost. Brugmans supported with great effectiveness the former alternative, and he managed to gather the consensus of a very large majority of the UEF. The fundamental concepts of the “begin in the west” line can be summarised as follows: 1. the union of western Europe would have to be achieved without the east, but not against the east; 2. only western European countries had democratic governments and therefore the possibility of choice on a domestic and international level; 3. the European federation would help to lead the countries of eastern Europe towards democracy.

It is necessary to remember that the reasons behind the decision to start such a process in western Europe were expressed with great clarity by Spinelli. During his speech in Montreux, he invited his listeners to take a realistic view of the division that was rapidly turning Europe (and the world as a whole) into two opposing blocs. It was in fact a situation that did not depend after all on the decisions of Europeans, but was the inevitable consequence of the bipolar equilibrium which had formed following the collapse of the European powers and constituted a concrete political framework which those intending to act in a politically incisive manner were forced to take into account. Furthermore, in the context of the western bloc there was a possibility — due to the liberal characteristics of the USA and the non complete loss of autonomy on the part of the western European states — of beginning the construction of a united Europe. If such an enterprise was pursued with determination — with respect to which Spinelli, like Brugmans, still hoped that Great Britain would play a

leading role —, western Europe would recover its lost autonomy, installing a more balanced relationship with the USA. As a consequence, it would be able to make a decisive contribution to an evolution towards the relaxing and surpassing of the blocs and, therefore, the unification of Europe as far as the border with the USSR, as a necessary condition for the future unification of the whole of mankind. If not, the American protectorate on western Europe would be transformed into a long-lasting imperial arrangement and the stiffening of the blocs would create the conditions for a possible third world war.

The “begin in the west” line did not imply a breakdown in the conveyance of the Resistance’s European federalist message, but represented its application to the real-life post-war conditions, which were now evident after a short transitional period. This decision, however, still provoked divisions with federalists who believed that unification of western Europe would deepen divisions within the continent and heighten international tension. It was also a cause of disjunction from those in favour of world federalism. They held in Montreux from August 17th to 24th a congress of the Movement for World Federal Government, from which, through a series of developments, the present World Federalist Movement would later derive. From that moment on, the European and world federalist organisations went their separate ways. A convergence between the two organisations would later manifest itself during the 1990s and the UEF officially joined the WFM in 2004 (9).

The decision to “begin in the west” was certainly the most important aspect of the Montreux congress. The validity of this position, it should be emphasised, would find clear confirmation during the subsequent historical period. Western European integration, despite its clear limitations, would effectively and decisively contribute to the dissolving of the Soviet bloc, which would thus open the way for the unification of the whole of Europe. In Montreux, the federalists also passionately debated the characteristics of European federation and the

(9) Cfr. JEAN-FRANCIS BILLION, *Mondialisme, fédéralisme européen et démocratie internationale* Eglise-Neuve d’Issac, Fédérop, 1997, and ID., *World Federalism, European Federalism and International Democracy*, New York, Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies, World Federalist Movement-Institut for Global Policy, 2001.

type of movement required to reach such an objective. In this regard, two orientations clearly emerged: that of integral federalism (represented by Brugmans, Marc and the *Fédération*), which was backed by the majority (10), and that of constitutionalist federalism, whose most prestigious exponent was Spinelli.

Integral federalism was not only against centralism, but also the purely parliamentary conception of democracy, which according to the this school of thought, had to be supplemented by a constitutional role to be attributed to economic groups, trade union organisations, as well as professional and cultural groups. This was indicated in the statute approved in Montreux and in the motion of general policy. Indeed, the latter confirmed the claim of a federal authority that possessed a government answerable to individuals and groups rather than to member states, a supreme court to settle disputes between members of the federation, and armed forces responsible for enforcing federal decisions. However, it was specified that federalism did not simply aim to introduce a new political framework, but also new social, economic and cultural structures. Therefore, the European programme had to be accompanied by an internal political programme aiming at constitutional reform in the shape of decentralisation and of corporative representation.

The constitutionalist orientation, represented by Spinelli, maintained on the other hand that positions on internal political problems should not be adopted, because this would divide the upholders of European federation present in the various groups, movements and political parties. Therefore, the organisation of the federalists would have to adopt the characteristics of a league able to mobilise public opinion in order to put pressure on parliaments and on national governments, pushing towards the creation of a European federation. The obstacle to be overcome in order to obtain real economic, social and political reform and therefore the rebirth of European democratic civilisation was the absolute national sovereignty.

The equilibrium between these two schools of thought, which

(10) The positions of integral federalism were mainly developed in the speeches of Brugmans, de Rougemont and Maurice Allais.

would always remain present within the UEF, would modify over the coming years as we will see.

The German problem was also discussed at length in Montreux and a specific resolution to this end was approved. The fundamental points were: the elimination of military occupation; the reconstruction of Germany on a federal basis; its integration within a European federation, starting with the part that would be able to participate in a federation of free peoples, before achieving complete integration into a united Europe. Reference to the German question was also contained in the motion of general policy in which the Schuman Plan was anticipated. Indeed, it was maintained that in Saarland and the Ruhr region, economic cooperation should be undertaken to the advantage of all Europeans, and be progressively extended to all the resources and means of production that Europe possessed.

It should also be remembered that the Montreux congress was attended by a number of leaders, acting as observers (11), from other movements for European unity which had been founded in the previous months and with which the UEF had constituted a liaison committee in Paris on July 20th 1947. Let us examine these movements:

Three of them were clearly orientated towards confederation, or unionism, as it was called then. On the initiative of Churchill, after his speech in Zurich in September of 1946, construction of the United Europe Movement (UEM) was commenced, and its foundation was made official on May 14th 1947 in a conference at the Albert Hall in London. Its chairman was Churchill himself, the secretary general was his son-in-law Duncan Sandys and its leading group included Lord Layton, Victor Gallancz and the reverend Gordon Lang. The UEM enjoyed close links with the Conseil Français pour l'Europe Unie, founded on July 16th 1947. It had Edouard Herriot as chairman (Raoul Dautry from December 1947) and René Courtin as secretary

(11) The round table which closed the congress was attended by all the most important personalities present in Montreux: Robert Aron, Grégoire Gafenco (former Romanian foreign minister), Bertrand de Jouvenel, rev. Gordon Lang (president of the British federalist parliamentary group), Jean Larmeroux (representative of the world federalists), Joseph Retinger, de Rougemont, Duncan Sandys, former French minister Daniel Serruys, Van Zeeland, as well as others.

general, and it gathered parliamentary and governmental exponents. The Ligue Indépendante de Coopération Economique (which would then take the name Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique-LECE), founded and chaired by Paul van Zeeland on april 7th 1947 and with Joseph Retinger as secretary general, also had an unionist orientation. The LECE, essentially composed of bankers and industrialists, would later play a pivotal role in the European Movement as a laboratory of economic and monetary studies.

In June of 1947, two organisations committed to European unity were born with links to political parties. In London, the Movement for the Socialist United States of Europe, which the following year became the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (SMUSE). Among its principal exponents were Frenchmen André Philip (12) and Marceau Pivert as well as Bob Edwards of the Independent Labour Party. In Chaudfontaine near Lieges, the Christian Democrats founded their European organisation under the name Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), whose president was Frenchman Robert Bichet from the Mouvement Republicaine Populaire (13).

Finally, on the 4th and 5th July 1947, the European Parliamentary Union (EPU) was founded in Gstaad in Switzerland thanks to the initiative of Coudenhove-Kalergi. This organisation, which was the closest to the positions adopted by the UEF (14), gathered those west-

(12) Cfr. LOÏC PHILIP, *André Philip, avec un témoignage de Léo Hamon*, Paris, Beauchesne, 1988; GIANNI COPETTI, ROGER VAN CAMPENHOUT, CATHERINE VIEILLE-DENT-MONFORT (edited by), *1946-2006-60 ans à gauche pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe*, Bruxelles, Editions Labor, 2007.

(13) Cfr. THOMAS JANSEN, *Die Entstehung einer Europäischen Partei, Vorgeschichte, Gründung und Entwicklung der EVP*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1986 (English translation, *The European People's Party-Origins and Development*, Houndsmill and London, Macmillan, 1998); Stefan Dulureanu, *Les Nouvelles Equipes Internationales. Per una rifondazione dell'Europa (1947-1965)*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2007.

(14) In this period, Coudenhove-Kalergi was very close to the federalist positions, also due to the influence of the federalist British MP MacKay (see R. MAYNE and J. PINDER, *Federal Union: the Pioneers* cit., and Martin Posselt, *L'Unione Parlamentare Europea*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1945-1954* cit.). Later, the Paneuropa movement, which after the 2nd World War led a laboured and marginal existence, moved towards Gaullist confederalism. After the death of Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1972, the leader of this movement, essentially present in Austria and in Bavaria, became Otto von Habsburg.

ern European members of parliament who were in favour of European federation, and in 1952 it merged with the European Movement (EM), of which it became the Parliamentary Council. The premise for the foundation of the EPU was the sending, promoted by the founder of the Paneuropa to around 4000 western European MPs, of a questionnaire in which they were asked to answer yes or no to the question: "Are you in favour of a European federation within the framework of the UN?". Between November of 1946 and September 1947, 1735 answers were received, of which only 52 were negative. The result was remarkable: Italy was in first place (thanks mainly to Constituent Assembly member Enzo Giacchero, who would later become member of the High Authority of the ECSC and president of the UEF) with 64.5% of the answers affirmative. Italy was followed by Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland with a percentage greater than 50%; Great Britain, Austria and Ireland remained under 30%, while Denmark, Norway and Sweden did not surpass 15%. An absolute majority, therefore, of the MPs of continental Europe declared that they were in favour of a European federation (15), while a rather lukewarm response was received from Scandinavia and the British Isles. This result paved the way for the beginning of an integration process that would lead to the framework of a six-nation European Community.

In connection with the development of the inquiry promoted by Coudenhove-Kalergi, a number of federalist inter-groups formed in many western European parliaments, and then the foundation of the EPU was achieved, which held its first congress from September 8th to 20th 1947, again in Gstaad, with the participation of 114 MPs from 10 European countries. The congress elected Georges Bohy (head of the socialist group from the Belgian chamber) as president and Coudenhove-Kalergi as secretary general. The most important result politically was the request contained in point 3 of the final resolution which was unanimously approved: "the rapid convocation of a Euro-

(15) One should remember that in Germany in 1947, when the *Bundestag* did not yet exist, EUD obtained adhesion to the idea of the United States of Europe from 299 members of the regional parliaments of the areas occupied by Great Britain and the USA.

pean constituent assembly with the task of formulating the federation's constitution. The members of this assembly must be elected by national parliaments or directly by the people. The constitution project formulated by the assembly must be immediately presented to the states who must individually accept or reject it". The idea of the constituent assembly then became a buzzword of an assembly of European members of parliament. This claim would then become the central and permanent aspect of the UEF's strategy starting from 1949. Meanwhile, the fundamental commitment of the European federalists was the organisation — in collaboration with the movements which launched the EM — of the Hague Congress, which paved the way for the birth of the Council of Europe.

2.2. From the Hague Congress to the Council of Europe.

The UEF had no direct influence on the foundation of the Western Union and the OEEC. They were essentially a response on the part of the national governments to American policy aiming to form a western bloc, and in this frame, to favour the beginning of European integration. The actions of the movements for European unity nevertheless had a role to play. Keeping the European message which had emerged with the Resistance and the pursuing of a systematic campaign in favour of European unity, starting with the west, created an invaluable base of consensus for governmental policies aimed at initiating European cooperation. In the birth of the Council of Europe it can be said however that the UEF, together with the converging movements in the EM, exercised a more direct influence. The fundamental initiative in this context was the Hague Congress from May 7th to 10th 1948.

In Montreux, the UEF conceived the idea of organising the General States of Europe, an assembly formed by delegates assigned by various sections of society. They would have to constitute permanent commissions, entrusted to examine the various aspects of European unity and to give life to the nucleus of the future European government. At the same time, the leaders of the unionist movements, particularly Sandys, Van Zeeland, Retinger and Courtin, conceived

the idea of summoning a conference in the Hague that would gather a large number of European political, economic and intellectual personalities. The conference was intended to give rise to the development of a gradual integration process, starting with economic cooperation. In the liaison committee, which had been constituted in Paris on July 20th 1947 and that on the 13th and 14th December was transformed into a committee for the coordination of movements for European unity chaired by Sandys, convergence between the two proposals was achieved with a compromise between the arguments of the unionists and those of the federalists.

The Hague Congress, also referred to as the Congress of Europe, at the seat of the Dutch parliament under the presidency of Churchill, gathered around one thousand participants from nineteen western European countries, as well as observers from some eastern European countries. As well as the principal leaders of the unionist and federalist movements and important personalities from economic, cultural (Salvador de Madariaga, Raymond and Robert Aron, René Capitant, Ignazio Silone, Salvatore Quasimodo, Giuseppe Ungaretti) and religious spheres, some of the most prestigious European political leaders also participated. Among them, we can cite: from France, Paul Ramadier, Paul Reynaud, Pierre-Henry Teitgen, François Mitterrand, Edmond Daladier, Maurice Schumann, François de Menthon; from Great Britain Harold Macmillan, Antony Eden, Leo Amery, Ron Mackay; from Germany, Konrad Adenauer, Walter Hallstein, Einrich von Brentano; from Italy Alcide De Gasperi, Bruno Visentini, Leone Cattani, Enzo Giaccherò, Nicolò Carandini, Adriano Olivetti; from Belgium, Spaak, Van Zeeland, Etienne de la Vallée Poussin; from the Netherlands, Jonkheer van der Goes van Naters, Henry Nord, Emanuel Sassen (future member of the Euratom Commission); the former head of the government of the Spanish Republic Indalecio Prieto, the former Rumanian foreign minister Grigore Gafenco (future president of the central committee of the UEF).

The political resolution approved at the conclusion of the congress was the result of a compromise between the federalist and unionist schools of thought. The fundamental requirements regarded economic union, which would gradually implement the free circula-

tion of capital, monetary union, the elimination of national borders and the harmonisation of social legislation. A request was added to formulate a Charter for Human Rights and to institute a European Court to which citizens could resort in order to defend the rights established in the Charter. It was also specified that the states would have to transfer some of their sovereign rights in order to exercise them in unison. It was not clarified, however, if the common political organisation should have a supranational or intergovernmental nature. Indeed, the terms union and federation were used indiscriminately.

With regard to the entity that would have to formulate concrete proposals in relation to the development of European unification (conceived as an essential factor for the development of world unity), the resolution required the institution of a European assembly elected (either within or outside them) by the participating national parliaments. The tasks entrusted to it were to be: *a)* to contribute to the creation and expression of European public opinion; *b)* to recommend the appropriate immediate measures to gradually establish the necessary level of European unity on both a political and economic level; *c)* to examine the juridical and constitutional problems posed by a Union or a Federation, as well as the relative consequences; *d)* to prepare, to this end, the appropriate strategies.

The fundamental and concrete request of the Hague Congress was therefore the institution of a parliamentary assembly of an advisory nature. Therefore, neither the call for a genuine constituent assembly, supported mainly by the Italian federalists and by Reynaud, nor the request — on the part of the integral federalists, who constituted a majority in the UEF — that the assembly should be an expression of the “living forces”, or rather of economic, social and cultural groups, and not essentially of parliamentary delegations, were approved. Agreement was reached, however, on a request of undoubted political importance. In the construction of European unity, the governments were not to play an exclusive role, the representatives of public opinion also had to be involved.

Immediately after the Hague, work started on obtaining from the governments the acceptance of the requests of the Congress of Europe, and to such an end a study group was formed, chaired by Ramadier,

who in the Hague had played a decisive role in the formulation of the final political resolution. Responsibility for putting pressure on the governments, it should be remembered, was assumed by the unionists. In the course of this action, they pursued the transformation, which was officially achieved on October 24th 1948, of the Coordination Committee into the European Movement. The new entity, placed under the honorary presidency of Blum, Churchill, De Gasperi and Spaak, gathered all movements pushing for European unity, with the sole exception of the European Parliamentary Union, which preferred to preserve its own freedom of action. The driving force was represented by the International Council, composed of delegates of the national councils which were undergoing constitutions in all the European countries. The president was Sandys until November 1950.

The fundamental objective of the EM was the institution of an assembly with advisory and non-legislative responsibilities (which the governments in any case were not willing to accept), but which had a parliamentary nature and therefore had one vote per member and was subject to majority decision making. This was supported by the UEF under the conviction that the institutional involvement of public opinion would create more advanced conditions in the struggle for European federation. This, which was the first relevant political action of the movements for European unity, found its outlet in the agreement struck in London on May 5th 1949 which instituted the Council of Europe. This “bottom-up” action was successful because — and this is a consistent aspect in the European integration process — it was combined with the critical situation in which the governments found themselves at the time.

The most general factor to be underlined in this regard was the decision, made necessary by the cold war, to give life to the Atlantic Alliance, which meant also accepting, apart from the American economic help offered by the Marshall Plan, a sort of political-military protectorate on western Europe. The treaty on the Council of Europe, approved one month after that relating to the Atlantic Alliance, corresponded to an urgent political and psychological need. The European governments, which in essence had delegated their security to the Americans, had to persuade public opinion that a real, if not

immediate, prospective of recovering through European unification the lost autonomy existed.

In this context, played an important role also a worry particularly strong France. The decision, imposed by the USA, within the context of the cold war, to construct a western German state increased French fear of the resurgence of German power and pushed to give serious consideration to the requests of the Hague which indicated that the future of Germany lay within the framework of European unity. Indeed, the French governing authorities were, together with their Belgian counterparts, those who supported the proposal for a European Assembly most strongly. It was defended during the course of difficult negotiations — within the Western Union bodies (16) — with the British government, which supported the creation of an organisation composed only of governmental representatives. In the end, a compromise was reached which hinged on the institution of an advisory assembly with one vote per member and majority decision making, with the task of presenting recommendations to the committee of foreign ministers which, on the basis of unanimous approval, would submit them to the national ratifications.

Like Western Union and OEEC, the Council of Europe had, in contrast with the expectations and claims of the federalists, a particularly weak confederal structure. There were, however, two innovations destined to favour the progress of European integration. First of all, the Council of Europe was the first international body in history to involve members of parliaments. For this reason, it was a useful tool for encouraging contact between all the European political movements and for making them more attentive to issues of European unity. Furthermore, the advisory assembly constituted a precedent that made the insertion of a parliamentary assembly among the institutions of the European Communities easier, something which would represent one of the most important federal embryos of the Communities institutional system. The Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, which was approved in Rome in 1950, and which was followed by

(16) The advisory council of the WU instituted a study committee on European unity which became the fundamental interlocutor of the EM. See UMBERTO LEONE, *Le origini diplomatiche del Consiglio d'Europa*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1966.

the institution of the Strasbourg Court, represented, as well as an important innovation, a precedent with respect to the creation of the European Community Court of Justice, which would constitute another of the important federal embryos of the European system.

Let us return to the UEF. The institution of the Council of Europe was important for the UEF because it offered it the opportunity to launch a campaign for the European Federal Pact. This was the first great initiative with the aim of mobilising the people that the UEF carried out, and its core was constituted by the idea of the European constituent, which from then on became the guiding light of the UEF's political actions. The necessary condition for the campaign for the Federal Pact was the prevalence within the UEF of a constitutionalist line vigorously and coherently supported by the MFE led by Spinelli. Let us step a little further back in time in order to clarify this evolution.

The claims for the European constituent had been acknowledged, as we have seen, by the EPU in Gstaad. The EPU organised a congress in Interlaken from September 1st to 4th 1949, which approved and launched a more precise request to the governments. They were invited: 1) to summon, by March 1948, a European assembly formed by members selected by the national parliaments of the OEEC countries, either from inside or outside (the same request made in the Hague); 2) to ask the assembly to submit proposals with the aim of achieving a constitution of the United States of Europe; 3) to draw up a multilateral agreement in order to implement these measures. It should be remembered that a number of federalist members of parliament played a decisive role in Interlaken, particularly Mackay (leader of the federalist inter-group at the House of Commons) and Giacchero (leader of the MFE and president of the federalist inter-group at the Italian *Camera dei Deputati*).

The Interlaken Plan was one of the main themes of discussion at the 2nd ordinary congress of the UEF, which was held in Rome from November 7th to 11th 1948 and gathered over five hundred delegates. On this occasion Piero Calamandrei, who in the Italian Constituent Assembly had performed a central role in the formulation of the Constitution of the Italian Republic, presented on behalf of the constitu-

tionalists a report which translated the requests formulated in Interlaken into an extremely rigorous project on a political and juridical level. In this document, there was a clear distinction with regard to the doctrine between the federal state (which had to be achieved in order to effectively and democratically unite Europe) and the union of sovereign states, and above all, the procedure through which the democratic constituent method could be applied to achieve a federal European state was outlined in great detail. The following fundamental stages were foreseen: 1) a preliminary conference gathering the participating governments to agree the statute of the European constituent assembly which was to be ratified by the national parliaments, who would then have to elect their own representatives in such an assembly; 2) the summoning of the constituent assembly, entrusted to deliberate by majority voting (one vote per member) the text of the federal European constitution; 3) the implementation of the constitution as soon as ratification was obtained by at least six states (which could accept or reject it, but not modify it).

The Calamandrei report contained a strict definition of a democratic constituent procedure, which was inspired by the model of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the convention which led to the birth of the Constitution of the United States of America, the first federal state in history (17). Apart from that, the report distinguished itself with a strongly innovative proposal with relation to the geopolitical framework in which to initiate the construction of a federal Europe. More precisely, for the first time, the prejudicial question of British participation was rejected and thus the idea of a “two-speed” Europe was given serious consideration (18). This concept was sup-

(17) The three fundamental aspects of the procedure implemented with the Convention of Philadelphia are: 1) a role of the governments which is constituted by the attribution of a mandate to the constituent assembly and which excludes any further intervention; 2) a constituent assembly of a parliamentary nature and therefore characterised by majority decision making; 3) the coming into force of the constitution between the ratifying countries, even if a unanimous decision is not achieved (the quorum was set at 2/3 of the states).

(18) This expression, introduced for the first time in an official text by the Tindemans Report on the European Union of December 1975, is generally intended in the sense of progress in integration, both on a political and institutional level, that

ported and clarified further in Nicolò Carandini's address to the Rome Congress, ex-Italian ambassador to London. Provoking a heated reaction among the British delegation, who stormed out of the hall in protest, he declared that the specific requirements of Great Britain, linked to its relations with the Commonwealth and the USA, should not be permitted to influence plans for the unification of continental European countries. "If the nations of Benelux, France and Italy and other European nations have the will to federate, then let them federate and proclaim the formation of the initial nucleus of a future United States of Europe, open to all European peoples" (19). After the decision to begin in the west, a platform for a "little Europe" was put into place, in the framework of which the construction of the European Community would begin in 1950.

The position of the constitutionalists were not accepted by the Congress of Rome. The majority of the delegates considered the idea of a federation without Great Britain as unacceptable, and under the guidance of Brugmans, it reiterated the importance of the active participation of this country to the construction of European unity and the conviction that its reluctance could soon be overcome. On the other hand, the positions of the integral federalists remained dominant. They were translated in the approval of a preliminary design for a European constitution, with a clearly federal nature but with evident additions of corporative elements. In particular, a European parliament formed by three houses — of states, of the people and of economic and social organisations — with substantially equivalent powers was foreseen. Furthermore to the request for the constituent assembly the majority opposed support of the EM line in favour of summoning of an advisory assembly, moreover, firmly insisting on the idea that alongside the members of parliament there should be a strong presence of representatives of economic, social and cultural organisations. In the resolution, dedicated specifically to the question of the European assembly, there was only a vague indication, but one which created a

is not obstructed by the right of veto on the part of states not yet ready for significant progress.

(19) The immediate participation of West Germany (still under construction at the time) was clearly expected.

certain interest in its possible constituent role. It was indeed established that what was expected of it was the preparation of a constitution of a European federation and the proposal of measures aimed at immediately laying the foundations for federal unity, without specifying precise methods and timescales for these initiatives.

If the Congress of Rome did not arrive at a clear decision with regard to a strategic framework, the orientation that was defined with regard to relations with the EM was much clearer. In this regard, Brugmans expressed a position which would substantially lead to a renouncement of the UEF's autonomy. However, the vast majority of the UEF did not follow him down this path, and approved the principle of the UEF's participation in the EM, maintaining an undisputable autonomy specifically founded on a clear choice in favour of federalism. In order to guarantee the choice of autonomy on the part of the UEF, Frenay was elected as president of the central committee — replacing Ignazio Silone, elected at the beginning of 1948 — who was very critical of the unionist positions and close to those of the constitutionalists. The principle of autonomy would permanently characterise relations between the UEF and the EM.

After the congress of Rome, discussions on strategy continued in the UEF and encountered a crucial moment with the Spinelli report at the MFE Congress held in Florence from April 23rd to 25th 1949, on the eve of the agreement on the institution of the Council of Europe. This report contained the fundamental observations which would constitute the basis of the UEF's actions, starting with the campaign for the Federal Pact (20). Let us examine the substance.

Spinelli expressed a clear vision of the limits of the functionalist integration initiated by the European governments at that time and, at the same time, of the opportunities that it offered to the federalist struggle. He radically criticised the conviction of the supporters of the functionalist approach according to whom it was possible to effec-

(20) The text is published in *Il pensiero dei federalisti italiani al III Congresso Nazionale*, Series of the MFE, Rome, 1949 and also in A. SPINELLI, *Dagli Stati sovrani agli Stati Uniti d'Europa* (which contains Spinelli's writings from 1942 to 1949), Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1950. Republished in A. SPINELLI, *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, cit.

tively and permanently unify, in a gradual way and separately from each other, the various sectors (economic, military, foreign policy) currently under the command of individual governments, postponing *sine die* the creation of a supranational political power. This position was countered by the constitutionalist approach, or rather the necessity of creating, through the democratic constituent method, a federal European constitution as an invaluable framework within which a gradual but effective and irreversible European integration process could be implemented. This criticism, however, was not limited to a mechanical and doctrinal opposition.

On the one hand, Spinelli was clearly aware that the functionalist approach had its roots in the structurally contradictory behaviour of the national governments with respect to European unification. The policy of European integration was imposed by the historic situation, i.e. by the irreversible crisis of the nation states (by the “unite or perish” alternative), on which were grafted the factors represented by American pressure in favour of European unity, by the fear held by the leading democratic classes of communist advances, and by the matter of German reconstruction. At the same time, the national governments tended to resist permanent transfers of sovereignty, and naturally preferred an approach which indefinitely postponed the creation of fully federal institutions.

On the other hand, Spinelli was just as aware that the functionalist approach was structurally a bringer of grave contradictions, which opened the way for concrete constitutionalist initiatives. There were two fundamental contradictions. The first was constituted by the democratic deficit in the functionalist integration process. It transferred important decisions on a supranational level without simultaneously transferring the procedures of democratic control to the same level. Therefore, this situation was destined to create unease in all those who seriously believed in democratic principles and who as such could not be insensitive to the appeal to democratise European integration. The second contradiction was represented by the structurally precarious results obtained with the functionalist approach. As the functionalist institutions were ultimately founded on the unanimous decisions of governments, they would have shown themselves to be incapable

of producing adequate results in difficult situations. As a consequence, they would have frustrated the expectations raised by the European initiatives of governments in public opinion and in the economic and social forces with an interest in integration. This frustration could have been transformed into support for federal institutions.

The UEF had to find a way to take advantage of such contradictions and gain leverage from them, above all in the moments where they manifested themselves in a clearly perceivable manner, in order to push governments, by mobilising public opinion and at the same time advising the political classes, to take decisions that would be capable of activating a democratic constituent procedure.

These strategic indications, it should be underlined, have become the driving factor of the actions that the UEF has performed up to the present day, naturally with the necessary adjustments made in order to adapt to the changeable situations which arise in the European integration process. The first relevant practical application of the strategy outlined by Spinelli was the action of the UEF towards the Council of Europe, aimed at promoting the assumption on the part of the Strasbourg Advisory Assembly of a constituent role. Despite highlighting the serious deficiencies of the Council of Europe, the federalists recognised that the Advisory Assembly was the first European institution to overcome the principle of state representation. The Assembly would not be formed by national delegations, but each member would debate and vote without an imperative mandate. It would therefore be able to give a voice to a pro-European orientation of public opinion, obtain support from national parliaments and express the tendency to acquire effective power. In this situation, the UEF, gaining leverage from the need to submit to democratic control and accelerate the integration process that was taking its first steps on an economic (through the OEEC and the first attempts to customs union) and military (the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Pact) level, attempted to push the Strasbourg Assembly to promote the creation of federal institutions. It would therefore have to persuade state authorities that it was necessary to approve a Federal Pact for the United States of Europe and prepare a draft of the said pact to submit to the appropriate national bodies for ratification.

The opportunity to launch a campaign for a federal pact and to mobilise public opinion was provided by the Strasbourg Assembly. During its first session on September 6th 1949, it unanimously approved a motion, drafted by Ronald Mackay in collaboration with André Philip, for the creation of a European political authority equipped with limited but concrete powers. It therefore formally entrusted the committee of general affairs to formulate and submit for approval a pact which defined the directive principles of the Council of Europe on a political, economic, social and cultural level, and which should bound the member or associated states.

The reaction of the federalists in view of this manifestation of will on the part of the Advisory Assembly was expressed by the extraordinary assembly of the UEF, which was held in Paris from October 28th to 31st 1949. It approved the basic principles of a European pact for federal union, or rather a schematic plan for a federal constitution on the basis of which gradual economic unification, a common foreign policy and common defence for those countries adhering to the pact could be achieved. It was therefore decided to ask the Advisory Assembly to draw up in its next session, on the basis of such indications, the text of a federal pact and to recommend its ratification to member states, which would have to commit themselves to the implementation of the said pact as soon as it was ratified by a number of states whose total population reached at least one hundred million people (21). In the end, it was decided to organise a petition in favour of a federal pact in order to provide tangible support to the efforts of the Advisory Assembly's most advanced component against the resistance of the least advanced component.

The campaign for the Federal Pact was supported by the SMUSE, the NEI and the Movimento dei Lavoratori Cristiani per

(21) Therefore the UEF, as a whole, surpassed the essential condition of British participation in the advancement of European unification. It was also decided to modify the statute of the UEF in those provisions that were an expression of integral federalism. The only aim of the organisation thus became the construction of a European federation, to be created initially between those democratic countries willing to accept the principle of the limitation of sovereignty. The reference to world federation also fell in consideration of the fact that among the world federalists, in the context of the cold war, rejection of European federation had prevailed.

l'Europa (the Christian Workers for Europe Movement). It took place in 1950 and was led by an international campaign committee formed by top level European personalities (22) and was initiated in individual countries under the responsibility of the national campaign committees. The most significant results, which met with the indifference if not the hostility of the EM, with the exception of a number of national councils, were obtained in Italy, France and Germany, while in the other countries no relevant results were achieved (23).

— In Italy — where the greatest success was achieved — by October the petition had been signed by 500,000 citizens, including 246 members of parliament, and was adopted by 493 municipal councils, 39 provincial administrations, the principal political parties, non-communist trade unions, non-communist partisan associations and a further 200 associations of various types. The gathering of signatures, in support of which more than 300 demonstrations were organised, was concluded with a great demonstration in Rome on November 4th 1950 at the Teatro Sistina. In the course of this demonstration, which was attended by the President of the Republic Einaudi, the petition was signed by the Prime Minister De Gasperi, the Foreign Minister Sforza, by another six ministers and seven undersecretaries. The petition was presented to the two Italian chambers on November 7th, which on November 10th and 15th adopted a motion of identical content (24).

— In the Federal Republic of Germany, the campaign materialised, as well as in numerous demonstrations, in the organisations of a number of referendums on the Federal Pact. In the referendums held in July in collaboration with the municipal administrations of Breisach

(22) We can cite in particular: Piero Calamandrei, Carlo Levi, Benedetto Croce, Maria Montessori, Alberto Moravia, Ferruccio Parri, Enzo Giacchero, Gaetano Salvemini, Ignazio Silone, Luigi Sturzo, Giuseppe Saragat, Léon Blum, René Coty, Georges Duhamel, Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ramadier, Paul Reynaud, André Siegfried, Karl Arnold, Otto Bach, Thomas Dehler, Werner Heisenberg, Eugen Kogon, Carlo Schmid, William Beveridge, Ronald W.G. Mackay. The complete list can be found in "EF", 1950, n. 16. Of "EF" exists an anastatic reprint edited by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont, Turin, Celid, 2004.

(23) Cfr. U. MORELLI, *La campagna per il Patto di Unione Federale Europea*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1945-1954*, cit.

(24) Before the gathering of signatures was concluded, the MFE presented the Italian petition to the president of the Advisory Assembly of Strasbourg, Spaak.

(a small town in Baden) and Castrop-Rauxel (an industrial town in Renania-Vestfalia with 70,000 inhabitants), 94.5% and 93% respectively of the adhesions of the participants were obtained (87,5% and 73%). A second referendum was held in November on the occasion of the elections to renew the Bavarian parliament. In the cities of Munich, Bad-Reichenall and Traunstein, 83.3%, 82.7% and 84.5% respectively of the population declared themselves in favour of a federal union of European states. The idea of the Federal Pact was also approved on July 26th by the *Bundestag* with a resolution which only four communist members of parliament voted against.

— In France, the campaign was impeded by the existing rivalries between the various French federalist organisations and began rather late, but nevertheless an important result was achieved, with the adhesion to the petition on the part of 1/3 of 30,000 French mayors (25).

The conclusion of the campaign for a Federal Pact on a European level was the meeting held between November 20th and 23rd 1950 in Strasbourg at the *Orangerie* hall (just a short distance from the *Maison de l'Europe*, seat of the Advisory Assembly) of the European Council of Vigilance, which was immediately renamed, upon the proposal of the director of "Franc Tireur", Georges Altman, the Council of the Peoples of Europe. The project conceived by Voisin, was taken forward by Frenay, president of the executive office of the UEF (26),

(25) The success of the petition among the French municipalities contributed to the birth, which would occur officially between January 28th and 30th 1951 in Geneva, of the Council of European Municipalities (which in the 1970s would become the Council of European Municipalities and Regions - CEMR). The exponent of La Fédération Jean Bareth, would be a long-serving secretary general of this organisation, whose political actions would consistently converge with those of the UEF. The secretary of the Italian section of the CEMR (Associazione Italiana del Consiglio dei Comuni e delle Regioni d'Europa - AICCRE), Umberto Serafini, who had always been a member of the leading group of the MFE, played a particularly important role in the collaboration between UEF and CEMR. Cf.: FABIO ZUCCA, *Autonomie locali e federazione sopranazionale. La battaglia del Conseil des Communes et Régions d'Europe per l'unità europea*, with a preface by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001; UMBERTO SERAFINI, *Adriano Olivetti e il Movimento Comunità*, Roma, Officina Edizioni, 1982; AICCRE, *Breve storia del Consiglio dei Comuni e delle Regioni d'Europa*, Roma, Salemi Pro. Edit, 1995.

(26) At the beginning of 1950, Frenay succeeded Brugmans in this role, who in turn became president of the UEF's central committee.

Philip, the secretary general of the SMUSE, and Bichet, the president of the NEI. It took place immediately after the 3rd ordinary congress of the UEF and the 4th congress of the SMUSE, which were held simultaneously in Strasbourg from November 17th to 19th.

The Council of the Peoples of Europe, in which a number of important representatives of trade unions, industry, agriculture, the churches, education and science (27) participated, approved an appeal to those states willing to accept a limitation to their sovereignty to commit to the immediate signing of an international treaty which would summon as soon as possible a constituent assembly with the task of drafting the Federal Pact. It therefore attempted to push the Advisory Assembly to oppose the Council of Ministers, which impeded through unanimous voting any kind of development of a federal nature on the part of the Council of Europe, and even invited a secession on the part of those members of federal persuasion. However, the resolution inspired by federalist principles, presented by members Philip and Gérard Jaquet to the Advisory Assembly, obtained only a meagre minority of votes. Furthermore, a delegation, which from the *Orangerie* went to the *Maison de l'Europe* to deliver the request for a European constituent to Spaak, the president of the Advisory Assembly, received a cold response in which the Council of Europe was indicated as the only foundation on which it was possible to construct a united Europe. The federalist action towards the Council of Europe then concluded on November 24th with a demonstration by 5,000 young people (in front of the *Maison de l'Europe*), organised by the Jeunesses Fédéralistes Européennes (JEF), which had only just been founded, in order to express its dissatisfaction ahead of the impotence and lack of courage of the Advisory Assembly (28).

The campaign for the Federal Pact was not therefore able to

(27) The main speakers were Belgian Fernand Dehousse, Frenchman Pierre De Felice (both members of the Advisory Assembly) and Spinelli.

(28) The constituent congress of the JEF was held in Strasbourg on November 18th-19th 1950. Cf. DANIELA PREDÀ, *Le Jeunesse Fédéralistes Européennes (1948-1969)*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, Pavia, PIME, 1996. Also ALESSANDRO RICCIO, *La GFE dal dopoguerra a oggi: un laboratorio per la costruzione dell'Europa*, degree thesis presented at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Genoa, academic year 2005-2006, supervisor Daniela Preda.

achieve its primary objective, which was that of obtaining on the part of the Advisory Assembly the launch of a courageous and incisive initiative in favour of European federation. During the meetings and demonstrations held in Strasbourg between November 17th and 24th 1950, the federalists became well aware of the Council of Europe's inability to provide the stimulus for the progress of European unification and the far greater possibilities contained in the Schuman and Pleven Plans, both for their more advanced nature with regard to the specific proposals they contained, and for the fact that British adhesion was not considered an essential condition. The UEF therefore accepted Spinelli's proposal to launch the idea that the European constituent could be created outside the institutional framework of the Council of Europe, and it prepared to exploit the opportunities that emerged in this regard from the new phase of functionalist integration founded on the community method.

Despite not having immediate practical effects on the development of European integration, the action of the UEF towards the Council of Europe nevertheless obtained the important political result of proving that it was possible to mobilise pro-European stances widespread in public opinion in order to put effective federalist pressure on the political classes. This capability would produce its most politically incisive consequences in the phase of European integration that hinged on article 38 of the EDC and on the European Political Community (EPC).

2.3. From the European Defence Community to the European Political Community.

Let us now examine the scenario of relations among governments from which the Schuman Plan and Pleven Plan emerged. In this regard, the evolution of the German situation was decisive. A fundamental appendix to the American strategy of containing the USSR was the decision to proceed with the economic and political reconstruction of West Germany in order to consolidate the Atlantic bloc in a decisive sector. Within this context, the American government, shortly after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), put the elimination of allied controls (exercised by the Inter-

national Ruhr Authority) on the German coal and steel industries at the top of the agenda. The French government, for which the decision to construct a western German state had already represented a push in favour of the institution of the Council of Europe, found itself in an even more critical situation. It did not want to accept the rebirth of a completely autonomous German industry, which it perceived as the basis of the rebirth of German nationalism. However, on the other hand, all it could do was delay the American initiative, but only at the price of seriously compromising relations with the protector on the other side of the Atlantic. This *impasse* was subsequently overcome by foreign minister Robert Schuman, accepting Monnet's suggestion — just like in London in 1940! — to organically organise the reconstruction of German sovereignty within a qualitative leap of the European integration process. The declaration of May 9th therefore brought with it a proposal to submit the German coal and steel industries to supranational control together with the corresponding French industries and those of other states willing to participate.

With positive responses from Adenauer's Germany, as well as Italy and the Benelux countries, in 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community was born (ECSC). Although it was an organisation with limited powers and on which governments maintained strong control through the Council of Ministers, it contained, unlike the WU, OEEC and the Council of Europe, certain important embryonic forms of federalism: a decisive role attributed to an entity independent of governments such as the High Authority; — the direct effectiveness of Community judicial and legislative acts within the member states; — the principle of majority voting for some of the deliberations of the Council of Ministers; — a parliamentary assembly with not only advisory tasks, because it could give a vote of no confidence to the High Authority, and for which direct election was foreseen in the future; — the financing of the Community budget by means of taxes taken directly from companies in the coal and steel industries, as well as loans.

The national governments had to accept an institutional system of a federal vocation such as the Community because otherwise they would not have been able to achieve the primary aim of the initiative,

i.e. the subtraction of the coal and steel industries from Germany's exclusive control. Due to the necessary presence of federal aspects, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries did not adhere to the ECSC, and this gave rise to a Europe of six states, a platform built on the concept of French-German reconciliation and giving a guiding role to these two countries. The platform of the so-called "little Europe" made possible further developments in integration due to the particularly strong convergence of the six economies and the fact that the six had experienced the most dramatic consequences of the historical crisis of the nation states.

The Pleven Plan emerged from a similar scenario. In this case, ahead of the American decision to put German rearmament on the agenda after the outbreak of war in Korea, the French government again followed the advice of Monnet. It was convinced that the best way to avert the resurgence of German militarism was the creation of a European army founded on integration between German and French troops as well as those of the other countries willing to participate. The first draft of the EDC project was thus completed (drawn up in July 1951 under the name of 'provisional report'), a design for an organisation with the same characteristics as the ECSC, but with military rather than economic powers. At this stage, however, the action of the UEF came into play, making a decisive contribution to the evolution of a sectorial integration project in the military field towards total political union which, if all went well, would give rise to the accelerated construction of a federal European state.

Let us take few steps back however, and see first of all the contribution made by the federalists in the emergence of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan. The idea of the supranational government of the coal and steel industries had already been mentioned by Brugmans in Montreux, and was then further clarified by Spinelli (29). The

(29) Cfr. A. SPINELLI, *Considerazioni di un federalista sulla Germania*, in H. BRUGMANS, L. EINAUDI, E. ROSSI, C.K. STREIT, B. WOOTTON, L. ROBBINS, N. BENTWICH, A. SPINELLI, *Federazione europea* with foreword by Tristano Codignola, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1948. Also very important in this regard is the document "Thèses pour l'élaboration d'une politique de l'UEF", which Spinelli presented to the UEF's executive committee on March 25th 1949. This document (and in general the documents of the UEF and the supranational European Federalist Movement) can be

idea of an initial platform of six, i.e. proceeding without waiting for Great Britain, was present in Calamandrei's report on the European constituent and then in the campaign for the Federal Pact. Also the idea of a European army with German participation constituted a precise and explicit aspect of the idea developed by the UEF on how the reconstruction of Germany should be taken forward within the building of a European federation (30). Having remembered this, let us see now how the intervention of the UEF developed in relation to the Pleven Plan. Such intervention was led with clarity and determination by Spinelli and we must start with his vision.

When in September 1950, the question of German rearmament within a NATO framework was posed, and when Pleven presented his proposal on October 24th 1950, the leader of the MFE immediately realised that here was an exceptional opportunity to try and prize from the six governments that were already negotiating the institution of the ECSC the formation of a constituent assembly of the European federation (31). The cornerstone of this reasoning can be summarised as follows. A limited sector such as the coal and steel industries could be temporarily isolated by the other sectors of state activities and be governed by a functional authority with no real sovereign power or democratic legitimisation. On the contrary, the application of a similar method to a fundamental sector of state sovereignty such as the military field would cause unsustainable contradictions to emerge. Creating a European army meant, as well the integration of specifically military organisations, having a common foreign policy, because this army was to be its tool; having a common military budget, because

found in the UEF archive, preserved at the Historical Archives of the European Communities, founded and managed by the European University Institute of Florence.

(30) This position was articulated organically in a resolution, approved by the central committee of the UEF in Paris on October 6th-7th 1951, in which the hypothesis of German neutrality was rejected and it was established that the federation of western Europe would peacefully modify relations between East and West, and make German unification possible. The UEF then consistently maintained this position. Cfr. S. PISTONE, *La Germania e l'unità europea*, Napoli, Guida, 1978.

(31) See in particular the following writings of SPINELLI: *L'esercito europeo*, in "EF", 16th September 1950, n. 31; *Riarmo tedesco*, Ibid., 30th September 1950, n. 32; *L'ombra di Wallenstein sull'Europa*, Ibid., 14th October 1950, n. 33; *Tardi ma in tempo*, Ibid., 31st October 1950, n. 34; *Osservatorio federalista*, Ibid., 30th January 1951, n. 39.

the expenditure for a European army can only be met by a European treasury; instituting a common power of control over national economies, because the economy is the back bone of military power; having a European government that appoints and controls the European general staff, because the armed forces of the democratic peoples must obey a democratic government. In essence, creating a European army meant nothing less than creating a European federation. Only within such a framework could the European people effectively obtain fully equal rights, rooting out the hegemonic dangers and discriminatory tendencies ingrained in the relationships of power running between completely sovereign states (32).

According to Spinelli, the very nature of the problem of creating a European army without at the same time creating a federal European state (due to a tendency to indefinitely postpone any transfer of sovereignty) was destined to produce very serious difficulties in the work of the intergovernmental conference, which the governments were preparing to entrust with the task of resolving such a problem. These difficulties would end up putting the negotiators in a similar situation to that of the Annapolis Convention in 1786, in which the American delegates, that had convened in order to tackle commercial problems among the American states, argued that they could not fulfil such a task and invited their principals to summon a Convention authorised to draw up the constitution of the American federation for the following year. Therefore, the federalists had to intervene decisively in order to push the European governments to make the jump from Annapolis to Philadelphia, passing from a diplomatic conference to a constituent assembly entrusted to draft a proposal for a federal constitution. The constitution, in the framework of which military and economic integration would have to be implemented, would have to be directly subject to the ratification of the appropriate national constitutional bodies.

These considerations were at the basis of the campaign for the European constituent decided by the 3rd Congress of the UEF which was held in Strasbourg between the November 17th and 19th

(32) Similar considerations were made at the time by Fernand Dehousse. See, F. DEHOUSSE, *L'Europe et le monde. Recueil d'Etudes, de Rapports et de Discours 1945-1960*, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1960.

1950 (33). The congress expressed itself in favour of both the Schuman Plan and the Plevin Plan and, therefore, of German participation in European defence. It also specified that the European army would have to be created within the framework of the construction of a European federation with limited but concrete powers. To such an end, it was no longer possible to aim for a constituent role performed by the Advisory Assembly of Strasbourg. Indeed, a specially created constituent assembly would have to be summoned from those countries willing to accept limitations to their sovereignty. This conclusion was presented to the Council of the Peoples of Europe which was held immediately after the UEF congress, and which, before its closure, appointed a provisional commission entrusted with calling an international conference in Lugano to prepare a proposal for a treaty to be submitted to the governments for the summoning of the constituent.

The UEF contributed decisively to the functioning of this commission and above all of its juridical committee (of which Spinelli (34) was rapporteur), and which formulated a proposal for a Statute for the European constituent and a memorandum containing the outline of a federal constitution which it hoped would be created. These documents were finalised at the conference of Lugano between April 18th and 20th 1951. The most significant aspects of these documents were: the opposition to the method of the specialised authorities of a technocratic nature with the principle of complete political and economic integration achievable under the guidance of a supranational authority of a federal and democratic nature; the choice of allowing the members of the constituent to be appointed by national parliaments instead of directly electing them, thus avoiding the significant delays that the

(33) After the Strasbourg Congress, the positions in the UEF were held as follows: Kogon, president of the central committee, Brugmans (who had become the rector of the European College of Bruges), Dehousse, Giacchero and Germaine Peyroles (vice-president of the French National Assembly), vice-presidents, Frenay, president of the executive office, Usellini, secretary general (replacing Albert Lohest, who, in February 1949 had substituted Raymond Silva). It should be remembered that the congress was attended by representatives of federalist groups in exile in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Spain.

(34) The other members of the juridical committee were Dehousse (president of the committee), Calamandrei, Georges Scelles (University of Paris) and Hans Nawiasky (University of Munich).

latter procedure would have caused; the principle that the proposal drafted by the European constituent could only be either accepted or rejected in its entirety by the national bodies entrusted with ratification, and could not therefore be amended by a diplomatic conference.

The 60 delegates present in Lugano launched an appeal to all the organisations, including those not present at the conference, to undertake with all the means available to them a far-reaching campaign designed to convince the appropriate authorities in the various countries to take the consequent initiative. Immediately after Lugano, the central committee of the UEF officially entrusted Spinelli with the task of leading, as a general delegate of the UEF, the action for a European constituent. In this way, the UEF was effectively run by a triumvirate composed of Spinelli, Frenay (president of the executive office) and Kogon (president of the central committee). In the course of the spring and summer of 1951 around 800 members of parliament from Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Saarland signed a commitment in favour of the European constituent. In the Italian parliament, in which there were more than 200 adhesions, approval was achieved in the following October, with the opposition of the extreme left and extreme right, of a motion (illustrated in the chambers by the two presidents of the federalist inter-group Giacchero and Ferruccio Parri) in which the Italian government was invited to promote the constitution of a European political authority by means of a European constituent.

The campaign for the constituent provided the general framework for the mobilisation of public opinion (35) and the raising of awareness within the political class, where the UEF carried out a cru-

(35) Among the various ways of mobilising public opinion used by the UEF in this period, the following should be remembered: meetings between European citizens on the borders (especially, but not only, on the French-German and French-Italian borders), during which a number of the posts marking the borders were symbolically burned; the European Youth Campaign, organised by the EM, but with a fundamental role of the UEF (in this context, the youth camps at Loreley should be remembered in particular, organised by the Marienberg House of Europe); the distribution of tens of thousands of copies of the pamphlet *L'heure de la fédération européenne*, published by the UEF in various languages; the systematic presence of federalist demonstrators at the most important intergovernmental meetings.

cial action which made a decisive contribution to the creation of article 38 of the EDC and the project for a European Political Community. The fundamental interlocutor of the federalists on a governmental level was De Gasperi, whose pivotal role in this matter is underlined here below (36).

It was the head of the Italian government that wanted and persuaded the other governments to accept the decision to add the construction of a political community to that of a European army. Article 38 of the EDC, which De Gasperi obtained thanks to his obstinate determination and the support of Adenauer in particular, effectively assigned the EDC Assembly with a pre-constituent task. The said assembly would have to formulate a proposal for a political community of a federal or confederal nature, founded on the separation of powers, a bicameral system and direct election of the chamber of the people. Such a project, in the context of which the sectorial communities would have to converge, would be presented to an intergovernmental conference which would then have the final word. Just as decisive was the intervention of De Gasperi with respect to the decision of entrusting the ECSC Assembly, deemed an ad hoc Assembly for such an occasion, with the task of drafting the proposal for a European Political Community.

At the root of De Gasperi's choice there was first of all a clear awareness of the strict convergence between fundamental national interests and a deep-rooted and complete European integration on an economic and political level. The serious problems of social and economic backwardness suffered by Italy, and therefore, the weakness of the state structures and the liberal-democratic system, required parallelism between military (and sectorial in general) and economic integration, managed by supranational institutions of a democratic nature. Only in such a context would Italian efforts find adequate scope for development and would the spirit of solidarity be able to emerge, so that the problems of the most underdeveloped regions of Europe

(36) See in particular: ALCIDE DE GASPERI, *L'Europa. Scritti e discorsi*, edited by Maria Romana De Gasperi, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2004; GIUSEPPE PETRILLI, *La politica estera ed europea di De Gasperi*, Roma, Cinque Lune, 1975; DANIELA PREDÀ, *Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004.

could be treated as on a common European level. Apart from this awareness, which since then has always inspired Italian politics every time the problems of European integration have been faced with rigour and firm commitment (37), De Gasperi had worry for the great difficulty in overcoming socialist/communist obstructionism (38) to the ratification of a proposal for purely military integration.

That said, the decisive intervention of the UEF in relation to article 38 of the EDC was the “Memorandum on the provisional report presented in July 1951 by the conference for the organisation of the EDC”, which Spinelli sent to the Italian government in September 1951 and immediately afterwards to the other five governments of the initial six. In this document — which must be considered as one of the monuments to the struggle for European federation — the innate contradictions of the concept of a European army without a European state were explained with cast iron logic. In particular, two main points were underlined.

First of all, ahead of the various and serious difficulties that the negotiations founded on this proposal had met, there was a tendency in certain delegations to renounce the objective of a European army and to be content with a form of integration of command. In this way, however, a mere coalition of national armies would be created, with the consequent effect of reconstituting the German army, which was the very thing that the EDC project was supposed to avoid, and maintaining the military inefficiency of western Europe, caused by the presence of individual national armies. Secondly, the European military coalition, subtracted from national control and put at the disposal of an Atlantic command centre, would have eventually belonged to the said command centre as troops of tributary states and therefore of states no longer truly sovereign. They would have been substantially similar to the auxiliary troops that the Indian *rajah* supplied to the British Army,

(37) It should also be underlined that the chronic instability of the Italian political system often produced significant inefficiency in the practical translation of the commitment to European unification, and in certain moments (the most significant instances were the Pella government of 1953 and those of Berlusconi in 1994 and between 2001 and 2006) allowed governments who were not fully committed to European unification policy to emerge.

(38) At the time, Pietro Nenni’s socialists were allies of the communists.

or the *reguli* (the kings of the little kingdoms satellites of ancient Rome) to the Romans. As Spinelli said, “by not wanting to create a sovereign European body, the Conference tacitly (proposed) that the European sovereign (be) the American general”.

Starting from these observations, the memorandum subjected the institutions and military organisation proposed by the provisional report to detailed criticism, traced all its contradictions to one fundamental initial contradiction — an army without a state — and proposed in precise terms a constituent procedure. It was stated in particular that the conference on the EDC: 1) would have to recognise the necessity, in order to achieve true unification, of agreement on a text that would define with clarity the European institutional bodies, the powers assigned to them and the relationships between the nation states and the new European state; 2) would also have to recognise its own inability to formulate a text that would be an international treaty up to the moment of national ratification, but which would become the constitution of the new state after ratification and the creation of the appropriate bodies; 3) would therefore have to propose a European constituent assembly elected by national parliaments (“the guardians of the people’s sovereignty”) for reasons of speed, and charged with drafting such a text within six months to be submitted for approval by the nation states.

After this memorandum had been presented the Italian negotiators committed to reach the purview of article 38, which connected the construction of a European army to that of a political community (39). The culmination of the negotiations was reached on Decem-

(39) See: M. ALBERTINI, *La fondazione dello Stato europeo. Esame e documentazione del tentativo intrapreso da De Gasperi nel 1951 e prospettive attuali*, in “*Il Federalista*”, 1978, n. 1; W. LIPGENS, *EVG und politische Föderation. Protokolle der Konferenz der Außenminister der an den Verhandlungen über eine Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft beteiligten Länder am 11 Dezember 1951*, in “*Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*”, 1984, n. 4; S. PISTONE, *Il ruolo di Altiero Spinelli nella genesi dell’art. 38 della CED e del progetto di Comunità Politica Europea*, in *The European Integration from the Schuman-Plan to the Treaties of Rome*, Publications of the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1993; D. PREDÀ, *Storia di una speranza. La battaglia per la CED e la federazione europea*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1990. It should be remembered that in September 1951, the head of the Italian delegation at the conference on the EDC became, replacing Paolo Emilio Taviani, Ivan Matteo Lombardo, a

ber 11th 1951 in Strasbourg at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the six countries of the ECSC, in which De Gasperi presented arguments which were entirely compatible with those of the UEF memorandum. He underlined in particular the extreme difficulties the national parliaments had in accepting the creation of a European army without giving life to an authentic European country which also implied economic solidarity between the various European peoples, and the right to the supranational democratic participation that genuine European citizenship would bring.

As far as the decisions adopted on the December 11th are concerned, it should be remembered that a second UEF memorandum was drawn up by Spinelli and had been sent to the French government during the previous month. Other governments' attention had also been drawn to it. As a reaction to the Schuman's announcement on September 20th 1951, according to which the French would, at the right moment, pose the question of the creation of a supranational political authority in order to formulate a common foreign policy, a purview similar to that contained in article 38 was suggested, but one which eliminated the need for an intergovernmental conference. It was proposed to add a number of clauses to the constitutive treaty of the EDC that attributed to its assembly, apart from its normal functions, the responsibilities of a constituent assembly with the task of drafting a proposal for a Pact for federal union, which would be immediately submitted to the appropriate national authorities for ratification. A future work programme was also put forward, which foresaw approval of the project on the part of the EDC Assembly by December 1952, and its ratification by March 1953.

The coincidence between UEF action towards the European governments, particularly the Italian government, and the birth of article 38 does not mean that this action was the only decisive factor. In the second phase of the EDC negotiations there were at least two other hugely relevant factors at work. On the one hand, the American

former minister who was part of the central committee of the MFE. Cfr. I.M. LOMBARDO, *L'europa che sorge*, Roma, Opere Nuove, 1952. The complete text of Spinelli's memorandum can be found in S. PISTONE (edited by), *L'Italia e l'unità europea*, Turin, Loescher, 1982.

government decided to support the EDC and expressed its position with the clearly federalist declarations made by the supreme allied commander, General Eisenhower (40). This eliminated any scepticism regarding the possibility of arriving at an agreement between the USA, France and Germany for the creation of a European army and pushed the Italian government to contribute decisively and innovatively to the negotiations. On the other hand, the ineluctable logic of the problem of the European army had seen the emergence of an alternative between a sort of European foreign legion to be made available to Eisenhower, and a genuine common army, with a genuine common budget and, therefore, a real common executive and a real common parliament, and therefore had made it possible for the more openly federalist exponents of the national governments (above all, De Gasperi and Ivan Matteo Lombardo) to allow the option of the European constitution to prevail. Anyway without federalist propaganda and mobilisation, and the fierce criticism of false and inadequate solutions, it would have been very difficult for the more advanced sections of the Italian government, and of other governments, to oppose the restrictive tendencies originating from important sectors of diplomacy, the armed forces and the governments themselves. Above all, the federalists were able to suggest to the Italian negotiators the decisive arguments and the procedural methods that would allow the leap from a functional system to a federal-constitutional one.

Immediately after the success obtained with article 38 of the EDC, the UEF devised a new initiative (the bringing forward of the constituent, i.e. to summon it before ratification of the EDC) with the aim of obtaining a direct passage from the constituent to the national

(40) Eisenhower, in 1951-52, had several meetings with the leaders of the UEF, one of which at the MFE headquarters in Rome. Moreover, Frenay and Kogon embarked on a propaganda tour of the USA organised by the *American Committee on United Europe* (it was composed of exponents of US politics and economics in order to provide financial support to the movements for European unity, and its activities would cease in 1959). The American decision to strongly support the EDC, overcoming its initial attitude of distrust (it was feared that the Pleven Plan was only an attempt to play for time) was significantly influenced by Monnet. See PIERRE MELANDRI, *Les Etats Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe 1945-1954*, Paris, Pedone, 1950 and PAOLO EMILIO TAVIANI, *Solidarietà atlantica e Comunità europea*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1958.

parliaments, eliminating the diplomatic conference foreseen by article 38, achieving a better formulation of the mandate to be given to the constituent. The campaign for the constituent at this stage could achieve wider development because it was supported not only by the UEF (41), but also by the EM. Its president, Spaak, had resigned from the presidency of the Advisory Assembly of the Council of Europe on December 11th 1951, coming to the conclusion, a year after the federalists, that it was no longer possible in this organisation to conduct any incisive actions in favour of furthering European integration (42). Following the advice of Spinelli, Spaak promoted the constitution of an Action Committee for the European Constituent formed only by representatives of the national councils of the EM of the ECSC countries. The committee took complete responsibility, with rather more resources and with the ability to obtain even more numerous and influential adhesions, for the campaign which had been led so far by strictly federalist organisations (43). In this way the EM, which had

(41) From March 29th to 31st 1952, the UEF held its fourth ordinary congress in Aachen, which was attended by numerous personalities including Ivan Matteo Lombardo, the French Commissioner in Germany François Poncet and German Chancellor Adenauer, who participated in a public demonstration at the end of the congress. Politically, almost unanimous support was expressed in favour of the action for the European constituent. As far as the leading structure was concerned, Kogon (president of the central committee), Frenay (president of the executive office), Spinelli (general delegate for the constituent campaign), Giacchero, Dehousse and Brugmans (vice-presidents of the central committee, who were joined by De Felice who replaced Peyroles), Usellini (secretary general) and Gabriel Badarau (joined secretary general) were all confirmed in their roles. It should be underlined that numerous exponents of the EUD joined the central committee, including Ernst Friedländer (editorialist of the weekly "*Die Zeit*"), who would later become president of EUD in 1954. It should also be underlined that the central committee was joined by representatives of exiled federalist organisations from Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Lithuania. At the Aachen Congress the UEF had around 200,000 members.

(42) Sandys resigned as president in consideration of the British governments resolutely opposing stance with regard to real progress being made in European unification. He was replaced in November 1950 by Spaak.

(43) The committee, constituted in Paris on March 7th 1952, was composed of Spaak (president), Frenay (secretary), E. Brill (Germany), A. Philip (France), Spinelli, C. Van Rij (Netherlands).

been conceived by British conservatives as a means to obstruct federalist ideas, became a tool of the federalist struggle.

In effect, the International Council of the EM, accepting and improving upon its meeting of May 21st to 23rd 1952 a proposal forwarded by Spinelli, asked the six governments to entrust the task of drafting the project of the European constitution with the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC, which was due to gather within the next few months and which practically coincided to the foreseen parliamentary assembly of the EDC (44). Afterwards, a firm action of pressuring the six governments, particularly the Italian government, was undertaken, and it was Spinelli yet again who took decisive action with a third memorandum sent to the six governments on June 23rd 1952 on behalf of the UEF, and an open letter sent to De Gasperi on behalf of the MFE on June 29th of the same year.

In these documents, the request to entrust the constituent task to the ECSC Assembly was supplemented: by an invitation to allow the French, German and Italian partners to appoint the three supplementary members foreseen by the EDC treaty; by the specification, founded on the reference to the precedent of the Philadelphia Convention, that the assignment of the constituent mandate did not require a special treaty, but a simple message to the Assembly on the part of the council of the six ministers; by a further specification that any mandate given to the Assembly could not be formulated in the insufficiently precise terms of article 38, but had to explicitly ask for the drafting within six months of a proposal for a supranational political community and contain the commitment to its direct transmission for national ratification; by the rejection of the Eden Plan which, in order to restrict any kind of development in a federal sense, proposed to encapsulate all the representative and governmental institutions of

(44) In the report presented at the Luxembourg meeting, Spinelli claimed that the Advisory Assembly of Strasbourg should, following the example of the Convention of Annapolis, invite the parliaments of the initial six to immediately appoint the members of the Assembly foreseen by the EDC treaty and invite them to Luxembourg on October 1st 1952 so that they could begin work as a European Constituent Assembly. The idea of using the ECSC Assembly for such a function was supported by Spaak, who very probably adopted Monnet's suggestion as his own. Cfr. P.-H. SPAAK, *Combats inachevés*, Paris, Fayard, 1952, vol. II, pp. 55-56.

the functional authorities within the confederal framework of the Council of Europe.

Let us compare these documents with the text of the resolution — with a decisive role being played by De Gasperi — approved on September 10th 1952 in Luxembourg by the six foreign ministers of the ECSC, and which allowed the work of the ad hoc Assembly to commence. It can be argued that all the most important requests of the federalists were accepted, with the exception of that relating to the elimination of the diplomatic conference entrusted to examine the ad hoc Assembly's proposal before being sent for national ratification (45). Despite this limitation, the decision of September 10th represented a notable victory for the federalists because the battle commenced in 1949 had finally given prevalence to the principle according to which the representatives of the European people, and not only governments and diplomatic services, should be involved in the definition of the objectives and institutions of European unification (46).

Having achieved such a milestone, the following phase of federalist action was centred on efforts to influence the work of the ad hoc Assembly, trying to persuade it to formulate an as advanced as possible project in a federalist sense. With this task in mind, the Action Committee for the European Constituent had already started to prepare well before September 10th. As far back as March 6th 1952, a Study Committee for the European Constitution had been created, composed of federalist leaders and jurists (47), which by October of the same year

(45) Cfr. D. PREDÀ, *Sulla soglia dell'unione. La vicenda della Comunità Politica Europea (1952-1954)*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1994.

(46) The importance of Spinelli's role in this phase is also underlined by the fact that he contributed to prepare the first two speeches given by Monnet as president of the High Authority of the ECSC (that of August 10th 1952, at the moment the High Authority took office, and that of September 10th at the ad hoc Assembly). Cfr. A. SPINELLI, *Diario europeo*, p. 142.

(47) The members of the committee were: Spaak (president), Dehousse (general secretary), Max Becker (German MP), Benvenuti (Italian MP and undersecretary for foreign trade), Calamandrei, A. Calteux (member of the Luxembourg Superior Court of Justice), De Felice, Frenay, Nawiasky, Hermann Punder (German MP), Spinelli, C. van Rij. Others who participated in the work of the committee as consultants were American teachers from the University of Harvard, Robert R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich, who lead a research group which produced seven volumes of

had formulated nine resolutions containing the fundamental principles of what was intended to become the European constitution (48). Spinelli's role was fundamental also in this case. Not only was he the one to propose the formation of the Committee, but, as is clear from the minutes of its meetings, while the other members provided crucial contributions of a technical nature, Spinelli was the political brain of the Committee, and inspired its most significant decisions (49).

With regard to the influence of the work of the Study Committee for the European Constitution on the works of the ad hoc Assembly, one should remember that the two principal exponents of the latter were the Belgian Dehousse and Italian Benvenuti, both federalists and members of the Study Committee, and that during all the activities of the Assembly the federalists were present behind the scenes, assisting the parliamentary federalists with suggestions and criticisms. As far as the success of this influence is concerned, it was remarkable but not complete. From the comparison between the Statutory project of the EPC drafted by March 10th 1953 and the resolutions of the federalist Study Committee (50), it emerged that on at least four important points, the ad hoc Assembly did not follow the suggestions of the federalists:

Etudes sur le fédéralisme, published by the European Movement in Brussels between December 1952 and November 1953. See also the Italian edition: R. BOWIE & C.J. FRIEDRICH (edited by), *Studi sul federalismo*, foreword by A. Garosci, Milan, Comunità, 1959.

(48) These resolutions were then printed in a pamphlet published in November 1952 by the European Movement in Brussels under the title *Comité d'Etudes pour la Constitution Européenne, Résolutions*. They were republished by, among others, W. LIPGENS, *45 Jahre Ringen um die Europäische Verfassung*, cit.

(49) Cfr. MOUVEMENT EUROPÉEN (CECE), *Projet de statut de la Communauté politique européenne. Travaux préparatoires*, Bruxelles, 1952. This text was published in Italian under the title *Per una costituzione federale dell'Europa. Lavori preparatori del Comitato di Studi presieduto da P.H. Spaak 1952-1953*, edited by D. Preda, Padova, Cedam, 1996.

(50) For a comparison of the resolutions of the federalist study committee and the text of the EPC project cfr.: *Etude comparative du projet de traité portant Statut de la Communauté européenne*, Cahiers Européennes n. 7, published by the European Movement, Brussels, June 1953; A. SPINELLI, *Lo Statuto della Comunità europea*, in ID., *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, cit.; S. PISTONE, *I progetti di costituzione per una unione europea nel secondo dopoguerra*, in "Il Federalista", 1982, n. 1; L. LEVI, *Crisi della Comunità europea e riforma delle istituzioni*, F. Angeli, Milano, 1983.

1) With regard to the model of the ECSC and the project of the EDC, a Council of National Ministers was foreseen, answerable to their respective national parliaments and whose approval, to be given with qualified majorities, or in more important cases, unanimous decisions, would be necessary for a wide range of executive and legislative decisions of the EPC;

2) As far as military powers are concerned, it was established that the EPC possessed the powers of the EDC, transferring in such a way all the defects of the latter to the new Community; if, on the one hand, the Community became the sole organiser of the common army, on the other hand, the powers to ascertain grounds for aggression, to declare war, to mobilise the army and to make peace, remained with the nation states; furthermore, the appointment of a supreme commander of the European armed forces was not foreseen, it was only established that they would be at the disposal of the SHAPE, i.e. a body subordinate to the unanimous decision making of the Atlantic Council;

3) As far as the composition of the two chambers is concerned, instead of accepting the proposal to activate the principle of proportional representation of the people's chamber and that of weighted representation in the chamber of the states, it was established that weighted representation would be applied to both chambers, thus weakening the prestige of the European parliament as it would not be founded on adequate popular representation;

4) Finally, instead of introducing a relatively easy constitutional review procedure, allowing the Community to develop organically, strong rigidity was preferred, prescribing the vote of all the national parliaments for every transfer of power from the states to the Community and the unanimous approval of the national ministers for all amendments.

Alongside these concessions to the upholders of the confederal structures, who aimed to keep the control of European integration ultimately in the hands of the national governments, the EPC's statutory project, which indicated among its objectives complete economic integration (51), contained institutes of a purely federal nature. Specifi-

(51) The fundamental impulse for the inclusion of the objective of a common

cally, there were: a parliament with legislative powers and control over the executive, one of whose chambers had to be directly elected; the court of justice; a supranational executive able to implement the will of the Community through an administration independent from that of the individual states. It is therefore reasonable to sustain that the approval of a similar project would have created rather solid foundations, also taking into account the weakness of the European nation states at that time, on which to quickly build a European federation.

Unfortunately, in the months following the conclusion of the ad hoc Assembly's work, the political situation that had made possible the success of federalist action until the spring of 1953 changed significantly. The most important fact, of a more general nature, was the death of Stalin (5th March 1953) and the consequent emergence of the first hints of international détente. One only needs to think of the armistice in Korea on July 27th, the announcement of the end of the Soviet occupation of Austria (which would then be implemented in 1955 when Vienna recovered its sovereignty), the Geneva conference which gathered the big four on April 2nd 1954 and during which Molotov proposed for the first time a conference on European security, and the armistice in Indochina on July 20th 1954. This change in climate automatically weakened the effectiveness of the driving factor towards the European military integration constituted by the fear of Soviet expansionism and consequently favoured the opposition to integration on the part of the nationalist forces of both left and right. The second important alteration was constituted by the crisis in France regarding the coalition between the Christian-democrats, socialists and radicals, which led to an increase in the influence of the Gaullists on government policy (52) and to the passage of the position of foreign minister from the hands of Schuman to the significantly less Europeanist hands of Bidault (53). The situation deteriorated further and came

market within the EPC project came from Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen. Cfr. BEATE SCHNEIDER and RUDOLF ULLNER, *Europäer aus Tradition: Jan Willem Beyen und Joseph Luns*, in T. JANSEN and D. MAHNCKE (edited by), *op. cit.*

(52) See the pamphlet written by H. Frenay, *La Communauté Européenne de Défense. Réponse au Général de Gaulle*, Paris, C.I.T., 1953.

(53) The federalist front also weakened in France, when the Fédération broke away from the UFF and then from the UEF. The fundamental reason for this divorce

to the government of the anti-Europeanist Mendès-France, which, on the occasion of the vote in the National Assembly of August 30th 1954 which buried the EDC, did not pose the question of confidence. It should be added that a not insignificant contribution to the sinking of the EDC derived from the fall of De Gasperi following the elections of May 1953. In the unstable situation that followed, the Pella government (supported by the monarchic and newfascist Right), in the second half of 1953 opted for a line of short-sighted nationalism with regard to the Trieste question and then for a squalid diplomatic operation which consisted of deliberately delaying the ratification of the EDC to obtain a more favourable attitude to Italian requests from the Americans (who were pushing for rapid ratification) (54). As a result of this delay that the Scelba government, which had succeeded that of Pella, was unable to recover, the Italian government did not achieve ratification of the EDC, unlike the governments of the FRG and the Benelux, and this undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of the position of the Europeanists of the French parliament.

In this increasingly adverse period, which stretched from the presentation of the proposal for the EPC to the fall of the EDC, the UEF fought strenuously to defend the two projects (55). On the one hand it

was the criticism of the constitutionalist line which had become prevalent in the UEF and which, apart from having neglected the fundamental claims of integral federalism, appeared to be too advanced in a supranational sense.

(54) A position severely criticised by the MFE. Cfr. S. PISTONE, *L'Italia e l'unità europea*, cit., pp. 153-154. Also ALFONSO STERPELLONE, *Vent'anni di politica estera*, in ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI, *La politica estera della Repubblica italiana*, edited by Massimo Bonanni, Milan, Comunità, 1967, vol. II, p. 274 and subsequently, where it is clarified, among other things, that unlike Pella, De Gasperi believed that it was necessary to seek an improvement in the Italian position with respect to Trieste, by quickly ratifying the EDC and not resorting to blackmail.

(55) Among the numerous actions carried out by the UEF in this period, the following should be remembered in particular: the two international conventions promoted to influence the press in Bellagio from July 16th to 18th 1952 (150 journalists representing 200 daily newspapers) and in Venice from April 27th to 30th 1953 (more than 500 journalists and the presence of the president of the constitutional committee of the ad hoc Assembly, von Brentano, the French diplomat Hervé Alphand, the US ambassador to the ECSC David Bruce, the vice-president of the French National Assembly André Mutter, the leader of the MRP Pierre Henri Teitgen and Ivan Matteo Lombardo); the gathering of the adhesions of 1,647,395 German citizens in the first few months of 1953 to an appeal in favour of European federation presented to the six for-

showed commitment to the defence of the EPC against the manipulations of the national diplomatic services, but it was unable to prevent them from weakening the federal aspects of the project. On the other hand, it put the governments and parliaments of the initial six under constant pressure with the aim of a rapid ratification of the EDC, counting on the fact that, once approval from the six states had been obtained, the situation would have become significantly more favourable for the attempts to re-propose the more advanced aspects of the EPC project (56).

Within the framework of this action, the most important event was the second Hague Congress held between October 8th and 10th 1953. It was called by the Action Committee for the Supranational European Community, chaired by Spaak and founded in November of the previous year, following a proposal by Spinelli, and was intended as a means of collaboration between the UEF and the elements of the EM in favour of a federal political community. At the same location as the first, the second Hague Congress gathered, apart from the federalists, important political personalities, including the likes of Robert Schuman, Einrich von Brentano, De Gasperi and Teitgen (57).

eign ministers; the continuation of the action at the borders with the display of signals (putting into practice an idea of Claus Schöndube) showing the phrase “Come from Europe and Stay in Europe”; a demonstration of 2000 young federalists in Baden-Baden (during which Franz Josef Strauss made a speech) opposite the venue for the meeting of the six foreign ministers dedicated to the examination of the EPC project.

(56) One should remember that in this period the UEF expressed a position of great value (formulated by Alfred Mozer, secretary of the Dutch labour party and member of the central committee of the UEF) on the question of the Saar which was causing tension between France and Germany. In essence, the UEF launched the idea of transforming the Saar into a European territory, i.e. in a kind of district of Columbia, and the French-Saarese convention of May 1953 took up the essential point of this idea, making explicit reference to a European statute for the region. If the EDC and EPC had come into force, in all probability a European Statute of the Saar would have been created, but with the failure of these two projects and the indefinite postponement of the prospect of political federal union, nationalist solutions prevailed: in the referendum of October 23rd 1955 in which the inhabitants of the Saar were invited to choose between a European statute under the control of the Western European Union and the reunification with the German state, the latter solution was favoured. Cfr. A. MOZER-EBBINGE-R. COHEN (edited by), *Alfred Mozer. Portrait, eines Europäers*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1981.

(57) In the Hague, a procession was also organised in which 5000 young federalists from the six ECSC countries participated.

The most important arguments put forward by the federalists on this occasion were the following:

1) With regard to the problem of détente, which emerged after the death of Stalin, it was held that the effective and permanent resolving of the East-West conflict would only be possible after the transformation of the Soviet communist system towards political democracy and economic and social pluralism. Such a process had its irreplaceable premise in the creation of a European federation. Such an achievement would definitively eliminate national conflicts in Europe, and would further collaboration between Europe and the USA in conditions of equality, promoting extensive social and economic development. This would also make increasingly evident the superiority of democratic civilisation with respect to totalitarianism and generate a gradual erosion of the Soviet system. For this reason, it was imperative to tackle with all available resources the prospect of bargaining between the renouncement of the EDC — which was above all an instrument designed to unify Europe, while the aim of defending the west against the Soviet threat was only a secondary objective — and a more moderate Soviet foreign policy.

2) Particular attention was paid to the question of the common market, indicated in general terms as one of the objectives of the EPC. The report presented by Dutchman Blaisse and approved by the congress asked the member states to constitute within ten years a single customs territory, to create effective coordination of budget, financial and monetary policy, a general harmonisation of social policy, a common investment policy aimed at favouring economic expansion, full employment, and the regeneration of Europe's underdeveloped regions. In essence, had been anticipated the guidelines that would later inspire, after the Conference of Messina, the drafting of the Treaty of Rome. The negotiations on this treaty were effectively directed by the president of the second Hague Congress, Spaak.

3) In the Hague, the strengthening of the powers of the economic and social council foreseen by the ad hoc Assembly was also called for — and here is where integral federalism crept in. In particular, it was requested that such a body had to be consulted in the cases in which projects regarding economic and social conditions were

discussed, specifically improvements in the standard of living, full employment and the migration of labour.

4) Finally, the intervention of the governments on the project of the ad hoc Assembly was criticised. The Congress Hague therefore maintained that the definitive project of the EPC had to be entrusted to the ad hoc Assembly and to the council of ministers, which would then have to implement a procedure of constitutional joint decision-making. If the governments had not accepted this appeal, the ad hoc Assembly would have had to gather again and take the necessary decisions to confront the situation.

In the end, despite all its efforts, the UEF was unable to avoid the heavy defeat of August 30th 1954, in which the sinking of the EDC also led to that of the EPC (58). Some say that this defeat was also due to an excessively hasty attitude. The fact that there was a transition, largely thanks to the federalist action, from a sectoral system to a federalist political system would therefore have made the ratification of the EDC even more difficult, therefore harming the cause of European unity. I believe, however, that precisely the opposite is true. If the governments had fully accepted the proposals contained in the first UEF memorandum, i.e. if they had summoned the constituent assembly immediately instead of postponing it with the purview of article 38, the problem of political union would have been top of the agenda in public debate right from the beginning, together with that

(58) It should be remembered that within the framework of the UEF the problem of decolonisation was also confronted, coinciding with the collapse of the EDC, which occurred in the same period as the conclusion of the first war in Indo-China. With regard to France's African colonies, the idea put forward was one of their complete political and economic emancipation within the framework of a united Europe conceived as a "Eurafrica". This concept picked up the stances expressed by the Senegalese French MP Léopold Sedar Senghor, member of the ad hoc Assembly and future president of the independent Senegal. He insisted on the rapid achievement of a European federation, partly because in such a way Africa would have a common institutional, political and economic future with Europe. As far as Indo-China (and Asia in general), the valid choice was one of total independence, as occurred in India and the Philippines. The concession of independence, accompanied by significant development aid (which had to be supplied by Europe and not the colonial powers), was indicated as the high road to take in order to encourage democracy in Asia as an alternative to communism. In particular, see A. SPINELLI, *Indocina: problema europeo*, in "EF", 1954, n. 3.

of complete economic union. The problem of military union, destined, due to its very nature, to facilitate the propaganda of opponents of European union, i.e. the nationalists, would have not been dominant in the debate. Moreover, maybe it would have been possible to reach definitive decisions before the fatal change of circumstances linked to the death of Stalin. In facts, it should not be forgotten that the French National Assembly — the same one that caused to EDC to fall on August 30th 1954 with 319 votes against 264 — had approved on February 19th 1952, with 327 votes against 287, the principle of the European army, setting certain conditions including the subordination of the European army to a supranational political power (59).

That said, it can be added that human events depend, according to a famous sentence pronounced by Machiavelli, half on virtue and half on luck. This represented adversity to the federalists, though they refused to surrender.

(59) For a reconstruction of the debate which was waged in those years, see RAYMOND ARON and DANIEL LERNER, *La querelle de la CED*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1956.

III

CRISIS AND SPLIT OF THE UEF IN THE YEARS OF THE BIRTH AND BEGINNINGS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1954-1963)

SUMMARY: 3.1. The relaunching of European integration. — 3.2. The new course of federalist action launched by Spinelli. — 3.3. The UEF Split. — 3.4. The Congress of the European People. — 3.5. The reapproaching between the supranational European Federalist Movement and the European Federalist Action.

3.1. *The relaunching of European integration.*

The fall of the EDC provoked serious repercussions in the UEF. Until that moment, the organisation had registered continuous growth and had exerted significant influence on the development of European integration. The strategy of the European constituent, formulated and guided by Spinelli, had been accepted by the group of movements striving for European unity and had led the federalists, with the ad hoc Assembly and the EPC project, to the verge of European federation. With the defeat of August 30th 1954, internal dissent, no longer held back by the prospect of success, dramatically flared up and caused a split in the UEF. As a consequence, there was a significant organisational weakening of the federalists and a substantial loss of influence. The division would be formally overcome with the re-foundation of the UEF in 1973, which constituted the culmination of a reconciliatory process between its separate components which had begun in 1963. In consideration of such a turning point the third chapter covers the period up to the aforementioned years.

The basis of the split was fundamentally the diverging opinions regarding the initiatives in favour of European integration adopted by the governments after the fall of the EDC, and which led to the sign-

ing of the Treaties of Rome. It is therefore useful to begin such an analysis with a description of the said initiatives.

Once the EDC's project, as well as that of the EPC, had failed, the governments had to find alternative solutions. The first question obviously regarded German rearmament, which could no longer be put off and that found a different solution to the supranational proposal put forward by Schuman, Pleven, Adenauer, De Gasperi and Spaak. The line that prevailed was that of restoring state sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the subsequent reconstruction of a national German army within the framework of NATO and that of a European organisation, the Western European Union (WEU), which held no supranational power whatsoever. The new institution, which thanks to the initiative of Great Britain emerged from the agreements of London and Paris of September and October 1954, did nothing more than pick up where the Western Union, created by the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, had left off, and whose responsibilities had largely been absorbed by NATO (regarding defensive cooperation) and by the Council of Europe (in the field of cultural cooperation). With the WEU, the Treaty of Brussels was extended to Germany and Italy and was supplemented by a more complex institutional framework, including a Council of Ministers deliberating unanimously and a Parliamentary Assembly with purely consultative powers. As such, the real task of this institution essentially consisted in verifying that German rearmament remained within the strictly functional limits designed to contribute to the defence of western Europe organised under American hegemony (1).

Having resolved the question of German rearmament in such terms, the issue of how to resume the policy of European integration had to be confronted. In effect, despite the dramatic crisis produced by the vote of August 30th 1954, and even though there were fewer favourable factors constituted by the acute phase of the cold war and American pressure, the impulse of the governments of the original Six to proceed with European construction had not been dampened. This had profound roots in the historical crisis of the nation states, or rather

(1) Cfr. H. BRUGMANS, *op. cit.*, pp. 205 sgg. E WILLEM VAN EEKELLEN, *Debating European Security 1948-1998*, The Hague, Sdu Publishers, 1998.

in their structural inability to confront the fundamental problems of economic development, democratic progress and security, challenges which imposed the alternative “unite or perish”. These were added to by the permanent need (also averted by German democratic movements as well as those of the partners) to frame the German dynamics within an increasingly profound integration as well by the success of the ECSC.

If the stimuli to proceed with integration were strong, it was, on the other hand, clear for the governments that they had to limit the integration to the economic sphere. This, unlike political and military integration, would have not raised from the outset the issue of transferring fundamental aspects of sovereignty to supranational bodies, an issue which had caused the EDC to come to a standstill. Furthermore, within the framework of bipolar system, the question of security appeared to have been resolved inside the western bloc built with the hegemony of the United States. The fundamental decision to be made was therefore whether to continue with a vertical form of economic integration, i.e. in a limited sector in accordance with the ECSC model, or to commit to a form of horizontal economic integration, which involved the economy in its entirety. The former option was supported by Monnet, who considered complete economic integration too ambitious and too unlikely to be accepted by France. He therefore proposed the idea of a European Community for Atomic Energy (Euratom) (2), convinced that in such a way a limited but strategically important sector would be integrated, and that the French government would be encouraged to approve this project partly in the interests of building a national nuclear arsenal. The option of the common market, on the other hand, was sustained above all by Beyen, Spaak and Joseph Bech (foreign ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium and Lux-

(2) After abandoning the presidency of the High Authority of the ECSC, on October 13th 1955 Monnet founded the Action Committee for the United States of Europe which included authoritative political and trade union personalities from the six founding countries. With the support of this committee, which was in operation until the beginning of the 1970s, he carried forward various proposals regarding the development of European integration, including that referring to the institution of the European Council. Cfr. PASCAL FONTAINE, *Le Comité d'Action pour les États-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet*, Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1974.

embourg respectively), and their memorandum was substantially approved by the German and Italian governments.

The Conference of June 1st and 2nd 1955, which gathered in Messina and Taormina the foreign ministers of the ECSC (as well as the aforementioned three, Italy's Gaetano Martino, Germany's Walter Hallstein and France's Edgar Faure (3)) in order to discuss the re-launch of European integration, while not completely discarding Monnet's proposal, decided to focus essentially on horizontal economic integration (4). This decision proved to be of enormous historical importance because, while Euratom did not generate any significant developments, the EEC would become the supportive framework for the integration process and its most significant progress.

It should be underlined at this stage that the decision to favour horizontal economic integration, while generally representing an answer to the historical crisis of the nation states, which imposed the creation of an economy of continental dimensions, was based on a specific factor dialectically linked with the federalist struggle for the EPC. It is a fact, as has been well documented, that the federalists contributed decisively to the extension of the project for a European army into a wider-reaching design for federal union which would include European economic union among its objectives. Moreover, it is a fact that this objective had aroused great expectations on the part of public opinion and in the more advanced economic sectors. As a consequence, the collapse of the EDC and the closely linked EPC posed the problem of how to revive such frustrated hopes, and this was clearly a factor that influenced the decision of Messina to set the economic aspects of the EPC project as the preferential axis through which to re-launch the integration process (5).

(3) At the negotiations on European relaunch, a representative of the British government was initially present as an observer, and stated: "The future contract that you are about to discuss has absolutely no chance of being approved. If it were to be approved, it would have absolutely no chance of being applied. If it were to be applied, it would be unacceptable for Great Britain".

(4) On the Conference of Messina and, more generally, on the birth of the Treaties of Rome, see ENRICO SERRA (edited by), *The relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1989.

(5) Cfr. HANS JÜRGEN KÜSTERS, *Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsge-*

Returning to Messina, another relapse of the ill-fated battle for the EPC should be highlighted, namely the choice, also of great historical importance, of the method through which to define the juridical and institutional framework that would further the integration process. The crucial point to be underlined in this regard is that, rather than immediately allocating the task of formulating new treaties to a classic intergovernmental conference, the Conference of Messina decided to entrust a study group with the assignment of evaluating the feasibility of the two projects put forward (the European Common Market and the common organisation of the peaceful development of atomic energy) and to offer proposals to such an end. The Spaak Committee was a group of experts appointed by European governments and institutions, but led by a political coordinator. The firm political leadership of the committee was ensured, as its name suggests, by the figure who, in the position of president of the European Movement from 1950 to 1954, together with Spinelli, had led the battle for the EPC, performing, among other things, the crucial role of chairman of the ad hoc Assembly (6).

The work carried out by the Spaak Committee concluded with a report, containing advanced and detailed proposals, which was presented to the conference of foreign ministers held in Venice of May 29th to 31st 1956. Spaak, like its chairman, had made a great contribution to this work by adopting a substantially similar approach to that used by the previously mentioned Committee of Studies for the European Constitution, which under the leadership of Spaak and Spinelli, had contributed decisively to the work of the ad hoc Assembly (7). In effect, the debate within the Spaak Committee concentrated on work-

meinschaft, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1982 and ROY PRYCE (edited by), *The Dynamics of European Union*, London, Croom Elm, 1987; Pierre Gerbet, 1957, *La naissance du Marché commun*, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 2007.

(6) Cfr. LUIGI VITTORIO MAJOCCHI (edited by), *Messina quarant'anni dopo. L'attualità del metodo in vista della Conferenza intergovernativa del 1996*, Bari, Cacucci, 1996 and S. PISTONE, *The Messina Conference and the Development of the European Unification*, in "The Federalist", 2005, n. 3.

(7) It should be remembered that Lodovico Benvenuti was a member of the Spaak Committee, and he had also been member of the Study Committee for the European Constitution and the ad hoc Assembly.

ing documents whose fundamental sections had been previously prepared by some of the chairman's most faithful collaborators, in particular Pierre Uri and Hans von der Groeben, and it concluded with a number of resolutions which aimed to provide the basis for the sections and paragraphs of the future treaties. The Spaak Committee's final report in effect had a crucial influence on the work of the inter-governmental conference that approved the texts of the Treaties of Rome. This was due not only to the considerable depth and clarity of its content, but also to the fact that the report was revealed in advance to the public, earning widespread consensus and significantly raising expectations which strongly influenced intergovernmental negotiations and therefore weakened the nationalistic resistance which was structurally emerging during the said negotiations.

In a certain sense, it could be said that a small part of the constituent method supported by the federalists was acknowledged in Messina!

The positive conclusion of the re-launch of the integration process initiated in the Sicilian city, it is worth highlighting again, was also favoured by the two international crises which occurred in 1956. On the one hand, Soviet military intervention in Hungary dramatically demonstrated the inability of a divided Europe to positively influence the evolution of central-eastern Europe which was subject to Soviet hegemony. On the other hand, the failure, due to the converging opposition of the USA and the USSR, of the Anglo-French military intervention against Nasser's Egypt, who had nationalised the Suez Canal Company, was a crippling blow to the two country's remaining ambitions of power and imperialism. This matter reinforced the influence over the choices of the French government — loath to confront the challenge of the dismantling of economic protectionism — on the part of those who were aware that European integration constituted the true historical alternative to the colonial empire which was now in inexorable decline (8).

With the signing of the Treaties of Rome on March 25th 1957,

(8) Cfr. WILFRIED LOTH, *Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939-1957*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck-Ruprecht, 1990.

just a little over two and a half years after the rejection of the EDC, the ECSC was joined by two new economic communities. The EEC, which was by far the most important, had the extremely ambitious objective of implementing in stages not only a customs union supplemented by a common agricultural policy, but nothing less than a common market, implying the complete freedom of the circulation of goods, people, capital and services. In essence, the aim was to pursue a genuine internal market among the countries of the European Community, or rather an economic system similar to that already existing within the individual countries. Therefore, alongside provisions of a “negative” nature, i.e. tending to eliminate all restrictions to the four freedoms, measures of a “positive” (although in rather less clear-cut terms) nature were foreseen, aiming to overcome the territorial, sectoral and social imbalances characterising the economies of the Six, and the general objective of harmonising national economic policies.

The institutions foreseen for the implementation of the common market were inspired by the ECSC model, but with the significant difference that the Council of Ministers was considerably strengthened, concentrating legislative power and a large part of executive powers within its mandate. Substantially, the functionalistic vision that inspired the EEC treaty emphasised the automatic consequences of economic integration. It was expected that the progress of such integration would give rise to an increasing level of solidarity between member states and thus facilitate both the strengthening of the federal embryos present in European institutions and the subsequent transition from economic to political integration.

3.2. The new course of federalist action launched by Spinelli.

Let us now analyse the disagreements that emerged between the federalist ranks in the evaluation of the post-EDC situation and the government initiatives for the relaunching of European integration and in deciding what was to be done about it. The fundamental clash occurred between the disciples of Spinelli and those of Brugmans and Friedländer. We shall begin with an illustration of these two positions starting with that of Spinelli, which was certainly the more articulate

and developed in depth of the two. Afterwards, we will go back over the defining moments of the split in the UEF.

The failure of the EDC, according to Spinelli, required a radical review of the position towards the Europeanist government policy that the UEF had pursued from 1949 up to 1954. This line had essentially consisted of an attempt to push the six governments — through a common action of mobilising public opinion and advising the more advanced sectors and personalities of the national political classes — into initiating a democratic constituent procedure within the framework of the functionalistic integration policy. The fall of the EDC and EPC and the subsequent agreements of London and Paris, which led to the WEU and national German rearmament within the NATO structure, marked in Spinelli's analysis a crucial turning point in the policy of European unification, namely the end of an "era of Europeanist governments" (9). The fact that the governments of the six countries, even though they were structurally orientated, like all national governments, towards the preservation of the absolute sovereignty of their respective states, had initiated in the early 1950s a European policy so advanced that it led them to accept the recommendations of the federalists was linked to a particularly favourable historical situation, of which four fundamental factors were underlined.

Firstly, the six states of the "Little Europe" were in a state of such prostration and weakness that the forces with interests in the preservation of national sovereignty and with their foundations in diplomacy, high level civil and military bureaucracy and in public and private economic sectors profiting from economic nationalism, were forced onto the back foot. Secondly, Stalin's Russia struck fear into all western countries with the manifestation of expansionist ambitions and pushed the democratic ruling classes, especially those in which the communist parties were strongest, to look beyond their national self-

(9) A. SPINELLI, *Nuovo corso*, in "EF", 1954, n. 10, republished in ID., *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1960, which contains the most important of Spinelli's writings between 1949 and 1959; ID., *Lo sviluppo del moto per l'unità europea dopo la seconda guerra mondiale*, in *L'integrazione europea*, edited by Charles Grove Haines, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1957, republished in A. SPINELLI, *Il progetto europeo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985.

ishness. Thirdly, the USA, that with its initially economic and subsequently military aid, exerted great influence over democratic Europe, was convinced that it had a duty not only to protect western Europe from a military point of view, but also to accompany it towards ultimate union. Lastly, there was the crucial problem of the economic and military reconstruction of West Germany which, in a period in which the memory of German expansionism was still fresh in the mind, pushed above all the French government towards a supranational framework widely perceived as the only solution that could resolve the German question at grass roots level.

The extenuation of the first three factors favouring pro-European policy on the part of the governments was the fundamental reason, according to Spinelli's analysis, for the collapse of the EDC. With the relative readjustment of the national economies, thanks to American aid which had been given in order to facilitate European unification, but which had obtained scarce results to such an end, the forces of national preservation had begun to prevail and had become increasingly intolerant towards the prospect of conceding concrete powers to supranational institutions. On the other hand, the international situation had changed. Following the death of Stalin, a power shift in the Soviet leadership had occurred which, allowing the emergence of prospects for a thaw in the cold war and *détente*, had weakened the propensity towards supranational solutions on the part of those who had converted to Europeanism more for a reflex of fear than due to a clear comprehension of the historical need to go beyond the concept of the national sovereign state. Furthermore, American support for European unification had lessened and, in any case, America's ability to influence European countries had diminished, meaning that national diplomacies had become more skilful in curbing the initiatives of pro-European ministers.

After the decision to accept the national rearmament of West Germany within the framework of NATO and the creation of a European organisation with no real power such as the WEU (10), a

(10) For the federalists' criticism of the WEU and the proposal, which at the time was discussed without reaching any concrete decisions, for a European armament pool, see A. CHITI-BATELLI, *Europa 1955*, Rome, Campagna Europea della Gioventù,

consequence of the collapse of the EDC, a national rather than European solution was provided to the problem which more than any other had pushed the pro-European governments to seriously commit to an attempt to move from functionalism to federalism. In the fresh circumstances that had thus been created, it no longer appeared realistic to expect from national governments pro-European policies which would go beyond mere cooperation between sovereign states and the creation of pseudo-supranational institutions.

On the basis of this analysis, Spinelli proposed a new course of action to the UEF, that can be concisely defined as a commitment to fully implement the basic theory that had been at the heart of the foundation of the MFE during the second world war. The central nucleus of the Ventotene Manifesto was, as seen, the conviction that governments and national parties would not be able to spontaneously achieve the creation of a genuine European federal union. In order to encourage them to go beyond an inadequate and precarious policy of international cooperation, it was absolutely essential to create a federal political force independent of governments and parties, organised on a supranational basis, capable of mobilising public opinion on a large scale and able to exploit to its own advantage the severe crises that the nation states were destined for, given their inbred inadequacy ahead of the challenges of the modern world. This conviction, which had been largely overshadowed in the initial phase of European unification by the assumption, linked to a contingent and unrepeatable historical situation, of a largely inspiring and advisory role for governments, became, after the heavy defeat of 1954, the basic guiding criteria of the political line supported by Spinelli.

There were four main aspects in this new orientation. Firstly, it carried with it an attitude of opposition without compromise towards governments and of intransigent denouncement of all those Europeanist initiatives that did not foresee the creation of institutions of a federal nature and the participation of the public in their creation. The objective was to formulate a perfectly federal constitution which

1955; ID., *Il palio dei grulli. Il carattere pseudoeuropeo dell'UEO e delle attuali pseudoproposte d'integrazione continentale*, pamphlet published and reproduced by the MFE in Rome in 1955.

would surpass the limits of the EPC. The essential procedure for the achievement of such an objective had to be the full implementation of the democratic constituent method. Therefore, any body with a legitimate mandate to draft the European constitution could not be composed either by diplomats or by delegations of national parliaments, but had to be directly elected by the European people, and the constitution voted by it would have to be ratified not by national parliaments but by popular referenda (11).

In order to construct a political force capable of forcing governments, whenever the situation was ripe, to summon the European constituent, it was necessary — and this is the second aspect — to launch a far-reaching and long term campaign to raise public awareness of the illegitimacy of the nation states that, incapable of guaranteeing the freedom, safety and economic welfare of their people, could no longer justify their demands for the obedience of their laws in areas such as foreign, military and economic policy, in which they thus legislated unlawfully (12). This campaign was supposed to mobilise public opinion in support of the European constituent outside national political frameworks.

According to Spinelli and his disciples, the vast majority of the European people, particularly of those in the “Little Europe”, were in favour of European unity because they detected the impotence of the nation states. In such a sense, a European people existed. Such a

(11) As well as in various resolutions and articles, this request was expressed in an MFE memorandum, entitled “The action in favour of European unification in the present circumstances”, and sent on February 7th 1955 to Prime Minister Scelba, Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino and to all Italian members of parliament. See also A. SPINELLI, *Il modello costituzionale americano e i tentativi di unità europea*, in *La nascita degli Stati Uniti d’America*, edited by Luciano Bolis, Milan, Comunità, 1957, republished in *Il progetto europeo*, cit.

(12) The federalist criticism of the sovereign nation states in that period found authoritative support in an essay written by Georges Vedel, in which he argued that democracy, although originally a national concept, would be in danger if it remained in the restrictive context of sovereign states and therefore had to be established on a supranational level. Cf. G. VEDEL, *L’état souverain contre la démocratie*, in “*Informations fédéralistes*” (internal bulletin of the UEF published in Paris from 1953 to 1956), 1955, n. 21-22 (Italian translation in *Piccola antologia federalista*, Roma, Giovane Europa editrice, 1956, which also contains the Manifesto di Ventotene and texts written by Denis de Rougemont, Luigi Einaudi, Ivo Murgia and Jean Monnet.

people, however, was not to be intended as one of a national nature, since it was composed of different nationalities. Rather it was a community of citizens that had been seriously damaged with regard to their material interests, needs and ideals by the historical crisis of the nation states and that aspired, albeit confusedly, to defeating such a situation through European unity. This widespread aspiration could not, however, be effectively expressed through the structures and procedures of national politics (parties, elections, the forming of national governments), which only allowed the people of each individual country to be mobilised for objectives of national policy. The task of the federalists was therefore to create the tools for supranational political intervention which could permit the European people to recognise the need to build a European federation through the democratic constituent method and to make such a will felt outside the conditionings produced by national political institutions.

The fundamental tool proposed by Spinelli for the realisation of such an objective was the Congress of the European People (CEP), which was inspired by the Indian People's Congress founded by Gandhi in India's struggle for independence. The idea was essentially to organise, with one eye on the example of the United States of America, a series of primary elections in the cities of Europe in order to give rise to a congress of representatives of the European people. This, through the progressive involvement of millions of people, would achieve the necessary democratic legitimacy and political weight to force the governments to summon the European constituent.

The third aspect of the new course proposed by Spinelli regarded the structure of the UEF. It found itself faced with a choice of being either a federal movement, i.e. a coherent centre of political action able to take valid decisions for all members and to enforce them, which required the strengthening of the powers of European bodies over local ones, or an international one, i.e. a centre of information and coordination of national sovereign organisations. The reform of the UEF was imposed, according to Spinelli, not by a sudden centralising spirit, but by the need to implement effective action on a European level aimed at forcing governments to choose the constituent and not at simply advising them within a context which objec-

tively favoured a very advanced pro-European policy. Substantially, a struggle which aimed to radically surpass the system of intergovernmental international cooperation in favour of a federal state presumed an organisation of federalists which went beyond the organisational formula of political parties, i.e. of the internationals, which had always failed in the past, because they were structurally incapable of looking beyond nationalistic visions and interests.

The proposal for the campaign to mobilise the public against the nation states and in favour of the federal constituent was accompanied by the conviction — and this was the fourth important aspect of this new direction — that such a strategy involved the initiation of a long term political battle. In the short term, there did not appear to be any chance of pushing governments to make significant concessions to federalist demands because the nation states, although they were historically condemned to inexorable decadence, did not find themselves in a phase of acute crisis. However, the impossibility of resolving fundamental problems within the framework of cooperation between sovereign states, and the inadequacy of a pro-European policy incapable of escaping such a framework, would sooner or later lead to situations of severe crisis in which the “unite or perish” alternative would decisively weaken nationalistic resistance. It was vital to be properly prepared for this appointment with a federalist political movement organised on a supranational level, one which enjoyed wide public consensus and was thus able to force, rather than just plead with national governments (13).

(13) See A. SPINELLI, *Il Manifesto dei federalisti europei*, Guanda, Parma, 1957, republished in an anastatic edition by the Regional Federation of Latiun of the AIC-CRE, edited by Gabriele Panizzi, Rome, 2006. This text was also published in German (*Manifest der europäischen föderalisten*, Frankfurt a. M., Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1958) and in French (*Projet de Manifeste des fédéralistes Européens*, Paris, S.E.E., 1957). In that period, Carl Joachim Friedrich also intervened in favour of a public opinion mobilisation campaign in support of the European constituent, after contributing to the work of the Study Committee for the European Constitution. See, by FRIEDRICH, *Potere costituente*, a pamphlet published in the *Piccola Biblioteca di Europa Federata* in Rome, 1956 and partially published in “EF”, 1955, n. 19. By FRIEDRICH, see also *Europa-Nation im Werden*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1972. See furthermore EUGENIO GUCCIONE, *Il fallimento della CED e l'idea di federalizzazione in Carl Joachim Friedrich*, Torino, Giappichelli, 2007.

Within the framework of this general political line, Spinelli and his followers expressed, as well as their view of the WEU as a nonentity, a radically critical judgement of the Treaties of Rome, the fundamental argumentations of which had been developed ever since the emergence of the early proposals that led to the Conference of Messina. These argumentations were then articulated in an increasingly far-reaching and detailed manner in relation to the development of the Spaak Committee's work and intergovernmental negotiations, and with regard to the specification of the form and content of the re-launch agreed in Messina. In the end, the signing of these treaties made a detailed critical analysis possible, and this led to confirmation of the negative judgement formed right at the beginning of the re-launch. Given the logical consistency of this judgement, it is appropriate to examine it here in detail according to an essentially thematic, rather than chronological, criterion (14).

First of all, it is necessary to specify that Spinelli's criticism of the Treaties of Rome was in reality a criticism of the EEC. Euratom was actually given rather limited attention. In effect, ever since the beginning of discussions on this Community there had been a conviction that, given the extremely limited nature of its powers (which in the end turned out to be restricted further with respect to Monnet's initial design), even if it had been able to achieve its objectives, this would not have allowed real and significant progress towards European unification, in the same way that such progress had not been made by the

(14) The fundamental writings of Spinelli containing the MFE's criticism of the Treaties of Rome are gathered in *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, cit.. The main stances of the MFE regarding the European re-launch are published in *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit. and in "EF". The most complete and systematic formulation of the MFE's criticism of the Treaties of Rome is that contained in A. CHITI BATELLI, *I Trattati del Mercato Comune e dell'Euratom visti da un federalista*, two cyclostyled pamphlets comprising a total of 277 pages published by the MFE in 1957 and 1958. See, also for bibliographic information, S. PISTONE, *Il Movimento Federalista Europeo e i Trattati di Roma*, in ENRICO SERRA (edited by), *The relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*, cit. It should be remembered that the six ministers who gathered in Messina received at the beginning of their work a federalist delegation composed of members of parliament Ugo La Malfa and Giuseppe Caron and by the vice-secretary of the MFE Luciano Bolis, illustrating the above mentioned MFE memorandum.

Europ freight wagons, the postal union, the telegraphic union and in general all international agencies with restricted sectional tasks (15).

As such, attention was essentially focused on the EEC, which had a far more ambitious objective, that of unifying the entire European market as a basis from which to proceed towards political union. In relation to this project, it was first of all developed an axiomatic criticism. It was believed, on the basis of the fundamental teachings contained in the *Federalist* of Hamilton, Madison and Jay and picked up by contemporary economists such as Robbins and Einaudi (16), that the effective European economic unification of several sovereign states was impossible without a preliminary political union that limited sovereignty and created a federal, supranational power. There were two fundamental issues in which this axiom was articulated, which had guided the MFE's criticism of the gradualist-sectoral approach right from the beginning of the policy of European unification.

In the first place, the economic union of those European states willing to move seriously in this direction held its presupposition in the unification of their foreign and defence policies, because no state would be willing to forego, as was implied in the concept of economic union, its own economic independence — a condition of its political

(15) MARIO ALBERTINI, *Nenni e l'atomo*, in "EF", 1957, n. 1, in which it was stated that it would be possible to utilise Euratom to create a national nuclear armament, and in which the decision of the Italian Socialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni (who had rejected the ECSC and the EDC as the German Social Democrats had done), to support pro-European governmental policy was criticised.

(16) The main writings of Robbins and Einaudi on the need to create a single European market and the need for the constitution of a political federation in order to implement it are collected in LIONEL ROBBINS, *Il federalismo e l'ordine economico internazionale*, edited by Guido Montani, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985 and LUIGI EINAUDI, *La guerra e l'unità europea*, cit.. The thesis of the priority of political union with respect to economic union at that time was also authoritatively supported by ERNESTO ROSSI, *L'unione economica europea*, in *Sei lezioni federaliste*, Rome, 1954; ID., *Aria fritta*, Bari, Laterza, 1956. His criticism of the Treaties of Rome was moreover accompanied by the conviction that there was no real chance of success for the fight for a European federation. In this regard, see the Spinelli's criticism of Rossi in "EF", 1956, n. 9-10. With regard to Robbins, it should be remembered that when European unification was underway he abandoned his convictions in favour of European federation and manifested an orientation in favour of integration on an Atlantic level. Cfr. L. ROBBINS, *Autobiography of an Economist*, London, Macmillan, 1971.

autonomy and military security — without serious guarantees that could only be founded on the existence of federal institutions entrusted with coherently ensuring the independence and the defence of the territory of all adhering states. Furthermore, since relations with other states could not help but influence the economic development of the states involved in unification, a common foreign policy was crucial, which would only be possible on the basis of political and military union, in order to be able to achieve truly unitary economic union.

Secondly, only the existence, right from the beginning of the process of economic unification, of a supranational authority founded on the direct democratic consensus of the people of the countries participating in such a process would allow the powerful and deep-rooted protectionist interests present in the various states to be defeated as well as the prevalence of the general interest of the people in the creation of a single European economic system. As no-one could hope to be able to install and maintain a unitary economy in a single country while subjecting it to a council of provincial governors, neither did it make any sense to believe that a single economy could be created and maintained on the basis of cooperation between national sovereign governments, structurally orientated to favouring national interests over and above common European ones (17).

Guided by this theoretic perspective, the MFE developed a criticism towards the constitutive treaty of the EEC whose fundamental content naturally regarded institutional aspects. The common thread running through this institutional criticism was the rejection of the doctrine according to which the European Communities, if they did not have the characteristics necessary to be assimilated into a federal state, were nevertheless clearly distinct from traditional international organisations founded on the preservation of the absolute sovereignty of the member states. They constituted an intermediate category positioned between “international” and “federal” characterised by the specific principle of supranationality, or to be more precise,

(17) This argument was then sharply developed by MICHEL DERUET, *Réalités Européennes*, with a foreword by Georges Vedel, UEF pamphlet, Paris, 1957. By MICHEL DERUET, see also *La machine sociale. Fondements scientifiques du fédéralisme*, Antibes, 1992.

by the presence of federal aspects or embryos alongside the typical aspects of traditional international organisations. According to this doctrine (18) the fundamental federal embryos present in the institutions of the EEC were: the independence of the Executive Commission from national governments; the immediate effectiveness of EEC laws and jurisprudence; the principle of majority voting on the part of the Council of Ministers, of which gradual introduction was foreseen for certain important issues in place of unanimous voting; the fact that the parliamentary assembly, although holding only consultative power with respect to the issuing of community legislation, nevertheless held the power of executive control through the institute of censure to the Commission, and its direct election through a one-man-one-vote procedure was foreseen in the future.

The criticism in this regard highlighted above all a regression with respect to two very important aspects present in the institutional structure of the ECSC, namely the decisive scaling down, confronted with the High Authority, of the Commission to the advantage of the central role of the Council of Ministers (which gathered legislative power and a significant part of executive power) and the lack of own resources for the community budget. Apart from this, the decisive issue regarded a lack of capacity of enforcement with own means which is the fundamental characteristic of a true government. Since military and financial resources were to remain in the hands of the member states, the EEC had to rely on the goodwill of governments in making the will of the European institutions executive. This situation also made it illusory to believe that the principle of majority voting could be translated into a working reality. Indeed, given the impossibility to impede the secession of any state unwilling to continue its participation in the European unification process, it was inevitable that, according to the logic of international organisations founded on

(18) See in particular NICOLA CATALANO, *La Comunità economica europea e l'Euratom*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1957. The fundamental text of the MFE's criticism in this regard is the second volume of *I Trattati del Mercato Comune e dell'Euratom visti da un federalista*, by Chiti-Batelli, cit., which provides a comprehensive overview of the debate carried out up to that point on the juridical nature of the European Communities, and sides with that part of the doctrine that tended to deny the originality of the Communities with respect to traditional international organisations.

the preservation of absolute sovereignty, the system of unanimous voting, despite being contrary to the provisions of the treaty, would be maintained. As the years of experience of the ECSC demonstrated, the EEC's Council of Ministers would also end up functioning on the basis of compromises between the national governments that did not displease anyone and therefore according to the rule of the lowest common denominator. Finally, with regard to the Parliamentary Assembly, it was underlined that it held a power of control, by means of censure (which required a qualified majority — half plus one of the members and two thirds of voters — rather difficult to achieve), over the Commission which was a caricature of government, but not over the Council which was the highest decision-making authority of the EEC. The possible direct election of the assembly was on the other hand considered to be contrary to the most elementary democratic principles, given this body's lack of powers, and therefore useless and counterproductive. A direct European election would only make sense if it gave rise to a constituent assembly.

The institutional criticism was supplemented by the highlighting of defects in the project for economic union contained in the EEC Treaty. The fundamental flaw was identified as the lack of any provision whatsoever regarding the introduction of a single currency. This decision, linked to the confederal nature of the institutional system outlined, undermined the foundations of the project for a common market for two fundamental reasons: firstly, only a single currency would allow secure forecasts and payments throughout the common market area and eliminate the risks posed by possible alterations of exchange rates; secondly, only with a single currency it would be possible to cope with the fundamental disequilibrium problems, which otherwise would impose, due to unquestionable national interest, all sorts of restrictions.

This flaw represented a particularly blatant symptom of a more general deficiency in relation to economic policy. The EEC provided for, in an extremely precise and detailed manner, the gradual abolition of custom rates and quantitative restrictions for industrial products and contained a promise to achieve the organisation of a common agricultural market as well as allowing the free movement of workers, capital

and services. On the other hand, it was seriously flawed with reference to economic policy, or rather the tools prepared in the context of modern mixed economies in order to confront economic crises and to correct the territorial, sectoral and social unbalances produced by an uncontrolled action of economic forces, more generally to direct economic development towards specific priorities chosen by democratic institutions. In this field, two instruments were foreseen, the Social Fund and the European Investment Bank, but were equipped with resources and powers which were too limited to give them a serious rebalancing influence (19). Besides only vague commitments were foreseen to harmonise the economic and social policies of the member states which remained under the exclusive control of the national governments and therefore, in moments of serious crisis, would risk becoming strongly divergent with inevitable restrictive consequences.

Here too there was an obligatory choice given the confederal nature of the community institutions. The transfer to the EEC of responsibilities relating to the sector of economic policy would only be effectively possible on the condition of giving rise to a European government equipped with the tools (enforcement power, democratic consensus and financial autonomy) indispensable for the implementation of effective economic policy on a European level, sometimes replacing and other times operating alongside national economic policies.

This economic criticism of the EEC led to a particularly negative conclusion. The common market, in its most simple terms, was the commitment of the six governments to intensify the liberalisation process in the industrial sector, which in the framework of the OEEC had reached a dead end. This commitment had been made possible by

(19) The lack of effective economic policies on a European level, apart from making the integration of markets precarious, also implied, according to the analysis of the MFE, that the progress that could be made in this area would inevitably be accompanied by damaging distortions and would not have been able to confront territorial unbalances, a particularly serious problem for Italy. This forecast, which proved to be essentially correct, was contained in MARIO ALBERTINI, *La CECA, i cartelli e l'Europa*, in "EF", 1957, n. 13; Id., letter to the "Il Mondo" of September 10th 1957 and letter to "Mondo economico" of May 3rd 1958; PAOLO MARANINI, *Mistificati e mistificatori*, in "EF", 1957, n. 17-18; GIULIANO RENDI, *Cronache dell'europeismo*, in "EF", 1957, n. 3.

a situation of strong economic expansion which characterised since some years the countries with market economies, making the liberalisation of trade desirable and unthreatening to the six national economies and favouring the convergence of economic policy. Until the favourable economic circumstances lasted, the EEC would work because the governments would benefit from making it work, but it would disintegrate as soon as, with a change in economic circumstances, the governments, or a part of them, would deem shirking the commitments undertaken more convenient. In other words, the EEC could only exist while it was superfluous, and it would die as soon as the maintenance of the common market came into contrast with the tendencies of the member states, or a certain number of them.

The political consequence, that the MFE drew from this analysis at the moment in which the ratification of the Treaties of Rome became the order of the day, was that of not siding with either those who were in favour of ratification, because that would mean endorsing what was at best an illusion, but which could also be interpreted as fraudulent (20), or with those who, like the communists, were against ratification because they simply rejected the idea of European unification. Therefore, a third possibility was suggested: the mobilisation of the European people in favour of a European constituent and a European federal union, and the denouncement of the illegitimacy of the nation states and of the falsity of governmental pro-European policies (21).

3.3. *The UEF Split.*

Let us now move on to an illustration of the fundamental as-

(20) See A. SPINELLI, *La beffa del mercato comune* (September 24th 1957), republished in *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, cit.

(21) The MFE's most dramatic demonstration against the Treaties of Rome took place on the occasion of a conference about them, held by the Italian head of government Antonio Segni at the Adriano Theatre in Rome on March 31st 1957. At the end of the conference, the JEF of Rome inundated the theatre with leaflets of protest. A similar protest was held in Turin in early February on the occasion of a conference of the undersecretary to the foreign office Dino Del Bo. Cfr. "EF", 1957, n. 4 and 7.

pects of the line taken by Brugmans and Friedländer (who defined themselves “realists”) in opposition to that of Spinelli and his followers (labelled “maximalists”) (22).

The basic assumption of the realist line was the conviction that the integration process set in motion by the states was irreversible and that it was possible to build a federation through the gradual evolution of institutions, either already in existence or still to be created. Therefore, it was necessary to proceed with the policy of the advisers, continue to support official Europeanist initiatives and try to obtain results from future circumstances with the aim of allowing a federation to gradually mature. This plan led to the belief that the choice of the constituent as the single political objective of the federalist strategy would turn out to be doctrinal for three reasons.

The issue was too technical to capture the imagination of the public, i.e. it might interest intellectuals, but not the masses. Propaganda in this direction would therefore have brought scarce results. Furthermore, federal European power, which could not be created out of nothing, had to be founded on a European society and conscience that the collapse of the EDC had shown to be weak. At the moment of this defeat, the avant-garde had found itself too far ahead of the bulk of its troops, and it was therefore necessary to strengthen the rearguard. In the end, given that the political aspects were inextricably linked to social ones, it was utopian to limit the federalist strategy to a simple action aimed at creating a supranational power. Europe was not only a juridical or political structure, it was also a society. Limiting objectives to the constituent — the sector where little could have been achieved at the time — meant condemning the UEF to sectarianism and ultimately to failure. As an alternative to

(22) On the positions expressed by Brugmans and Friedländer during the UEF's split, see in general: H. BRUGMANS, *L'idée européenne 1920-1970*, cit.; WOLFGANG RAMONAT, *Lehrer für Europa. Henri Brugmans*, in T. JANSEN-D. MAHNCKE (edited by), *op. cit.*; K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*; UMBERTO MORELLI, *L'Unione europea dei federalisti e il Movimento Federalista Europeo sopranazionale*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit. In particular, see: H. BRUGMANS, *Nuovo corso?*, in “*Informations fédéralistes*”, 1955, n. 21-22; H. BRUGMANS, R.P. KEULEMANS, A. MOZER, *Bisogna saper scegliere*, in “*EF*”, 1955, n. 17; E. FRIEDLÄNDER, *L'Europe commence là où il y a sacrifice de souveraineté*, in “*Informations fédéralistes*”, 1955, n. 23-24.

commitment to the constituent, which would only have become relevant in a far more advanced stage of the integration process, the federal pact was proposed, through which the governments decided to exert certain powers in common according to the ECSC model.

The criticism of the priority commitment in favour of constituent was accompanied as an obvious consequence by the rejection of the CEP proposal. Not only was the existence of a European people disputed, a concept which evoked the illusory and uninspiring prospect of merging nations, but the capability of the UEF to lead a popular mobilisation of such dimensions was also called into question. It was also deemed dangerous for democratic institutions to dispute the legitimacy of the national governments without possessing democratic European structures and in the presence of a communist threat. On the other hand, the governments were playing a role in the construction of a united Europe, as those who had obtained ratification from the EDC had demonstrated, meaning that a campaign of opposition could only find justification in a few countries, while it would have been incomprehensible in others.

Even the proposal to transform the UEF into a movement capable of imposing firm supranational discipline and the implementation of a single intervention on the part of all the national sections, including those that did not approve of it, was attributed to a concept inspired by Leninist democratic centralism. In order to function effectively, the UEF had to have a structure capable of adapting to a diverse range of national mentalities and situations, and had to be more of a coordination centre for national movements rather than a strongly centralised supranational body.

In the end, the judgement regarding the re-launch of the integration process and the Treaties of Rome was radically different from that expressed by Spinelli's disciples. In effect, the realists demonstrated great confidence in the new Communities. They substantially believed that upon the foundations of Community institutions, including important federal embryos, an economic integration process could flourish, one which would be able to favour the development of such embryos and to therefore facilitate the extension of the process to the areas of foreign policy and defence. In this context, particular and de-

cisive importance was attributed to the Parliamentary Assembly and the prospect of it being directly elected.

As it is easy to ascertain, the divergence between the two orientations was so deep that it was virtually impossible for them to coexist in the same organisation, even if the split was also exacerbated (as often occurs in such cases) by conflicts of a personal nature and misunderstandings. Let us now examine the fundamental stages of the UEF split.

The opening act of the drama was the VII Congress of the EUD held in Hannover between the 29th and 31st October 1954. After Spinelli had disclosed the fundamental thesis of the new course, the new president of the EUD, Friedländer (23), retained that contact should not be lost with concrete politics and the need, due to the requirements of world politics (to maintain links between western Europe and the USA), to immediately fill the gap left by the collapse of the EDC. Therefore, the WEU, which, as an intergovernmental body, was unsatisfactory for the federalists, nevertheless had to be accepted as the lesser of two evils and advantage had to be taken in order to obtain at least identical uniforms and common military schools for officers and deputy officers (a request which was taken up again in the motion adopted unanimously by the congress). Friedländer advised against, therefore, wasting energy in hasty attempts like that of the political community, judged at the time to be a pure and simple illusion, and, anticipating a positive evaluation on the two future Communities, expressed hope for further organisations along the lines of the ECSC. Even Brugmans, participating in the congress, not only reiterated his support for the ratification of the WEU, but also maintained that this

(23) By the end of 1953 Kogon had stepped down from his presidency due to a serious financial crisis within the EUD. This crisis was overcome by the Cologne Banker Friedrich Karl von Oppenheim, president of the regional group of the EUD of Nordrhein-Westfalen, which mobilised the financial support of an important part of German industry and finance. He became treasurer of the EUD, while Friedländer was elected president and held onto this position until 1958 when he was replaced by von Oppenheim. Cfr. W. LOTH, *Il movimento per l'unità europea nei primi anni della Repubblica Federale di Germania*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1945-1954*, cit.; ID., *I movimenti per l'unità europea nella Repubblica Federale di Germania*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

would represent a useful starting point if Mendès-France's idea of an armament pool were to be developed, the responsibility for which could be entrusted to the ECSC, which would then in turn have to formulate wider plans for economic integration. The intervention of Frenay, the president of the UEF, at the Hannover Congress was inspired by the will to soothe contrasts and save the unity of the UEF. On the one hand, he stated that the WEU could be accepted with the aim of safeguarding western unity, organising, though precariously, its defence and therefore averting the neutralist temptations in Europe and the isolationist tendencies in the USA which had been given greater space by the fall of the EDC. On the other hand, federalist actions had to continue to be founded on the demand for the constituent (24).

Despite these efforts of conciliation, the split appeared evident, even if not in lacerating terms, as early as the 5th Congress of the UEF held in Paris between the 21st and the 23rd January 1955. Here, positions were distinctly clarified around the radical and maximalist tendency represented in particular by Spinelli and Marc and the realist and minimalist position of Friedländer and Brugmans. If they did not get as far as formalising the split, it was due to the fact that the European re-launch had not yet been clearly outlined and also to the intervention during the congress of the new president of the EM, Schuman. Despite the fact that not much later he would fully support that initiative that would eventually lead to the Treaties of Rome, at the Congress of Paris he affirmed on the other hand that the national governments and parliaments could no longer be counted on and that it was necessary to mobilise public opinion to allow the citizens of Europe to impose their will (25).

As a result, a political resolution of compromise was therefore approved with misleading unanimity, with the exception of five abstentions. This resolution stated that, in front of the change of the Europeanist policy of the governments, the UEF placed itself in opposition, indicating the constituent as a means for creating the supranational institutions necessary to resolve the problems common to all

(24) Cfr. U. MORELLI, *op. cit.*, and K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*

(25) Cfr. Robert Schuman *parle au Ve congrès de l'UEF*, in "Informations fédéralistes", 1955, n. 23-24.

European people (26). At the same time, it allowed for the possibility to exploit the opportunities offered by acts of official policy, generally against federalist ideals, only if these ideals proved to be clear and continuously reaffirmed. On the other hand, the congress, ahead of the strong contrasts which had emerged with regard to the concrete federalist actions to be carried out, had to refer any decision to a special commission entrusted with the preparation of a plan to mobilise public opinion. The definitive split developed around the formulation and interpretation of this action plan, prepared by a commission formed by Dieter Roser (EUD), Belgian Jacques Spacy and Spinelli (after he had discussed the matter with the leaders of the movements of the six countries of the “Little Europe”) (27).

Spinelli, in a *Federalist Letter* sent to all the national and local leaders of the organisations adhering to the UEF and the JEF, interpreted the action plan in terms of that foreseen by the new course (28). German and Dutch leaders disputed such an interpretation, opposing the above mentioned theses and converging with the majority of the EM which clearly expressed itself in favour of the integration proposed by the governments (29). Afterwards, in a crescendo of reciprocal accusations — to accusations of Jacobinism and nihilism, Spinelli responded with those of liquidationism and opportunism — a decision was taken by the central committee on the 24th-25th

(26) See: *Nuovo corso federalista. Documenti del V congresso dell'UEF. Parigi, 21-23 gennaio 1955* (book n. 24 of the MFE, Rome 1955), which contains the speeches made by Mozer, Spinelli and Gabriel Badarau, and editions 23-24 of “*Informations fédéralistes*”. The Paris Congress elected Frenay as the president of the new central committee and Enzo Giacchero as honorary president. On February 20th, the central committee elected the new bureau exécutif: Spinelli, president; Usellini, secretary general; Badarau, deputy secretary general, delegate for ECSC issues; Pierre Lucion, treasurer; Nord, delegate for the formulation of the federal plan; Hans W. Kanngiesser, delegate for juvenile issues; Heinz Braun; Frenchman André Delmas; Mozer; Jacques Spacy. Friedländer, elected without standing as a candidate, did not accept his election.

(27) The action plan is published with the title *Programme d'action*, in “*Informations fédéralistes*”, 1955, n. 26.

(28) La *Lettera federalista* of the president of the bureau exécutif of the UEF can be found in “*Azione federalista*” (internal bulletin of the MFE published in 1955 and 1956 and inserted in the anastatic reprint of “*EF*”), 1955, n. 5.

(29) Cfr. JEAN-MARIE PALAYRET, *Il Movimento europeo*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

September 1955 to accept the resignation of the bureau exécutif without replacing it, to summon an extraordinary congress entrusted to determine the organisation and political actions of the UEF and to invite the organisations to precede it with national congresses.

At the VI congress of the UEF, which was held between March 2nd and 4th 1956 in Luxembourg, three motions were put forward. Motion number one, proposed by Spinelli, supported above all by Italians, Belgians and a certain number of Frenchmen, and including both Hamiltonians and Proudhonians, contained a rejection of the functional method on the basis of which another two Communities were being built, the proposal of the CEP as a tool for imposing the constituent, and the demand for a more centralised organisational structure of the UEF, being the current only able to carry out support and educational activities. Motion number three, signed by Brugmans, Friedländer, Hytte and Nord and supported above all by Germans and Dutchmen, invited the federalists to support economic integration and the atomic pool and to concentrate their efforts on allowing the principle of democratic control to triumph through an elected parliament, and stated therefore that any attempt to impose with a majority vote a point of view that the minority did not approve would lead to paralysis or to a split. Motion number two, proposed by André Delmas, supported in particular by French and Swiss, was essentially inspired by the effort to reconcile the two main orientations, which Frenay had already stressed in Hannover, and therefore turned out to be a little vague with regard to controversial issues. The motion was in favour of the campaign for the constituent, but it did not exclude support for limited objectives such as the ECSC, the atomic pool and the common market, and contested the existence of the European people and the possibility of mobilising it in favour of Europe. It maintained that the minority had to bow down to the majority, but without giving the UEF a centralised character or emphasising the autonomy of the adhering movements (30).

(30) The three motions were published in "*Informations fédéralistes*", 1956, n. 27-28 and in "*Azione federalista*", 1956, n. 1. Motion 1 was signed by Badarau, Bolis, Bondy, Jean Charles Demachy (France), Giacchero, Alfred Göschl (Switzerland), Georges Goriely (Belgium), Kanngiesser, Erwin Kolender (EUD), Marc, Michel

The 200 or so delegates from twenty different countries that attended the congress voted, in a preliminary ballot, in the following way: 45% for motion 1, 30% for motion 3, 25% for motion 2. Afterwards, the representatives of motions 1 and 3 agreed a protocol which, having reiterated the common aim, a United States of Europe, and acknowledging the existence of two distinct political conceptions regarding strategy and tactics, declared a will to maintain the existence and the unity of the UEF, offering the two tendencies the opportunity to undertake their own initiatives in a spirit of comprehension and mutual understanding in such a way that they could pursue common actions in the future. The final vote therefore posed the alternative between the agreed protocol and a document presented by Frenay replacing motion 2; the protocol received almost three quarters of the vote. In the new central committee, 15 places were reserved for representatives of motion 1, 8 places to supporters of motion 2, and 10 places to those who sustained motion 3 (31).

This pact of non-aggression, which sanctioned the impotence of the UEF in performing its own functions, was not able to preserve the co-existence of the two points of view and the situation came to a head. The supporters of the CEP campaign decided to begin their actions outside the framework of the UEF. On April 9th 1956, in Paris, the federalists of Turin, Saarbrücken, Geneva, Anversa, Düsseldorf, Lyon and Strasburg constituted the Committee of Initiative for the

Mouskhely (France); Reymond Rifflet (Belgium), Norbert-Roger Rochaert (Belgium), Spacy, Spinelli. Motion 2 was signed by Germaine Borcelle (France), Arghur Calteux (Luxembourg), Delmas, Germain Desboeufx (France), Pierre de Felice (France), Max Drescel (Belgium), Léon Geisen (Luxembourg), Francis Gerard (France), Albert Goldschild (France), Gouzy, Jeanne Hersch (Switzerland), R.P. Keulemans (Netherlands), Pierre Moriquand (France), Abbè Meurice Orban (Belgium), Pierre Passani (France), Gaston Riou (France), Marc Robert (France), Georges Thyès (Luxembourg). Motion 3 was signed by Brugmans, Friedländer, Hytte, Nord. A fourth motion of mediation was presented by Federal Union, but was not accepted because it did not reflect the nature of an international resolution. Cfr. "*Azione federalista*", 1956, n. 2. The Spinelli camp, which presented motion 1, had distributed as early as November 1955 a pamphlet entitled *Combat pour le peuple européen, thèses pour le VI congrès dell'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes* which summarised the arguments developed starting with the article on the new course. The theses were underwritten by Badarau, Bolis, Bondy, Goriely, Kanngiesser, Marc, Mouskhely, Rifflet, Spinelli.

(31) Cfr. *Il congresso UEF a Lussemburgo*, in "*EF*", 1956, n. 5.

CEP (32). On June 22nd, the Dutch federalist organisation decided to interrupt its collaboration with the UEF, and was followed on June 30th by the EUD. On September 16th in Weilburg the EUD, the Dutch federalists and the La Fédération movement (which had already left the UEF in 1953) officially founded a new international federalist movement, the Action Européenne Fédéraliste (AEF) (33). Brugmans was appointed president of the federal committee and Voisin president of the bureau exécutif. On December 1st, the directive committee of the EUD, the most important national organisation adhering to the AEF, approved the said movement's statute and deemed the acceptance on the part of its members of positions in the UEF or in the Committee of Initiative of the CEP to be incompatible with their participation in the EUD (34). On this basis, a series of members were expelled from the EUD and the German JEF (the most important being Claus Schöndube (35)), who then founded German groups in various cities and regions adhering to the supranational MFE.

The scission of the UEF was therefore complete. It is now ap-

(32) The Committee of initiative for the CEP was joined by Lazzaro Maria De Bernardis, Giulio Cesoni, Cabella (secretary), Mouskhély, Marc, Demachy, 2 from Lyon, 3 from Strasbourg, Winfried Krause (Germany), Kolender, Schöndube, Marlyse Roquette (Switzerland), Ludo Dierickx, Bondy, Goriely, Badarau, Usellini, cfr. A. SPINELLI, *Diario europeo 1948-1969*, cit., p. 240.

(33) As well as the EUD, Bewegung van Europese Federalisten (Netherlands) and La Fédération, the AEF was adhered to by Federal Union and other small federalist groups in Italy (Azione Europea Federalista, led by Giampiero Orsello), Denmark (Dansk Europa Union), Belgium (Beweging voor Verenigde Staten van Europa), the UEF of Luxembourg. The Swiss EU became an associate of the AEF, although, together with the Federal Union, maintained systematic contact with the remaining UEF. The EUD has always represented at least two thirds of the AEF. See ALAIN GREILSAMMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-123.

(34) The EUD's extremely severe criticism of the CEP was expressed in, among other places, in a pamphlet by HEINI SCHNEIDER, *Europäische "Volksdemokratie"? Kritik eines politischen Trugbildes*, published by the EUD and by the German JEF (Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1957 and 1958 2nd extended edition), in which the CEP's campaign was considered dangerous for liberal democracy, in as much as it was populist and even in contrast with the German constitution.

(35) Claus Schöndube (who died on January 27th 2007) was editor of the magazine "*Der Föderalist*" from 1957 to 1962. On Schöndube see OTTO SCHMUCK (Herausgeber), *Die Menschen für Europa gewinnen- Für ein Europa der Bürger. In Memoriam Prof. Claus Schöndube*, Bad Marienberg, Europa-Haus Marienberg, 2008.

appropriate to follow the parallel paths of the two schools of thought from the moment of the split until the beginning of their reconciliation in 1963.

3.4. *The Congress of the European People.*

Let's start with the illustration of the fundamental developments of the European integration process from the Treaties of Rome up until 1963, which constitute the backdrop against which the activities of the CEP and the AEF were played out.

The fundamental event of those years was the advancement of the project for economic integration contained in the EEC Treaty. After it came into effect on January 1st 1958, and under the leadership of the President of the Commission Walter Hallstein, the dismantling of custom rates proceeded even more rapidly than originally foreseen, and the common agricultural policy was set in motion. Progress towards a customs union was the fundamental factor driving the great economic development of the countries involved at that time, and that allowed the said countries to make a qualitative leap in terms of living standards and to significantly reduce the gap between the rate of development in Europe and that in the United States. If indeed western Europe as a whole was going through a phase of general growth in those years, notably facilitated by the USA's policies of free trade and monetary stability, it is clear that within this framework it was the rather more radical elimination of protectionism, achieved with the EEC, that made possible the higher growth rates of its member states (hence the "economic miracles" which took place in Italy, Germany and so on) with respect to those countries outside the Community.

This success, which set the EEC on its way to becoming the world's leading trading power, quickly produced consequences of great importance regarding its relations with external countries. First and foremost, it led to the decision of the United Kingdom (and subsequently Ireland and Denmark) to apply for entry to the EEC in 1961. This represented a historical turning point (even if the opposition of De Gaulle meant that enlargement was postponed for a further

decade) if one considers that initially the British government attempted to boycott the construction of the common market through the creation of the European Free Trade Area. Secondly, between 1959 and 1962, eight European countries presented applications for association, while in 1963, in Yaoundé in Cameroon, a convention of association between the Community and eighteen African states was signed.

During the development of European integration over the years currently in examination, De Gaulle played a decisive role which it is necessary to underline. The General, who returned to power in May of 1958, just a few months after the Treaties of Rome came into force, strongly favoured the progress of economic integration in two ways (36).

Firstly, he was able to resolve the crucial problem of conciliating the maintenance of democracy in France with decolonisation and in particular the acceptance of Algerian independence. The inability of the political classes and the regime of the fourth republic to resolve this problem was bound, in the absence of the charisma and political stature of the founder of the fifth republic, to produce an authoritarian regression or at least a paralysing instability that would have prevented France from participating in the development of European integration (37). And this process, given the fundamental importance of French-German relations, would in all likelihood have stalled.

Secondly, De Gaulle, despite being led by a nationalistic obsession for the safeguarding of absolute national sovereignty, was on the other hand convinced of the need for strict collaboration between the European states, and particularly between France and Germany, in order to face the fundamental problems of the second half of the 20th century, and especially to restore the autonomy of France and Europe

(36) Cfr. EDMOND JOUVE, *Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l'Europe*, 2 voll., Paris, Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1967; GAETANO QUAGLIARELLO, *De Gaulle e il gollismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003; GERARD BOSSUAT, *Faire d'Europe sans défaire la France: 60 ans de politique d'unité européenne des gouvernements et des présidents de la République française (1943-2003)*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2005.

(37) When judging De Gaulle, one must not forget the decisive role he twice played in favour of French and therefore European democracy. After the appeal to free France of June 18th 1940, which set in motion European Resistance to German Nazism, it must be precisely stressed the capacity to resolve the Algerian question while preserving the democratic system in France as well as its participation in the European integration process.

as a whole with respect to the hegemony of the United States in particular and of the superpowers in general. For this reason, he exerted an influence, in function of the modernisation of France, and which turned out to be decisive, in favour of customs union and the common agricultural policy. In this context, the decision in 1963 to veto British entry to the European Community, although motivated by the desire to maintain French leadership of the “Europe of Six”, in reality contributed to further progress in economic integration. Indeed, given the UK’s hesitation and its special relationship with the United States, enlargement before the completion of customs union and the common agricultural policy would have blocked the deepening of European integration and seriously risked dispersing it into a vast Atlantic free trade area (38).

As far as the institutional aspects of European integration were concerned, De Gaulle pursued with rigorous coherence the idea of organising Europe into a confederation founded on the maintenance of unlimited national sovereignty. Such a design initially came to light in those years in refusal of the direct election to the European Parliamentary Assembly. The Assembly (which would call itself the European Parliament from 1962 onwards), as early as 1960, presented a project proposed by Dehousse which foresaw the triplication of the number of members, the direct election of two thirds of them and the designation on the part of the national parliaments of one third. De Gaulle opposed the direct election of the European Parliament (EP) with the idea of a European referendum on a political union of a confederal nature.

The decision to impede the development of one of the fundamental federal embryos of the Community system was followed by the proposal in 1961–62 — the so-called “Fouchet Plan” — to extend integration to the areas of foreign policy and defence, introducing

(38) It should be underlined that the customs union and the common agricultural policy gave rise to solid and widespread interests linked to the development of European integration. This would constitute a decisive factor in the re-launch of the integration process after the deep crisis suffered in the 1970s. See S. PISTONE, *L'integrazione europea. Uno schizzo storico*, Utet, 1999; L. LEVI and U. MORELLI, *L'unificazione europea. Cinquant'anni di storia*, Turin, Celid, 1994.

alongside the Communities a political union equipped with institutions possessing no federal embryos whatsoever (institutionalised meetings with heads of governments deliberating solely according to unanimous voting, a secretariat to prepare decisions, and a purely consultative parliamentary assembly). The laudable objectives of the Fouchet Plan, namely the pursuing of European autonomy on an international level, were contradicted by the choice of confederal institutional mechanisms structurally incapable of effectively forging unified defence and foreign policies.

In any case, the project fell through largely due to the opposition of the governments of Benelux and Italy, who stated that they wanted in such a way to prevent the purely confederal structure of political union from compromising the federal potential of the Community system. It should on the other hand be underlined that the aforementioned governments, especially those of Benelux, would have been willing to accept the Fouchet Plan on the condition that the United Kingdom participated. This suggests that in the opposition to the Gaullist plan, the fear of French leadership and the tendency to preserve the status quo in Atlantic relations founded on American hegemony in reality held decisive weight. For its part, France adapted itself to implement the Fouchet Plan on a reduced scale through the signing of the treaty for French-German cooperation on January 22nd 1963. The Treaty was further reduced in its scope by a preamble attached to it by the *Bundestag* during the process of ratification, on the basis of whose content, the procedures and powers of the Community and of NATO would not be called into question by the French-German treaty.

We now come to the parallel experiences of the two federalist schools of thought, starting with the CEP, which played a decisive role in the 1956 split. First of all, it is necessary to clarify the evolution of the relationship between the CEP and the UEF. After the announcement of the separation of the Dutch and German federalists, the governing bodies of the UEF at first did not officially support the CEP. The central committee of September 23rd 1956, which elected the new executive (of which Marc became president a few months later, while Enzo Giacchero became the president of the central com-

mittee in place of Gafenco, who died in 1957), decided that the action of the CEP, valuable as it was, should be performed outside the framework of the UEF (39). This was because the voices of those who did not want to do anything that could compromise reconciliation with the dissidents prevailed. For its part, the CEP reaffirmed that its activities could not be confused with those of the UEF, but were parallel and were characterised by their own organisational structure. While the said organisation pursued its strategy of radically disputing the legitimacy of the nation states and official pro-European initiatives, the UEF, from which Spinelli, increasingly involved in the CEP's campaign, was gradually freeing himself and where as a result the less radical positions were assuming greater importance, was sending out signals of cautious openness towards the Treaties of Rome. Indeed, in a motion approved a week after their signing, the central committee maintained that the new treaties, whilst foreseeing weaker institutions in comparison with the ECSC, could contribute to the establishment of strict European economic cooperation and therefore their success had to be encouraged while providing them with the federalist content they were lacking (40). This position was disputed by the Italian MFE which on the contrary, as we have seen, labelled the common market a laughing stock (41).

(39) Cfr. "EF", 1956, n. 16.

(40) Cfr. "EF", 1957, n. 7 and n. 8. The UEF, however, did not spare the Treaties of Rome its criticism, particularly in the aforementioned pamphlet of 1957 written by M. DERUET, *Réalités européennes*.

(41) The new course and the radical criticism of the Treaties of Rome led to a split between the MFE and the Italian political parties and trade unions, with which there had been a strong convergence during the struggle for the EPC. The split began to emerge during the congresses of Ancona (June 17th-18th 1955) and Varese (February 10th-12th 1956) and was fully demonstrated in the congress of Bolzano (October 11th-13th 1957). Among the most important members of the MFE that adhered to the new course, the following are of particular significance: Luciano Bolis, Andrea Chiti-Batelli, Mario Albertini, Aldo Garosci, Teresa Caizzi, Amedeo Mortara, Mario Da Milano, Giulio Cesoni, Sante Granelli, Giulio Guderzo, Alberto Cabella, Gianni Merlini, Cesare Merlini, Giuliano Martignetti, Vittorio Castellazzi, Eugenio Calvi, Carlo Da Molo, Gianni Traverso, Franco Boracchia, Giuliano Rendi, Paolo Bogliaccino, Guido Comessatti. The line towards the Communities, which was alternative to that of the majority of the MFE, found its political and organisational expression in the reconstitution of the Italian Council of the European Movement (CIME), which had already

The situation changed because hopes of a reconciliation with the separatists began to fade, the same separatists who saw the support of the Treaties of Rome as the only objective of federalist actions (42). On the other hand, the progress made by the CEP campaign convinced the UEF as a whole to support it with a petition in favour of the European constituent which set in motion the convergence of the two organisations (43). At the same time, the project to transform the UEF into a supranational movement began to take shape. The objective was achieved by the 7th Extraordinary Congress of the UEF, held in Paris on June 28th 1959, which approved, with an overwhelming majority, the proposal of renewing the statute prepared by a commission composed of Badarau, Bolis, Delmas, Gérard and Rifflet, and gave life to a supranational European Federalist Movement (sMFE) (44). In the new structure, the fundamental units became the regional organisations, whose secretariats were in direct contact with their European counterpart. The regional congress appointed delegates to that of the sMFE, who would no longer represent the national movements of the various countries. Indeed, with

been constituted in 1948, but whose presence had in effect remained in the shadow of the dominant MFE. The most representative exponents of the CIME, reconstituted in 1956, include its president Randolfo Pacciardi, Giampiero Orsello (leader of the Italian section of the AEF), members of parliament Palmiro Foresi, Giovanni Bersani, Vittorio Badini-Confalonieri, Lodovico Benvenuti, Giuseppe Caron, Alcide Berloff and Renato Cappugi, as well as Enzo Dalla Chiesa, Angelo Lotti, Margherita Bernabei and Leo Solari. These events are comprehensively documented in “EF”. See also S. PISTONE, *I movimenti per l'unità europea in Italia*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.; PAOLO CARAFFINI, *Il Consiglio Italiano del Movimento Europeo 1948-1985*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008.

(42) The controversy between the UEF and the AEF became extremely bitter. In 1957, Frenay declared: “The Fédération is the defender of the nation states! What retreating for five years now can we remark if we rely on their actions and their declarations! Their aim is a confederation, not a federation of states!”; and Max Richard: “If Spinelli and those who follow him in his crazy venture were *agents provocateur* paid by the chauvinist reaction to strengthen a decadent and obsolete nationalism, they would behave no differently”. Cfr. A. GREILSAMMER, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

(43) Cfr. “EF”, 1957, nn. 11, 15-16, 21-22.

(44) The Congress of Paris confirmed Giacchero as president of the central committee and appointed Reymond Rifflet as president of the bureau exécutif and André Delmas as secretary general. Cfr. “*L'action fédéraliste européenne*”, 1959, n. 30, and “*Fédéralisme Européen*” (official organ of the sMFE published in Paris), 1959, n. 1.

the implementation of the new statute the said movements were dissolved. The national commissions, composed of members selected from the regions and with executive functions with respect to the supranational bodies, would deal with administrative problems and propaganda; the policy of the sMFE would be decided on a European level only. With the direct adhesion of the members to the sMFE, which thus became an association of individuals on a European scale, the confederal system of cooperation between completely autonomous national movements which had substantially characterised the old UEF, and which was an undisputed cornerstone of the AEF, had finally been surpassed (45).

After the reform of the statute, the process of convergence between the sMFE and the CEP progressed quickly. The 1st Congress of the sMFE, which was held in Strasburg from January 29th to 31st 1960, reaffirmed the need to gather a European political force capable of wresting the right to elect the constituent from the member states. It fully recognised the validity of the primaries election procedure promoted by the CEP with the aim of providing a popular basis for federalist actions. It established that relations between the CEP and the sMFE would be regulated in such a way as to ensure complete organisational, administrative and financial integration, thus achieving maximum effectiveness and unity. The various sections of the sMFE would have to train their militants in view of the primaries CEP elections. In turn, the CEP would contribute to the development of the sMFE by creating new sections where none had existed before (46). The com-

(45) In 1960, the sMFE was present in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands and maintained links under the form of association with the Swiss EU, the Federal Union, the Union Europäischer Föderalisten Österreich (the main leaders of the Austrian UEF at that time were Karl Brunner, Otto Steidler and Max Wratschgo and the managerial centre was in Feldbach (Steiermark), where the Karl Brunner Europahaus of Neumarkt was founded, i.e. the main political and formative centre for the Austrian federalists (cfr. *50 Jahre Bund Europäischer Jugend und Europäische Föderalistische Bewegung Österreich*, edited by Christine Hofmeister, Feldach, 2005) and the Greek Federalist Movement.

(46) After the Strasburg Congress, Giacchero, Rifflet and Delmas retained their positions and Marc, De Bernardis, Desboeuf and Orban were elected vice-president of the central committee. With regard to the Strasburg Congress, see "*Fédéralisme européen*", 1960, n. 4 and 5.

plete merging of the two organisations, i.e. the absorption of the CEP into the sMFE, was finally completed in Lyon, when the 9th congress of the sMFE was held in conjunction with 5th and final session of the CEP from February 9th to 11th 1962. The merger coincided therefore with the exhaustion of the CEP campaign. Let us now take a step back to illustrate the development of this campaign (47).

It all began with the Stresa convention held in July 1956, where for three weeks, under the leadership of Alberto Cabella, secretary of the preparatory committee of the CEP, political and organisational training sessions were held for the militants involved in organising the first primaries elections and where the fundamental documents that were to constitute the basis of the operation were ratified. As well as a political declaration that summarised the crucial theses of the new direction (48), an action plan was approved that foresaw in particular, on the part of the study groups formed by social and local groups attracted by the federalist campaign, the drafting of “documents of protest and reclamation” of the Europeans to be presented to the CEP. It was an idea conceived by Spinelli which was based on the precedent of the “*cahiers de doléance*” drafted in 1789 in view of the convocation of the General States which would proceed to pave the way for the French revolution. The documents of protest and reclamation would essentially have to give a voice to the legitimate aspirations of the European people, identifying the political, economic and social problems as they were perceived by the various groups constituting European society and which would find a solution in a European federation. It was therefore important to find a balance between general and

(47) The most comprehensive reconstruction of the events regarding the CEP can be found in Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli's, *Il Congresso del Popolo Europeo, in I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit. From 1958 to 1964, the monthly “Popolo Europeo” was published in Turin under the leadership of Spinelli as an organ of the CEP (editors Cesare Merlini and Giuliano Martignetti). A French version was published in Lyon (edited by André Darteil and Jacques Ollier), a Dutch version in Maastricht (edited by Piet Houx) and a German version in Frankfurt (edited by Schön-dube). The Italian edition was reproduced in an anastatic edition by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont, Turin, Celid, 2001.

(48) The Declaration of Stresa and the Work Programme are published in “*EF*”, 1956, n. 13-14.

specific reclamations so that the documents could represent the European people in its essential unity and in its legitimate peculiarities (49).

The organisation of the elections of the delegates of the CEP began in the autumn of 1957, starting with Turin, Ivrea, Galliate, Trecate, Pinerolo, Milan, Como, Strasburg (and about 50 small boroughs in Alsace), Lyon, Antwerpen, Düsseldorf, Maastricht and Geneva. The electoral operations — carried out according to procedures which prevented double voting and guaranteed the secrecy of the vote (50) — were periodically repeated, increasing the number of towns and cities involved, until 1962. In total, 638,114 votes were collected in seven countries — Germany, Austria (where the elections continued until 1964), Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland — of which 455,214 came from Italy (51). The poor results

(49) See S. Pistone's introduction for the anastatic reprint of "*Popolo Europeo*", cit.

(50) It should be remembered that the electoral materials — booths, ballot boxes, panels, tables — was generally provided by the municipal authorities that, most of the time, showed themselves to be sensitive to the appeal of the promoters of the CEP, especially in the cities adhering to the Council of European Municipalities and Regions. Here, the secretary of the Italian section of the CEMR (the AICCRES) played a decisive role, constantly supporting actions for the European constituent, although not entirely agreeing with Spinelli's judgement, too radically critical of the Treaties of Rome. Cfr. S. PISTONE, *I movimenti per l'unità europea in Italia*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit. and *Breve storia del Consiglio dei Comuni e delle Regioni d'Europa*, cit.

(51) The chart that follows presents the overall results in terms of electoral participation and towns and cities (omitting the smaller ones).

ELECTION RESULTS:

<i>Delegations</i>	<i>Electors</i>	<i>Delegates</i>
Antwerpen-Maastricht	66.003 (*)	32 (+ 30 not re-elected)
Bologna-Ferrara-Rovigo	42.997	24
Bruxelles-St. Josse	1.806	5
Capua-Napoli	7.571	11
Darmstadt	25.826	21
Düsseldorf	3.432	(+ 30 not re-elected)
Feldbach-Neumarkt-Hartberg	7.133	15
Firenze-Massa	10.973	12

obtained outside Italy were, together with the political evolution which we will come back to later, a fundamental reason for the ultimate failure of the campaign.

The delegates elected by the people of Europe, and considering rotations there were 611 of them in total, gathered in five CEP sessions: in Turin from December 4th to 6th 1957, in Lyon from January 23rd to 25th 1959, in Darmstadt from December 4th to 6th 1959, in Oostende from December 7th to 9th 1960 and finally together with the sMFE in Lyon from February 9th to 11th 1962. During these five sessions, the documents of protest and reclamation presented by the delegates elected in the towns and cities involved in the campaign

<i>Delegations</i>	<i>Electors</i>	<i>Delegates</i>
Frankfurt-Gross Geran	2.661	11
Furstenfeld	3.586	5
Genève	1.552	(+ 30 not re-elected)
Genova-La Spezia	50.650 (*)	33 (+ 20 not re-elected)
Lyon-Annecy	20.197 (*)	22 (+ 30 not re-elected)
Milano-Ticino	146.591 (*)	52 (+ 30 not re-elected)
Mons-St. Ghislain	3.934	17
Mulhouse	13.133	9
Nancy	879	5
Oostende	2.839	10
Roma	117.180	38
Strasbourg	27.001	(+ 30 not re-elected)
Torino-Cuneo	37.231 (*)	24
Udine	23.378	5
Vernon	2.948	5
Vicenza	18.643	9
	638.114	365 (**)

(*) Regions where elections were held twice.

(**) In total, those elected to the CEP, taking into account the rotation of the delegates, were 611.

were examined. In the end, a summary of all such documents was compiled (52) which shed light on the extensive and methodical work of mobilising public opinion around the concrete problems that made a European federation necessary, and contained a general framework of expectations of public opinion and of the debate on various aspects of European unification at that time (53).

Naturally, the fundamental political commitment of the CEP concentrated on the objective of the European constituent. In this regard, the Turin congress formulated a model based on a report by Guy Heraud (54) which indicated the choice of the treaty-constituent

(52) A commission, composed of Heraud, Marc, Mouskhely, Orban and André Thiery, elaborated a synthesis of all the documents received, published by the Centre International de Formation Européenne under the title *Revendications du peuple européen*, Paris, 1962. The text consists of five chapters: la place de l'Europe dans le monde; La Fédération européenne - réponse au défi de l'histoire; Ce que sera la Fédération européenne, Revendications économiques et sociales; Pourquoi et comment l'Europe peut-elle restaurer les valeurs universelles? The documents received by the first CEP, to which those sent from the cities in which other elections would subsequently be held would later be added, were: Cahier de revendications de la population anversoise - Anversa; Protestdokument der europäischen Bürger von Düsseldorf, Protestdokument zum problem der deutschen Wiedervereinigung - Düsseldorf; Manifeste des partisans suisses du Congrès du peuple européen, Cahier de revendications des pharmaciens suisses - Geneva; Cahier global présenté par la Ville de Lyon - Lyon; Cahier global présenté par la Ville de Maastricht - Maastricht; Cahier des étudiants milanais - Milan; série de cinq cahiers de revendications particulières venus: des universitaires de Strasbourg, des étudiants, des fonctionnaires et employés, des enseignants, des avocats - Strasbourg; Cahiers des intellectuels, des professeurs, des travailleurs, des agriculteurs, des élus locaux du Canavese, des étudiants - Turin. Cfr. *Actes et documents du premier Congrès du peuple européen*, Strasbourg, 1957. It should be remembered that the Centre International de Formation Européenne was founded by Marc in 1954 and since then it has been the most important centre of processing and circulation (through the magazine "*L'Europe en formation*" for example, which has been published regularly since 1960) of integral federalism. Cfr. RAIMONDO CAGIANO and PAOLA COLASANTI, *Il Centre International de Formation Européenne, gli anni cinquanta-settanta*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

(53) One of the most valid document of protest and reclamation is that of the Turin intellectuals, compiled in 1958 by Mario Albertini, Norberto Bobbio, Giulio Cesoni, Gustavo Colonnetti, Paolo Greco, Geno Pampaloni, Piero Pieri and Silvio Romano. The text is reproduced in L. LEVI and S. PISTONE (edited by), *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit.

(54) Cfr. G. HERAUD, *L'Assemblée constituante européenne*, in *Actes et documents du premier Congrès du peuple européen*, cit.

as an alternative to the treaty-constitution. Both implied the consensus of the states involved, but in the latter case, the constituent would be the work of the involved national governments, while in the first case the governments would only have the task of summoning the constituent assembly which would in turn draw up the constitution, which would then be offered for national ratification via a referendum. Following these indications, the subsequent CEP session in Lyon approved a draft treaty for the summons of a European constituent assembly (drawn up by a commission of jurists chaired by the aforementioned Heraud) and dictated mandate to the permanent committee of the CEP (the supreme governing body between one session and another) for its presentation to EP and national parliaments and governments.

On May 14th 1959 the project was presented by a delegation led by Mouskhely to the president of the EP, Robert Schuman, who received it with kind words. The following November, federalist delegations, each one led by a representative of another country to highlight the European nature of their actions, also presented the project to the six parliaments of the EEC. Apart from the president of the *Bundestag* Gerstenmaier, who refused to receive the Mouskhely-led delegation, all the other presidents offered encouraging, if non-committal, reactions (55).

After this initial contact, the action developed above all in Italy through two initiatives. The first was the petition, presented on January 19th 1960 by Bolis (then, as well as the secretary of the CEP, also secretary of the Italian Commission of the SMFE) to the Chamber of Deputies, with the aim of committing the Italian government to commence negotiations with the other governments for the summoning of the constituent. The petition was illustrated by the christian-democrat member of parliament Rosario Pintus in a plenary session without any consequence whatsoever. The same fate met the motion which was deposited — upon the invitation of the Lombard

(55) Cfr. *La presentazione del Trattato nelle capitali europee*, in “*Popolo Europeo*”, 1959, n. 21 and 22. The French delegation was led by Spinelli, the Belgian and Dutch delegation by Heraud, that of Luxembourg by George Dahmen, the Italian delegation by Hartman.

CEP delegates — in February 1961 to the Chamber by ten members of parliament and drafted by the MP Franco Ferrarotti (of the Community Movement, successor to the Chamber of Adriano Olivetti, who died in 1960), with which the government was invited to request the stipulation of a treaty introducing “without delay the constituent power of the European people”. Similar initiatives were undertaken in France, where in June 1961, an interrogation on the constituent was presented to the National Assembly by the member of parliament elected in Nancy Pierre Weber, in Germany, where a similar attempt was made by Schöndube, leader of the German Commission on the sMFE, but again with no consequence, as well as in Switzerland and in Austria.

The Italian effort, it should be remembered, enjoyed the support of public opinion, thanks to “operation market stall” launched in Milan in April 1960 with a spectacular event in Piazza del Duomo, and which was carried forward in the following months. At the specially laid out tables the federalist militants made themselves available to the people to explain and justify the developments of the CEP, inviting them to sign specially prepared cards in support of the members of parliament who had adhered to the requests of the federalists, and reprimanding those who had refused these (56).

The push for the constituent was also carried out through criticism of the Dehousse proposal for the direct election of the EP, which was particularly expressed by the meeting which gathered in Heidelberg on July 2nd-3rd 1960 the central committee of the sMFE and the permanent committee of the CEP. The most serious limitations of the Dehousse project were identified by the fact that the citizens were called upon to elect an assembly without power and in the absence of a uniform electoral procedure. This was a symptom of the nationalist resistance which was pushing integration to follow the Gaullist model of a Europe of nations, i.e. a confederation. The sMFE and the CEP therefore asked the governments and parliaments to

(56) Cfr. S. Pistone’s introduction to the anastatic reprint of “*Popolo Europeo*”.

transform such a proposal in the way indicated by the draft treaty for the summoning of the constituent (57).

While the CEP was developing, the Gaullist regime imposed itself and its stance against any development towards a federal European integration. The adoption of a clear and systematic position against such a stance was a qualifying aspect of the participation of the CEP and the sMFE in the political debate. The opposition to Gaullist nationalism, which accompanied a position in favour of Algerian independence, was particularly evident in the criticism of the Fouchet Plan, interpreted as the fundamental manifestation of the confederal designs pursued by the General (58).

3.5. *The reapproaching between the supranational European Federalist Movement and the European Federalist Action.*

The sMFE congress in Lyon, as mentioned before, coincided with the end of the CEP and opened the debate on what to do next given the situation that had been created, characterised by the strong confederal nationalism of De Gaulle, but also by the advancement, in contrast with the hypothesis on which the CEP was founded, of European economic integration. In order to illustrate the line that the sMFE was proposing in 1962 and 1963, it is necessary to start from Spinelli, who, after having promoted and led the experience of the CEP, conceived of a new direction starting in Lyon. First of all, of fundamental importance was the change in judgement regard-

(57) This criticism of the Dehousse project was expressed, on the basis of a report written by Heraud, by the joint meeting of the central committee of the sMFE and the permanent committee of the CEP held in Heidelberg on July 2nd-3rd 1960. Cfr. “*Fédéralisme européen*”, 1960, nn. 6 and 7, and L. BOLIS, *L'azione per la costituente opposta alle elezioni europee*, in “*Popolo Europeo*”, 1960, nn. 7-8. At the Heidelberg meeting, with regard to the direct election of the EP, two extreme but minority views were expressed: one by Desboeuf, who toned down the criticism aimed at the project and invited participation in the campaign for its approval, already announced by the EM; the other by Goriely, who emphasised the reasons of doctrine and federalist coherence which imposed a rigorous abstention from all actions of even partial or implicit acceptance of the project.

(58) For the sMFE's criticism of the confederal positions of De Gaulle see U. MORELLI, *L'Unione europea dei federalisti e il Movimento federalista europeo sopranazionale*, cit.

ing the EEC expressed at the moment of its inception. The furthering of economic integration, despite the fact that France was led by a man who was fundamentally against supranational unification, convinced Spinelli that the achievement obtained by the EEC — above all the creation of a European bureaucracy which was independent of national administrations and the establishment of a network of economic interests linked to the development of European integration — were rather more solid than he had originally imagined. At the heart of this progress he saw, as a central factor, the increasingly rapid advancement of human interdependence on a European scale, which had now rendered the historical decline of European nationalisms irreversible and made sure that even a nationalist like De Gaulle could not do without European integration. This was compounded by the strong convergence of national policies induced by American hegemony over western Europe within the framework of the bipolar system (59).

The overcoming of the profound initial scepticism towards the EEC did not, however, lead Spinelli to share the rather “acritical” conviction of the supporters of functionalism that the action of the Eurocracy alone would be enough to bring about complete integration, postponing the introduction of authentic democratic and federal structures in the European institutions until the end of the process. In reality, he maintained his conviction that the process would sooner or later stall without a qualitative change on the part of the institutions and the activation of a democratic constituent procedure for the achievement of such change. He maintained however that the federalist alternative had to be pursued within the EEC’s institutional framework, thus betting on its evolution rather than its collapse.

Spinelli was substantially returning to the set up established be-

(59) Cfr. A. SPINELLI, *Al di là del Mercato Comune*, in “*Popolo Europeo*”, 1962, n. 4 and in “*Il Mulino*”, 1962, n. 114 (in which Spinelli expressed publicly for the first time and in very clear terms the change in his opinion on the EEC); ID. (edited by), *Che fare per l’Europa?*, Milan, Comunità, 1963, (the proceedings of the XI Convention of the “*Amici del Mondo*”, of which he was promoter and main speaker); ID., *Rapporto sull’Europa*, Milan, Comunità, 1965 (English translation by C. GROVE HAINES, *The Eurocrats. Conflict and Crisis in the European Community*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

tween 1948 and 1954, i.e. the strategy of pursuing European federation by playing on the contradictions of functionalistic integration as a means of obtaining a democratic and federal transformation of the institutions founded by the functionalistic approach. In the framework of the EEC, the decisive objective on which to focus was the direct election of the European Parliament (EP), connected with the attribution to it of a permanent constituent role, which was to be realised through a subsequent series of constitutional acts until the achievement of a European federal constitution, complete in all aspects (60).

With regard to concrete action to obtain the democratisation of the EEC, Spinelli was thinking of the mobilisation of the democratic political forces, and this seemed to him effectively possible given the situation in which the EEC then found itself. As far as he could see, the success of economic integration posed the problem of its political direction and therefore, a choice between two alternatives was necessary.

On the one hand, there was the Gaullist proposal of a French-led confederation, which would have brought extremely dangerous consequences for the democratic development of the European countries. Indeed, it would only serve to deepen the Community's democratic deficit and it would have serious and negative consequences for the role of western Europe with regard to the East-West détente. This would be compromised as much by the revealing of the misguided nationalistic ambitions of the individual states (that a Europe of nations, wanted by De Gaulle, was destined to nurture) as by the emergence of a European nationalism led by France or by a French-German axis (61).

(60) Cfr. *Un'iniziativa italiana per l'Europa. Democratizzare le Comunità*, a note prepared on behalf of the Italian Committee for the European Democracy by a group consisting of Leopoldo Elia, Garosci, Spinelli and Mario Zagari (in effect drafted by Spinelli) and published in "*Quaderni del CIDE*", 1964, n. 1, republished in A. SPINELLI, *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, cit. The idea of the EP as a "permanent constituent assembly" had already been developed, as we will see later on, by Bruggmans in 1959 and would be picked up by Willy Brandt in his intervention at the Congress of Europe organised by the EM in Brussels from February 5th to 7th 1976. Cfr. L. LEVI and U. MORELLI, *L'unificazione europea ...*, cit., pp. 209-211.

(61) In this period, Spinelli wrote numerous essays and articles in which he rejected not only the choice of national nuclear armament, but also that of European nuclear armament. He sustained, on the other hand, that a United Europe should on-

On the other hand, the only effective alternative to the Gaullist design was a new federal development that, while decisively consolidating democracy in western Europe, would at the same time lead the region to play a positive role in favour of the détente policy and would allow the Atlantic Alliance to be transformed into an equal partnership between the USA and Europe, as proposed by President Kennedy. Spinelli believed that the federalist action could effectively influence the European democratic forces, which had a vested interest, even if they were not entirely aware of it, in disputing the Gaullist line. In particular, he hoped that the socialist forces, that had been indifferent if not outright hostile to European integration at the beginning of the process, but that had now overcome this attitude, would be willing to assume the role of being the driving force behind the European integration process, a position which, during the 1940s and 1950s, had been adopted by the christian democrats.

Having conceived of this new orientation, Spinelli decided on the other hand to continue his public initiatives outside the federalist organisation, while still retaining his membership. He created new tools for intervention in political debate, namely the Italian Committee for European Democracy (CIDE) (62) and the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) (63), and through them he proposed his own entry into the European institutions so that he could lead the federalist

ly hold conventional arms in order to be able to collaborate with the USA, on the basis of an equal partnership, on détente policy. He also systematically denounced the nationalistic tendencies which were re-emerging not only in France (with De Gaulle), but also in Germany (with the push to favour national reunification rather than European unification) and in Italy (with the foolish ambition of a Mediterranean policy). The most important writings dedicated to these issues are gathered in A. SPINELLI, *L'Europa tra Est e Ovest*, edited by C. Merlini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1990; ID., *La crisi degli Stati nazionali*, edited by L. Levi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1991.

(62) The CIDE was an Italian version of the Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe, and included among its members important political figures from the non-communist left. Cfr. *Per una politica europea del Centro Sinistra*, in *Quaderni del CIDE*, 1964, n. 2.

(63) Spinelli remained director of the IAI until he became a member of the Commission of the European Communities in 1970. He was replaced as IAI director by Cesare Merlini. The most important initiative of the IAI in the period when Spinelli was director was a large convention on Italian foreign policy held in January 1967, whose proceedings are published in *La politica estera della Repubblica Italiana*, cit.

struggle from within (64). His wish became reality in 1970, when he became member of the Commission of the Communities. There he remained until 1976, when he became a member of the European Parliament, a position he retained until his death in 1986.

The direction indicated by Spinelli was, in any case, substantially shared by most of the sMFE. The resolution of the Congress of Lyon (65) affirmed that the sMFE had to participate as an autonomous political force in the attempt to democratically renew western coun-

(64) As early as 1963, Spinelli was convinced that the Commission of the EEC could play a decisive and leading role in the fight for the democratic and federal transformation of the Communities. In this regard, the open letter (published in “*Il Mondo*” of July 23rd 1963 also in “*L’Express*”, “*Die Zeit*” and “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1963, n. 25) to the then president of the Commission of the EEC, Hallstein, was highly significant, and contained two observations of great importance. Firstly, Spinelli stated that the decline in political influence on the European integration process exerted by the movements for European unity (and by some forward-looking statesmen) was a structural consequence of the fact that ever since the Commission of the EEC came into existence, with the initiatives and prestige it brought with it, it had become the European interlocutor of the governments and had increasingly become a point of reference for public opinion, both that organised within political parties, and that which was undifferentiated. Secondly, he maintained that the Commission, if it wanted to be able to completely overcome nationalistic resistance, it had to set itself the objective of methodically orienting public consensus while entering into an organic relationship with pro-European organisations and democratic political forces. In this regard, he specified: “the Commission had nurtured the illusion of being able to build Europe without mobilising the political forces, perhaps even in spite of them (...). You can still do today what you failed to do yesterday. Of course, the Commission cannot exceed the limits set for it by the treaty (...) but the commissioners can do what all statesmen have always done: to be at the same time the heads of the administration that has been entrusted to them and the leaders of a European political force which aims to obtain Community reform”. In light of these considerations, Spinelli tried to become a commissioner, utilising the relationships he had forged with the political class, and with Nenni in particular, through the CIDE, but on this occasion he was not successful. The correspondence relating to Spinelli’s first attempt to enter the Eurocracy, as well as Hallstein’s rather cold response to Spinelli’s open letter is preserved in the historical archives of the European Union. As we will see later on, Hallstein would eventually be convinced of the importance of mobilising public opinion.

(65) Regarding the Lyon Congress, see “*Fédéralisme européen*”, 1962, n. 16 and 17. Also U. MORELLI, *L’Unione Europea dei Federalisti e il Movimento Federalista Europeo sovranazionale*, cit. With regard to the new executive of the sMFE, Rifflet was confirmed president, Delmas, replaced by Orio Giarini at the end of the year, secretary general, with Gouzy as vice-president and Magnant as treasurer. Desbouf, Etienne Hirsch and Henry Mallet joined the executive.

tries, with the aim of avoiding the wastage in the national experiences, and with the ultimate objective of building a federal democracy in Europe, fighting against authoritarian solutions such as Gaullism. The idea was to involve the democratic left in the European unification project, providing it with a contribution that had already been made in the early 1950s by the centre parties.

A fundamental instrument in order to achieve this involvement of the democratic and progressive forces in the federalist struggle had to be the formulation (proposed above all by Mallet) of a Federalist Charter, which had to pick up on and update the views of integral federalists on the necessity of constructing not only a federal state, but also a federal society. In essence, the actions carried out through the documents of protest and reclamation had to lead to the formulation of a clear and articulate political, economic and social platform, which seemed to be indispensable in order to involve the forces necessary for the pursuit of the federalist design. As far as the European Communities were concerned, the growth in prosperity and the progress made in the area of economic integration were recognised, but the lack of a political power capable of preparing a democratic programme to consolidate such progress and to meet social objectives was also underlined. Subsequent enlargement towards countries who had presented an application to join made the creation of a European power even more urgent if the slowing of the unification process due to geographic extension was to be avoided. The resolution reiterated therefore the validity of the traditional request for a constituent elected on a one-man-one-vote basis.

On this aspect, there was a rapid evolution which found its outlet in the central committee which gathered in Luxemburg on June 15th-16th 1963 (66). Here, the foundations were laid for the new actions of the sMFE, for which the aim was an alliance of democratic groups willing to agree on a programme for a precise, minimum objective: the direct election of the EP and the democratisation of the European Communities (transformation of the Council into a Chamber of States deliberating according to majority voting, and the attri-

(66) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1963, n. 24.

bution of genuine powers to the EP, including that of appointing the Commission). Progress towards the common market was undisputable and the Communities had become a consolidated reality. European unification seemed to be achievable through such a hybrid attempt, once considered ephemeral and destined for failure, that mixed federal, confederal and functionalistic elements. If this was the path to follow, it was the federalists' job to strengthen the supranational embryos and to reach the constituent through the existing representative assembly.

Now, it should be emphasised that the line followed by the sMFE after the end of the CEP met with certain opposition. The most important was that led by Mario Albertini. He had been a supporter of the new course, to which he had made an extremely useful contribution on both a theoretical and political/organisational level. But when Spinelli moved towards the previously mentioned turning point, Albertini provided strenuous opposition and, in the period from 1962 to 1964, he managed to acquire the leadership of the Italian Commission of the sMFE, leaving Spinelli's followers in the minority (67). On a sMFE level, starting with the Congress of Lyon, he constituted the Federalist Autonomy group, which until 1965 opposed the majority before subsequently dissolving and participating in the unitary management of sMFE policy (68).

The most qualifying aspect of Albertini's view (which would play a central role in the re-foundation and the leadership of the

(67) Cfr. S. PISTONE, *Il passaggio della leadership del Movimento Federalista Europeo da Altiero Spinelli a Mario Albertini*, in FABIO ZUCCA (edited by), *Europeismo e federalismo in Lombardia dal Risorgimento all'Unione Europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007; FLAVIO TERRANOVA, *Il federalismo di Mario Albertini*, Giuffrè, Milan, 2003; "Il Federalista", 2002, n. 3, special edition dedicated to Albertini to mark the fifth anniversary of his death, with contributions from John Pinder, Salvatore Veca, Francesco Rossolillo, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Lucio Levi and Sergio Pistone.

(68) Among the federalists that sided with Albertini, the following should be remembered: Teresa Caizzi, Bernard Lesfargues, Mario Braga, Sante Granelli, Luciano Bolis, Alessandro Cavalli, Dietrich Gruber, Ezio Lancellotti, Francesco Rossolillo, Guy Plantier, Bruno Kraft, Luigi Vittorio Majocchi, Alberto Majocchi, Mario Stoppino, Giulio Guderzo, Massimo Malcovati, Giovanni Vigo, Elio Cannillo, Guido Montani, Dario Velo, Franco Praussello, Alfonso Sabatino, Umberto Giovine, Riccardo Petrella, Rodolfo Gargano, Guido Comessatti, Caterina Chizzola, Gastone Bonzagni, Roberto Palea, Lucio Levi, Sergio Pistone, Alfonso Iozzo.

UEF, of which he would be president from 1975 to 1984) fundamentally coincided with the commitment to continue the effort which Spinelli had undertaken with the experience of the CEP and subsequently abandoned. The commitment was to construct a genuinely and permanently autonomous federalist force, able to lead the collection of movements for European unity and also the pro-Europeans present in the political parties, social and economic organisations and in the world of culture towards an effective fight for the constituent and for a European federation. Having become leader of the Italian Commission of the sMFE, Albertini from then on was the principal exponent of this commitment and the results he achieved in this area should be considered his most important contribution to the fight for European unification.

In effect, he theorised and rigorously implemented the principles of the political, organisational, financial and cultural autonomy of federalists. Here, the directives for the training and recruitment of militants should be particularly underlined. They were driven by the need to avoid any influences that may have been imposed on the movement by a cumbersome and costly administrative system, and were thus inevitably and essentially dependent on external financing in order to survive. As a consequence, the system of paid officials was excluded and it was established that the militant federalists were part-time militants, with a job that could guarantee their economic independence while still allowing them enough time to devote to federalist activities (69). It should also be remembered, as far as cultural autonomy is concerned, that Albertini made a great contribution to the development of federalist theory, integrating it with a stinging criticism of nationalism and the inability of the dominant political ideologies, namely liberalism, democracy and socialism, to emancipate themselves from it.

(69) On this aspect of Albertini's line, see in particular FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO, *I rapporti fra politica e cultura nell'esperienza del MFE italiano*, in "Il Federalista", XXVI, n. 1, 1984; *Il Movimento Federalista Europeo*, pamphlet published by the CESFER, Pavia, 1986; *L'organizzazione della lotta federalista*, pamphlet published by the CESFER, Pavia, 1986; SANTE GRANELLI, *Movimento, partito o gruppo di pressione?*, pamphlet published by the CESFER, Pavia, 1993; see also L. LEVI, S. PISTONE, *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit.

In effect, Albertini radically criticised the idea of the nation (70) and, developing certain intuitions of Proudhon, highlighted how nations were not actually entities that pre-empted the nation states, rather they were an ideological reflex generating a sense of belonging to the bureaucratic and centralised states that established itself on the European continent from the French revolution on. In essence, the national conscience as a commonly held ideal throughout the population was not the premise but the consequence of the formation of the nation states and political programmes which aimed to impose unity of language, culture and tradition throughout the state's territory. All this led to the systematic destruction of spontaneous nationalities, or rather the sense of belonging to natural communities (the territorial horizons of the birth and life of individuals, nations in the etymological sense of the word), and the transfer of this sense of belonging to the state in order to create an exclusive loyalism and, as a result, the basis of an aggressive foreign policy (71).

This criticism of the idea of the nation state aimed to overcome a serious limitation of political ideologies — liberalism, democracy and socialism — which provided the inspiration for the political parties of western Europe. These ideologies are universalist and, therefore, agree in principle with the concept of supranational unification. At the same time, however, they tend to mythicise the nation states which are seen more as “natural” institutions, since they are founded on pre-existing (but this is an ideological self-mistification) nations, than institutions which were historically determined, and which can therefore be his-

(70) Cfr. In particular, MARIO ALBERTINI, *Lo Stato nazionale*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1960 (last edition Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996), French translation, Lyon, Fédérop, 1978; ID., *Il risorgimento e l'unità europea*, Naples, Guida, 1979. For an overview of Albertini's criticism of the idea of the nation in the theoretical and political debate on this issue, see (as well as the volumes of “*Il Federalista*”) SERGIO PISTONE, *Friedrich Meinecke e la crisi dello Stato nazionale tedesco*, Turin, Giappichelli, 1969, and LUCIO LEVI, *Lecture su Stato nazionale e federalismo*, Turin, Celid, 1995. With regard to criticism of the idea of the nation, see also GEORGE GORIELY, *Nationalisme et idée européenne. Essais et réflexions*, texts gathered by SIMONE GORIELY, in “*Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*”, Université libre de Bruxelles, 2003, nn. 1-4 (edition entirely dedicated to Goriely, 1921-1998, and published in 2005).

(71) Cfr. MARIO ALBERTINI, *Nazionalismo e federalismo*, edited by Nicoletta Mosconi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999.

torically surpassed. As such, they tend to structurally (for this reason, as well as due to the tendency of national political parties to preserve their own power) conceive supranational unification as cooperation between nation states rather than the surpassing of absolute national sovereignty.

Secondly, Albertini maintained that federalism is not simply the doctrine of the federal state, but a political ideology in its own right, comparable to liberalism, democracy and socialism, and capable of accepting within its own doctrinal body fundamental contributions proposed by the other great ideologies which have led the emancipation in the modern world and, at the same time, able to overcome their limitations and obtain a greater understanding of the fundamental problems of the modern world (72).

According to this vision, federalism is, on a par with the other ideologies, characterised above all by a specific value. If liberty is the ultimate aim of liberalism, as equality is for democracy and social justice for socialism, then for federalism the ultimate aim is peace. From this perspective, Albertini utilized in a creative manner the fundamental political, juridical, historical and philosophical theories of Kant, whose relevance had been put back on the agenda by the crisis of the nation states and by the increasing interdependence of human actions over and above national borders, a fact of which European integration is the most advanced manifestation (73). Albertini considered these phenomena as the premise for a world federation, i.e. the realisation of perpetual peace. Thus he was able to state, with exceptional clarity, that the overcoming of exclusive national loyalism via a European federation would mean the end of the culture of mankind's division, which implied the legitimation of the duty to kill for one's na-

(72) Cfr. In particular, MARIO ALBERTINI, *Il federalismo e lo stato federale. Antologia e definizione*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1963, republished and updated with the title *Il federalismo*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979 and 1993; ID., *Qu'est-ce que le fédéralisme?*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1962, n. 1; ID., *Vers une théorie positive du fédéralisme*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1963, n. 4; ID., *L'"utopie" d'Olivetti*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1965, n. 2; ID., *Proudhon*, Florence, Vallecchi, 1974.

(73) Cfr. IMMANUEL KANT, *La pace, la ragione e la storia*, edited by Mario Albertini, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985. Also, MARIO ALBERTINI, *Una rivoluzione pacifica Dalle nazioni all'Europa*, edited by N. Mosconi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999.

tion, and the affirmation of the right not to kill in view of the full implementation of this right in a world federation.

Secondly, federalism is also characterised by a structural aspect, or rather the indication of the federal state as a way of organising power which allows the closed, centralised structures of the nation state to be surpassed at the foundations, with the creation of genuine regional and local autonomies, and at the top, with the realisation of effective forms of political and social solidarity over and above the nation state.

Thirdly, federalism is characterised by a social and historical aspect, or rather by the identification of the historical context in which it is possible to realize a value through an adequate power structure. This aspect is indicated in the overcoming of the tendency to divide the human race into classes and into antagonistic nations, which makes it possible to develop the pluralism which is typical of federal society, expressed by the principle of the 'unity of diversity'. Indeed, in federal societies, loyalism towards society as a whole coexists with that towards the smaller territorial communities (regions, provinces, cities, districts) in a non-hierarchical relationship. However, this social equilibrium has only partially developed in those federal societies which have existed up to now, because on the one hand, the class struggle (which will only be surpassed with the complete development of the scientific revolution implying the overcoming of the proletarian condition) has allowed the sense of belonging to a class to prevail over all other forms of social solidarity and has prevented strong links of solidarity from taking root in regional and local communities, and on the other hand, the struggle between states on an international level (which will only be eradicated with worldwide unification, for which European federation will be the starting point) has determined the strengthening of central power to the detriment of local authorities (74).

On these foundations, a group of militants was formed (the majority of whom were Italian) which has led the Italian MFE since the

(74) L. LEVI, *Il pensiero federalista*, Bari, Laterza, 2002, clarifies very well the difference between Albertini's conceptions of federalism and Alexandre Marc's theory of integral federalism.

1960s, and has played a crucial role in the leadership of the supranational organisation of federalists (75).

As far as the practical methods of the federalist struggle are concerned, it should be remembered that Albertini, as much as Spinelli, promoted, in light of the progress made by the economic integration process, the excessively schematic vision regarding the priority of political over economic unification. He was able, in my opinion, to provide a theoretically solid explanation (which was deeper than that of Spinelli) of the fact that with the EEC it had been possible to make considerable progress in the economic integration process despite the indefinite postponement of the creation of a European political authority of a federal nature (76). This progress had been made possible, according to his analysis, by the fact that the integration capability of a European federal power (which did not yet exist) was partially replaced by that deriving from a factual political power founded on the “factual eclipse of national sovereignty” and on the “factual unity of the European states’ *reasons of state*”. With these concepts it was substantially intended to attract attention to the endemic weakness of the European nation states, which forced them to cooperate in a stable and increasingly integrated way in order to survive, and to the strong convergence of their foreign, defence and economic policies ensured by American hegemony within the framework of bipolarism. It was specified, on the other hand, that this political basis for European economic integration was structurally precarious partly because the rela-

(75) Among the tools used to give life to an autonomous force, periodical publications were of great importance. One of these which deserves particular mention is the magazine “*Il Federalista*”, founded and edited by Albertini in 1959, and which is still published today under the editorship of Giovanni Vigo. This periodical, which in 2008 reached its fiftieth year (in Italy, it is the longest running federalist periodical), was published in French from 1962 to 1969, and since 1984, as well as in Italian, it has been published in English. One should also remember that in the early years of Albertini’s leadership of the MFE, he also edited the monthlies “*Giornale del Censimento*” (1965-1966) and “*Federalismo Europeo*” (1967-1969), also published in German and French. The Italian edition has been republished in anastatic print on behalf of the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont (Turin, Celid, 2003).

(76) Cfr. M. ALBERTINI, *La “force de dissuasion” francese*, in “*Il Federalista*”, 1960, n. 6; ID., *L’integrazione europea e altri saggi*, Pavia, Il Federalista, 1965.

tive strengthening of the nation states as a result of economic integration would be destined in the long run to undermine the foundations of the convergence of their reasons of state if such convergence did not transform into fusion through strong supranational institutions.

This analysis was completed by an evaluation of the role of De Gaulle in relation to the development of the European integration process which was notably different from that formulated by Spinelli. In effect, Albertini, although naturally refusing the nationalist and confederal orientation of the General, maintained until 1966 that certain aspects of his politics objectively favoured the advancement of European integration and, therefore, would also favour the efforts of the federalists to exploit the contradictions that this generated towards a constituent and federal alternative. In particular, the following actions were judged to be positive: *a*) the blocking of the premature enlargement of the European Community to include the United Kingdom, because in such a way the Europe of six would be kept alive, which for geographical and historical reasons (a particularly profound interdependence and historical experience of a particularly acute crisis of the nation state) was characterised by a particularly intense convergence of reasons of state; *b*) the decisive push in favour of the implementation of the common agricultural policy, which, hinging on the application of common prices, would present the necessity for further development in economic integration, including the crucial issue of monetary union; *c*) the resistance against the pressure, originating from the USA and the Kennedy Round, which met with favourable reaction in important German and Dutch spheres, to water down European economic integration into a vast Atlantic free trade area; *d*) the push in favour of the emancipation of Europe from its American protectorate which manifested itself with the attempt (the Fouchet Plan) to extend European integration to the sectors of defence and foreign policy (77).

(77) Cfr. In particular, M. ALBERTINI, *Quattro banalità e una conclusione sul vertice europeo*, in “*Il Federalista*”, 1961, n. 2 (see also Gianni Merlini’s letter in editions 3 and 4 of the magazine, which criticises this article from a Spinellian perspective, and Albertini’s response); ID., *L’Europe des Etats, l’Europe du Marché Commun et l’Europe du peuple fédéral européen*, in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1962, n. 2; ID., *Les limites de la politique étrangère américaine*, in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1963, n. 1; ID., *La défense de l’Europe et la signification des armes nucléaires*, in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1964, n. 2 (where, in contrast with Spinelli’s

If the vision of the process of European integration formulated by Albertini in the early 1960s had changed significantly with respect to that expressed by the 'new course', there was substantial continuity for a further few years with regard to action and strategy. In effect, Albertini and his followers continued up until 1966 to carry out an action which pursued, with no intermediate steps and without excluding possible recourse to the extreme method of civil disobedience, the convocation of a directly elected European constituent assembly with the specific assignment to formulate a project for a federal constitution, to be submitted for national ratification without any intervention on the part of a diplomatic conference. In essence, the action initiated with the CEP was carried forward, with Albertini and his followers limiting themselves to simplifying its organisational aspects with the campaign for the voluntary census of the federal European people, i.e. a collection of adhesions (self-financed by the people) in favour of the European constituent. According to the intentions of Albertini, in a few years this campaign would have achieved a mobilisation of public opinion of such dimensions that it would have been possible to simultaneously hold, in at least one hundred European cities, elections for the Congress of the European People. This would mean the achievement of a critical mass sufficient to force the governments to immediately summon the European constituent. Although the majority of the sMFE had opted for a different line, its directory bodies established that the census initiative would be carried out under the patronage and control of the sMFE, but under the responsibility of its proposer (78).

Other than the opposition of the Federalist Autonomy Group,

orientation, the necessity of European nuclear armament is supported); ID., *La Grande-Bretagne et l'Europe*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1966, n. 1; A. MAJOCCHI, *A propos du "Kennedy round"*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1964, n. 1. See also, for a precise reconstruction of these positions (also with reference to the bibliography), L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo. Significato storico di un'elezione*, cit.

(78) The census campaign obtained more than 100,000 adhesions between 1963 and 1966, above all in Italy, and led to a re-launch of the sMFE in Italy. Unlike the CEP, in which the elector was only invited to vote, the adherent to the census also had to pay for the cost of the ballot paper. With regard to the census campaign see, as well as the editions of the "Giornale del Censimento" from 1965 to 1966, *Le recensement volontarie du peuple fédéral européen*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1966, n. 1.

the majority of the sMFE had to deal with a rather less relevant group of opposition led by Alberto Cabella. For a number of years, he attempted to set up a European Federalist Party, with which he intended to compete with the other parties for the right to represent the European people directly at the political elections. The attempt was unsuccessful and Cabella disappeared from the federalist scene in 1965 (79).

The line which the majority of the sMFE opted for after the demise of the CEP presented significant similarities with the positions of the AEF, and for this very reason, in 1963, the first initiatives emerged with the aim of overcoming the split of 1956. Before examining these initiatives, it is necessary to take a look at the actions of the AEF during the years of the CEP campaign.

As mentioned before, the AEF line could be substantially identified with the majority of the EM and consisted in the support of the Communities and of the development of its federal embryos (80), without allowing it to become a systematic action of involving public

(79) Among the most important exponents of this school of thought, the following should be remembered as well as Cabella: Andrea Chiti-Batelli, Ludo Dierickx, Giuliano Martignetti, André Boucherle, Eugenio Calvi, Aldo Alessandro Mola, Amedeo Mortara, Dacirio Ghidorzi Ghizzi, Michel Morin. Apart from the information contained in U. MORELLI, *L'Unione Europea dei Federalisti e il Movimento Federalista Europeo sopranazionale*, cit., see also the volumes of "Fall Out" edited by Giuliano Martignetti and published in Turin between 1966 and 1968. By Cabella (who from 1982 to 1991 was cultural officer at the Italian Institute of Culture in Paris), the following writings (as well as the numerous articles which appeared in the federalist periodicals and, in particular, in "Europa Federata" and "Popolo Europeo") should be highlighted: *Piero Gobetti e il "Baretti"*. *Storia di una rivista europea*, in "Annales Universitatis Saraviensis. Philosophie, Lettres", III, 1995; *Rousseau e il nazionalismo*, in *Studi di Letteratura, Storia e Filosofia in onore di Bruno Revel*, Firenze, 1965; *Piero Gobetti e le riviste italo-francesi "Vita Latina", "Les jeunes auteurs" e "Vita", di Jean Luchaire*, in *Piero Gobetti e la Francia*, Milan, 1985; *L'idea di Europa dagli antichi a oggi*, Turin, Editrice il Punto, 2002.

(80) It should be remembered that Hans von der Groeben, member of the Spaak Committee and future member of the Commission of the EEC, was a speaker at the Congress of the EUD, held in Augsburg from November 9th to 11th 1956, on the negotiations which were preparing the Treaties of Rome. In general, the AEF systematically followed and made an effort to influence these negotiations. Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, p. 92 and following. E. H. BRUGMANS, *op. cit.*, p. 213 and following. As far as the EM was concerned, not only did it participate in the intergovernmental negotiations through its president of honour Spaak, but it also launched a campaign in support of the new treaties.

opinion comparable to that of the CEP campaign. After the signing of the Treaties of Rome, the AEF committed itself in favour of their prompt ratification, connecting this with the request for the introduction of a single parliamentary assembly covering all three Communities, to be directly elected as soon as possible and equipped with legislative powers, and the need for the Community executives to merge in order to become a federal government capable of effective action. These requests formulated by both the directive committee of the EUD, on March 30th 1957 in Bonn, and by the federal committee of the AEF on October 5th in the Hague, were at the heart of the Congress of Europe held in Rome, under the presidency of Schuman, from June 10th to 13th 1957. The congress organised by the EM, and to which the AEF made a rather significant contribution, saw the contribution of 1263 representatives of which 72% were members of parliament (81).

The commitment of the AEF to the direct election of the EP intensified after the EEC became operative with the appointment of Hallstein as President of the Commission and the appointment of Schuman as President of the Parliamentary Assembly. In this regard, it should be remembered that the said assembly, in its very first sitting, performed an act of some political significance. Upon the proposal of Hans Furler, it defined itself as the European Parliament (82), thus demonstrating the will for economic integration to be followed by political integration.

One moment of particular importance of the AEF line was the congress that it organised in Wiesbaden from January 9th to 11th 1959 (83), with the patronage of the EM, and a decisive contribution from the EUD. In effect, there was a high level confrontation between the federalists of the AEF and the representatives of European politics. Among others, the participants at the congress included Dehousse, Hallstein, Robert Marjolin (vice-president of the EEC Commission),

(81) See the pamphlet *Congresso d'Europa. Roma 10-13 giugno 1957*, published by the CIME, Roma, 1957 and P. CARAFFINI, *op. cit.*

(82) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, p. 107. However, only the German and Dutch used this name immediately, which was officially adopted only in 1962.

(83) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, p. 114 and subsequent.

Kurt Georg Kiesinger (then president of Baden-Württemberg), von Brentano, André François-Poncet (president of the EM Action Committee, operating on the level of the original “Six”), Schuman, Prince Bernard of the Netherlands, Randolfo Pacciardi (Italian Minister of Defence and the President of the CIME), a British delegation including Clement Attlee (former Labour Prime Minister) and numerous MPs of the six original member states of the Communities. The approved resolution asked for the gradual fulfilment of objectives such as the direct election of the EP, the formation of a directly accountable European government, the institutional merging of the Communities, their financial autonomy and the coordination of foreign policies, all with a view to achieving a European political community.

The congress entrusted Brugmans, confirmed as president of the AEF, with the task of developing and deepening the stances of Wiesbaden, which he did with a document arranged into 21 theses and distributed in the spring of 1959. It was argued that economic integration had to be complemented by integration in other sectors, particularly those of foreign policy and defence (“no integration without political integration”), but that it had to proceed with caution, avoiding revolutionary manoeuvres attempting create loopholes in national laws, which would have been counterproductive for any progress towards democratic federalism (here, criticism of the CEP was particularly clear). The most significant aspect was contained in the 21st thesis: in the long term, the ultimate objective had to be a European constitution and in relation to this objective, the EP should be transformed into a permanent constituent assembly, giving all progress made in the construction of Europe a corresponding juridical form (84).

Another important demonstration of the action in favour of the direct election of the EP was the support for the Dehousse project, whose preparation benefited from a decisive contribution on the part of the EM, and therefore the AEF, as it was an element adhering to the orientation of the majority of the EM (85). The project stimulated

(84) *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

(85) Cfr. MOUVEMENT EUROPÉEN, *Vers l'élection à suffrage universel direct de l'Assemblée parlementaire européenne. Rapport d'une Commission d'études. Projet de Convention*, Brussels, 1959. This is a report that was prepared by a commission summoned by the

the apprehension of those who criticised the lack of a uniform electoral system and above all the provisions for the direct election of a parliament that would have no power. However, unlike the sMFE, with the AEF the prevailing opinion was that the very act of holding a direct election was one of important political value since in such a way, the European people would be directly involved in the European integration process, and this would strengthen the push towards the democratisation of the Communities.

The Dehousse project, as mentioned before, was blocked by De Gaulle in conformance with his stance against the development of the Communities in a federal sense. It was the confrontation with the General's European policy, and in particular his design for political union on a confederal basis, that became during the years that we are analysing the crucial political problem of the AEF.

While for the majority of the sMFE, opposition to De Gaulle and his European policy was immediately and unequivocally clear with no hesitation, the definition of the AEF's position was more complex. In effect, the French component of the AEF, the Fédération, showed a certain inclination towards the Gaullist regime, with which it tried to maintain contact (86). But even in the most impor-

EM in 1958 and formed by Etienne de la Vallée Poussin (president), Conrad von Adelman (secretary), Gaston Thorn, Vittorio Badini Gonnafaloni, Marinus van der Goes Naters, Martin Blank, Guglielmo Negri, Robert van Schendel (secretary general of the EM) and Raymond Rifflet (who in 1959 would become president of the Executive of the sMFE). With regard to this initiative, and to further EM initiatives in such a direction, and their influence on the Dehousse project, see: *Per l'elezione del Parlamento europeo a suffragio universale diretto* (with foreword by Mario Scelba, president of the EP, and an introduction by Dehousse), General Direction of Parliamentary Documentation and Information, European Parliament, 1969 (it contains, as well as the Dehousse project, all the documentation regarding the institutional and political initiatives in favour of the direct election of the EP from 1960 to 1969); *Eleggiamo il Parlamento europeo*, edited by the Italian Council of the European Movement, Rome, 1963 (with texts written by MEPs Emilio Battista, Dehousse, Maurice Faure and W.J. Schnijf, as well as Angelo Lotti, secretary general of the CIME); L.V. MAJOCCHI, *L'azione per il riconoscimento del diritto di voto europeo*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

(86) It should be remembered that the Fédération, unlike the MFE-France, expressed itself in favour of French Algeria. Cfr. A. GREILSAMMER, *op. cit.*, p. 95 and subsequent.

tant component of the AEF, the EUD, uncertainty began to emerge ahead of the Gaullist project for political union. So much so that in the meeting of the Presidium on November 28th 1959 in Munich, the EUD criticised the German federal government, which had initially refused the French proposal to create a political secretariat for the coordination of the foreign policies of the original Six (87). These uncertainties were overcome after the press conference of September 5th 1960, in which De Gaulle clarified beyond doubt his confederal orientation, stating: "It is sheer folly to believe that something effective can be created and that the people will accept something over and above the state".

In the joint meeting of the federal committee of the AEF and the Presidium of the EUD, which was held on the 18th and 19th of the following September, a clear response emerged regarding this attack on the idea of supranational integration. The approved declaration stated that, in contrast with the conception of De Gaulle, European federation was the irreplaceable premise for the continuing life and development of the historical nations, that the creation of new organisations was useless, if not dangerous, that any future political secretariat would have to be a stepping stone towards a European Political Community and that the EP deriving from direct election (which was not to be substituted by the referendum proposed by De Gaulle) would have to exercise control over the political secretariat, since the national parliaments would no longer be able to perform the function of control in the area of foreign policy (88).

This position was weakened by the document of compromise approved by the conference of November 11th and 12th 1960 held in Luxemburg and organised by both the AEF and the EM. The conference was attended by, upon the invitation of the Fédération, a delegation of the Gaullist party led by Christian de la Maléne (considered the most pro-European of the Gaullists (89)). The document granted the political secretariat to the Gaullists, who would then on their part

(87) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

(88) *Ibid.*, p. 129 and subsequent.

(89) De la Maléne belonged, together with Alain Peyrefitte, to the Paneuropa of Coudenhove-Kalergi, which sided with the theories of De Gaulle on European unity.

have to accept the direct election of the EP (without an extension of its power). However, a few days later the French president rejected the Dehousse project, sent to the governments by the EP president Furler, reiterating the idea of a referendum.

When, during the course of 1961 and the first half of 1962, the problem of political union was the central focus of the discussions on the Fouchet Plan, referring back to the aforementioned Cologne declaration, the AEF expressed a position of clear rejection with regard to Gaullist confederalism (90). With reference to this intervention in the question of European integration, four conventions in particular should be highlighted.

The first was the study conference organised by the EUD on March 10th and 11th 1962 at Auel Castle, with the participation of Von Brentano, Friedländer, Heinz Krekeler (member of the Euratom Commission), Karl Mommer (member of the *Bundestag*), Dieter Roser, Ulrich Scheuner (from the University of Bonn) and Rudolf Woller. On this occasion, the “Auel Declaration” was drafted, delivering a clear and articulate “no” to the Fouchet Plan, which was revealed to the public through a press conference called by Friedländer, Von Brentano and Mommer in Bonn on March 13th, and which found a great deal of support in the *Bundestag* (91).

After the breakdown in negotiations on the Fouchet Plan (April 17th 1962), the federal committee took a position at the beginning of May that divided the political actions to be carried forward into three stages: in the first, the main aim had to be, while De Gaulle was still present, the full implementation of the Treaties of Rome (merging the executives, European elections, financial autonomy); in the second, the powers of the Communities had to be extended to other political sectors; the third stage was the creation of a European federation (92).

(90) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-141. It should be highlighted that Friedländer intervened in a particularly incisive way against the De Gaulle line on political union and at the same time criticised the attitude present in the EUD, which he considered excessively optimistic, towards British entry to the Community. In this period, Gerhard Eickhorn began to assume important responsibilities in the secretariat of the EUD, and he would become secretary general in 1967.

(91) K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.

(92) *Ibid.*, p. 144.

This was followed by the JEF-Germany Congress held on May 19th and 20th in Bad Godesberg, which congratulated France's five partner governments for the breakdown in negotiations on the Fouchet Plan, and which supported an innovating idea suggested by Mommer. He proposed that the countries of the Community in favour of the direct election of the EP should not wait for the consensus of all six governments, but that they should directly elect their own national delegations to the EP in connection with their national general elections. Mommer recommended that the federal government and the *Bundestag* should lead by example and submitted an official proposal to the *Bundestag*, which was intended to be implemented during the 1965 elections (93).

The fourth and most important convention was the EM Congress which was held in Munich on June 7th and 8th 1962 and organised by the German Council of the EM, with a decisive role being played by the EUD (94). The congress was attended by eight hundred participants from almost every western European country, including: Hallstein (who said that in order to defend the Community, one should fight "tooth and nail" if necessary), Von Brentano, and the former French Prime Minister Reynaud, Etienne Hirsch (who, due to clashes with De Gaulle, had to forego the presidency of the Euratom Commission and had joined the executive committee of the sMFE),

(93) *Ibid.*, p. 145. For the first time, the problem of the unilateral election of the national representatives in the EP was posed in order to overcome opposition to the general election. It should be remembered that on June 13th, 1962, after De Gaulle had defined the idea of supranational integration as "Volapük" at the press conference of May 15th, and the five ministers of the MRP (including Pierre Pflimlin and Maurice Schumann) had resigned from the government, the MP Simonnet (MRP) made a declaration on behalf of 280 members (out of 485) of the French National Assembly, asking for "the strengthening and merging of the Communities institutions, the election of the European parliament on a one-man-one-vote basis and the gradual application of the principle of majority voting in the Council of Ministers". Cfr. W. LIPGENS, *45 Jahre Ringen um die Europäische Verfassung*, cit., p. 448. The following year the MP André Rossi presented a bill to the National Assembly which foresaw the direct election of the EP, on May 9th 1965 the fifteenth anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. Cfr. *Per l'elezione del Parlamento europeo suffragio universale diretto*, cit., pp. 298-300.

(94) Cfr. ITALIAN COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT, *Dall'Aja a Monaco*, Rome, Edizioni per l'Europa, 1962; J.M. PALAYRET, *Il Movimento Europeo*, cit.

Maurice Faure (who had signed, on behalf of France, the Treaties of Rome), Belgian minister Pierre Wigny (author of the general report), Friedländer, Brugmans, De La Maléne (who came, for the last time, to defend the European policies of De Gaulle in the EM). One sensational aspect of the congress was the presence of a group of exiled Spaniards led by Salvador de Madariaga and a troop of pro-European Spaniards led by Christian Democrat Gil Robles. With their approval, the congress declared in one motion “its determined opposition to the admission of the currently “Franco’s” Spain, i.e under an authoritarian and totalitarian regime, to the EEC”, and hoped that the Spanish people could soon return to democracy so that they could fully participate in the construction of Europe (95).

The most important political result of the Munich Congress was the approval by a vast majority (with only 6 votes against and 21 abstentions) of a memorandum, deeply inspired by Faure and Hirsch, which summed up the demands regarding the federal and democratic development of the Communities and, with reference to the creation of a political Europe, stated: “the said creation implies a new treaty, but it cannot diminish the powers, neither can it modify the structures, nor weaken the dynamism of the Communities, nor that of NATO, which is the wider framework necessary for European defence. In other words, it must be coordinated with the Communities because the existing treaties foresee it, and the success of the Communities allows it. It will be necessary to outline a merger. A new treaty must attribute, in one or more stages, new powers with regard to foreign and defence policies, to the existing Council of the Communities at head of state or government level, or at ministerial level. The Council will make its decisions upon the proposals of a unified Executive, according to a qualified majority and not, as before, on a unanimous vote. This Executive, independent of the individual states

(95) The participation of the Spanish federalists to the Munich Congress consequently led to their arrest and they were interned. Cfr. the pamphlet published by the Consejo Federal Español of the European Movement in Paris (where it operated in exile) in 1962 under the title *Munich 1962*; JUAN CARLOS PEREIRA, *L'européisme spagnolo (1945-1970): obiettivi e iniziative di una Spagna divisa*, in *I Movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

and representing the general interests of Europe, must vigilate over the implementation of the said decisions. In exercising these new powers, the Council and the Executive must be subjected to the control of the Parliament and the Court of Justice” (96).

After the breakdown in negotiations on the Fouchet Plan, an understanding developed between the French and German governments, which led to the signing of the French-German Treaty. In this context, the German federalists in the AEF made themselves heard not only with their declarations, but also with a systematic dissenting presence on the occasion of De Gaulle’s visits to Germany in September of 1962. During all the General’s meetings with the German people, the JEF raised banners featuring the slogan “We Want a Federal European State”. Subsequently, the EUD officially presented a critical evaluation of the French-German Treaty, accompanied by the request made to the *Bundestag* to clarify with a foreword, on the occasion of its ratification, that the procedures and the powers of the Communities and of NATO would not be called into question by the treaty (97). This request, as mentioned before, was effectively accommodated by the *Bundestag*.

Concluding the illustration of the AEF’s actions between 1957 and 1963, one can observe an evolution on the struggle for the transformation in a federal sense of the Communities. If initially there was a certain levelling out on the idea of the automatic development from economic to political integration, and the AEF de facto acted as a resonance chamber for the development of the Community in the eyes of public opinion, this attitude underwent two significant modifications. On the one hand, the theme of the constituent, which had been one of the reasons behind the divisions with the supporters of the CEP, re-emerged in the idea of the EP elected as a permanent constituent. On the other hand, the commitment to the development of the Communities’ federal embryos translated into an increasingly strong and combative reclamation, which did not shy away from severely criticising the national governments for backing down in the

(96) Cfr. *Dall’Aja a Monaco*, cit., pp. 55-56.

(97) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-156.

face of Gaullist politics. In effect, the contradiction between the development of economic integration and the Gaullist obstacles to the development of institutions in a supranational sense began to lead to the understanding that it was not functionalistic automatism, but the autonomous action of federalists founded on a serious capability to mobilise public opinion that would be the decisive factor for the effective achievement of the federal and democratic transformation of the Communities.

This attitude favoured in a decisive way the reconciliation between the sMFE and the AEF, which was not therefore solely linked to the modification on the part of the CEP-sMFE of the evaluation initially formulated on the EEC. Having said that, there were essentially three concrete signs of the said reconciliation.

First of all, there was the return of the sMFE to the EM. On July 1st and 2nd 1961, a joint meeting of the sMFE and CEP directory bodies had decided to leave the EM, since it had rejected, in the Brussels Congress of June 16th and 17th 1961, a proposal of the sMFE which aimed to transform the EM from a conglomerate of several organisations into a genuinely European organism — with local branches, autonomous regions, supranational sovereign congresses — financed by its members, and with the objective of promoting without compromise the creation of a European federation. The sMFE interrupted all collaboration on an international level, but without imposing such a fracture on the lower levels of the organisation, given that certain national councils, such as those of France and Belgium, held objectives and points of view which were substantially in agreement with the corresponding national commissions of the sMFE (98). This decision was revoked by the central committee of the sMFE in October 1962 as a consequence of the EM's Munich Congress, in which Hirsch (even though he was not representing the sMFE) had played a decisive role and which received a positive evaluation (99). However, the Albertinian federalists voted against.

(98) Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, nn. 12, 13, 16, and *I federalisti escono dal Movimento Europeo*, in “*Popolo Europeo*”, 1961, nn. 6-7.

(99) Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1962, n. 20.

The improvement of relations between the sMFE and AEF also became apparent during the formulation of the federalist charter decided by the Lyon Congress. The discussions that led to the drafting of the charter (whose definitive version would be approved by the sMFE Montreux Congress, April 10th-12th 1964) involved both the EM and the AEF, whose President, Brugmans, expressed his agreement on the essential points. This collaboration would culminate in the organisation of an information day on the charter, on February 9th 1964 in Paris, which was attended by Brugmans, De Rougement and Marc, together for the first time after the heroic days of their federalist battles. With them, there were federalists of various origins such as André Alers, Jean Bareth, Arthur Calteux, Delmas, Desboeuf, Frenay, Giarini, Gouzy, Hytte, Koppe, Magnant, Rifflet, Von Schenk, Van Schendel, Andre Thiéry and Voisin (100).

Finally, the AEF Congress of October 11th to 13th 1963 in Luxembourg should also be remembered, which, celebrating Schuman who had died on September 4th of the same year, reiterated its claims for a federation, i.e. the ultimate objective of Community indicated in the declaration of May 9th 1950. The Luxembourg Congress was the last to be held by the AEF until the joint congress with the sMFE in 1973, and it was also the first to be attended by representatives of the sMFE (101).

(100) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1963, n. 21, and 1964, n. 27. The joint declaration of the secretaries general of the sMFE (Orio Giarini) and the AEF (Karlheinz Koppe) should be remembered, in which, though excluding unification for the time being, points of convergence were ascertained and contact was foreseen between the two organisations.

(101) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE FEDERALISTS (1964-1974)

SUMMARY: 4.1. The action of the federalists up until De Gaulle's disappearance from the political scene. — 4.2. The events marking European integration from the Hague Summit in 1969 to the Paris Summit in December 1974. — 4.3. The reunification of the federalists. — 4.4. The federalists obtain the commitment of the governments for the direct election of the European Parliament. — 4.5. Considerations on the role and nature of the UEF.

4.1. *The action of the federalists up until De Gaulle's disappearance from the political scene.*

The European integration process from 1964 up until the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969 was characterised by an emphasis on the contradictory development that had taken place between 1958 and 1963. Economic integration had made great progress. The customs union had been completed on July 1st 1968, a year and a half early with respect to the 12 years (extendable to 15) of transition foreseen by the EEC Treaty. To be precise, it was a union of tariffs, because two fundamental elements for a true customs union were yet to be implemented (and which would be added in 1970-1980): the attribution of the proceeds of the common customs belt to the resources of the EEC's budget and the adoption of a common customs legislation, or at least a strong harmonisation of the national customs legislations (1). Other than the complete dismantling of customs duties and

(1) Cfr. FRANCESCO MASTRONARDI, *Storia dell'integrazione europea*, Naples, Simone, 2006, p. 51.

quotas, and the establishment of a common customs tariff towards countries outside the EEC (which also implied a common trade policy), the common agricultural policy was almost completely implemented with the related foundation of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.

All this resulted in the EEC becoming the world's biggest commercial power and the second biggest industrial power. As a consequence, it became more attractive to countries beyond its borders. This was confirmed in particular by the new entry applications presented by the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark on May 10th 1967 and by Norway on July 21st of the same year. This time, the negotiations could not even begin because in the press conference held on November 27th 1967 De Gaulle reaffirmed his veto, stating that enlargement would lead to the "disintegration of the Community". In this regard, it should be said that the decision of the General did not represent an objective factor for the strengthening of integration, because, unlike in 1963, the pound no longer held the function of a reserve currency, and the structure of the agricultural market, hotly contested by the United Kingdom during the discussions that had followed its first application, had been sufficiently consolidated and did not appear to be renegotiable except for a few minor details. Finally, the danger of watering down European economic integration into a vast Atlantic free trade area had also subsided (2).

The progress of economic integration also had positive implications with respect to the development of world trade. In 1964, global tariff negotiations (known as the Kennedy Round) were undertaken with the USA within the framework of GATT, and concluded in 1967 with an agreement which involved around eighty countries and led to a qualitative leap in the overcoming of the still strong protec-

(2) On the development of the external as well as internal relations of the EEC, in the first decade see H.J. DÖRSCH-H. LEGROS (edited by), *Cronologie des Communautés Européennes. Les faits et les décisions de la Communauté économique européenne*, Institut d'études européennes-Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Presse Universitaire de Bruxelles, 1969-1979, vol. I: 1958-1964, vol. II: 1965-1968. Also FRANCESCA FAURI, *L'integrazione economica europea 1947-2006*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006.

tionist tendencies in the USA, as well as an important step forward in the realisation of free worldwide trade (3).

If from the point of view of pure economic growth the EEC was an undoubted success, it was on the other hand characterised by deep distortions, particularly by strong gaps between the more developed regions of the centre and north of the Community and the regions on the periphery (especially the south of Italy), and by the related phenomenon of mass emigration. In essence, given the weakness of the tools for positive integration foreseen by the treaty and the inability to create more suitable ones, economic development, which could no longer be controlled by national economic policy, was in reality abandoned to the anarchic forces of the free market and therefore dominated by the manoeuvres of large multinational companies. This inevitably led to strongly distorted development.

The lack of development in economic positive integration was clearly linked to the weakness of the Community's institutional system and thus to its serious deficits with relation to democracy and efficiency. A substantially intergovernmental system — with a weak executive, a parliament not elected directly and without any real power, a budget relying on national contributions, unanimous decision making — was structurally incapable of effectively expressing solidarity. The fact is that not only was no progress made whatsoever on an institutional level, and therefore with regard to the development and strengthening of the Community's federal embryos, but there was in fact an actual regression. In such a regard, the failure of Hallstein's proposals in 1965 was crucial.

On March 31st 1965, the Commission of the EEC (of which he

(3) It is necessary to underline that the Commission of the EEC obtained during the course of the negotiations a dispensation from the principle, supported by the Americans, of an identical reduction in duties — of 50% — for all products, which would have been advantageous for the USA and the United Kingdom. The average duty of the countries of the EEC was indeed much lower than that of the USA and the United Kingdom. Therefore, an identical reduction would have meant for the EEC the effective dismantling of its external tariff, while the two aforementioned countries would have maintained sufficient protection. Cf. ALBERTO MAJOCCHI, *La conclusione del Kennedy Round*, in *"Federalismo Europeo"*, 1967, nn. 5-6; L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo*, cit., p. 111.

was president), on the wave of the progress made in the dismantling of customs barriers and the creation of a common agricultural market (at the end of 1964, agreement had been reached on the common price of cereals), presented to the Council of Ministers a package containing three proposals: the realisation of the customs union and the CAP by 1967; the transition from financing the EEC budget with contributions from the nation states to using its own resources, identified as the proceeds from the external customs belt and the CAP (agricultural taxes), which belonged naturally to the Community because they derived from economic integration (4); the attribution to the EP of the power to approve (together with the Council) the budget, in order to avoid a lack of democratic legitimation, since the national parliaments would no longer be able to control these resources because they would no longer pass through national budgets. The package was accompanied by the affirmation that it was now time to change, as foreseen by the treaty, to majority voting on certain issues on the part of the Council and to realize the direct election of the EP, which would acquire new powers in relation to the approval of the Community's budget.

These developments, which would bring significant progress towards the supranationality of the European institutions, were strongly rejected by De Gaulle (5). Therefore, starting on July 1st 1965, a serious crisis developed between France, which for six months suspended the participation of its representatives in the council of ministers of the Community (crisis of the "empty chair"), and the other five partners.

(4) For example, the amount of duties on imports from countries outside the Community collected by the customs authorities of the port of Rotterdam depended on the attractiveness of the integrated economy of the EEC countries and not specifically on the Dutch economy.

(5) With regard to Hallstein's proposals and the crisis of 1965 see CORRADO MALANDRINO, *"Tut etwas tapferes": compi un atto di coraggio. L'Europa federale di Walter Hallstein (1948-1982)*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005. Also: W. HALLSTEIN, *Der unvollendete Bundesstaat, Europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse*, with the collaboration of H.H. Götz and K.H. Narjes, Düsseldorf-Wien, Econ Verlag, 1969 (Italian translation: *Europa federazione incompiuta*, with foreword by G. Petrilli, Milano, Rizzoli, 1971) and W. LOTH, W. WALLACE, W. WESSELS (edited by), *Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1995 (English translation: *Walter Hallstein, The Forgotten European?*, London-New York, Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1998).

The crisis was overcome in the end with the “Luxemburg Compromise” of January 1966, which not only blocked the proposals of the Commission with regard to EEC resources and the related increase in the powers of the EP, but also consolidated the confederal aspects of the Community system. In essence, the supremacy of the Council of Ministers was reaffirmed (the body destined to defend national interests) to the detriment of the Commission which had clearly been cut down to size, even with regard to its power of initiative, and France was also granted the right to resort to veto within the Council, which in effect blocked the transition from unanimous to majority voting (6).

The institutional development of the EEC remained at a standstill until De Gaulle abandoned the French leadership on April 28th 1969. The only change on an institutional level which took place in this period was the merging of the Communities executives, established by a treaty drawn up in 1965 and which came into force in 1967. The innovation, which as we have seen, corresponded to one of the requests of the federalists (initially only on the part of the AEF, and later by the sMFE as well) with regard to the strengthening of the EEC’s institutions, coincided on the other hand with De Gaulle’s refusal to award Hallstein (who resigned in May 1967) the presidency of the unified Commission. The said position was assumed by Jean Rey, who certainly could not be described as a battler.

In this context of stalemate, the sMFE and the AEF obstinately and with increasing commitment proceeded with their action which hinged on the democratisation of the Communities. The commitment to an increasingly far-reaching and structured collaboration was also growing, and the main aspects of such a commitment are outlined here.

(6) In effect, the text of the declaration issued by the EEC’s Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on January 29th 1966 ascertained a divergence between France and the other five partners. France stated that, if vital national interests were at stake, decisions must be taken according to unanimous voting, even if majority voting was foreseen. The partners on the other hand maintained that in such cases efforts must be made to find a solution to suit all the member states, without however excluding majority voting in the event that agreement could not be reached within a reasonable length of time. All the governments agreed, however, that this divergence should not prevent the Community from resuming its work. France therefore retook its place among the Community institutions, but, in order to avoid a new crisis, from then until the end of the 1980s majority decision-making was in substance avoided.

Things were set in motion by the Swiss EU, which had been carrying forward significant initiatives in favour of the reunification of the federalist movements for some time, and which, on January 27th 1964, through secretary general Thomas Raeber and vice president Massimo Pini, submitted a project to the sMFE and the AEF for the constitution of a liaison commission for the various European federalists in order to seek agreement and collaboration (7). The project was approved by the federal committee of the AEF in March and by the central committee of the sMFE in May of the same year. Meanwhile, the sMFE's Montreux Congress (April 19th-12th), to which Brugmans, president of the AEF, sent a long message on federalism's world mission, saw the personal intervention of the secretary general of the AEF, Koppe, who underlined the aims pursued by the sMFE and AEF (8).

On February 3rd 1965, the liaison commission, which gathered twice under the presidency of Raeber, presented a report detailing the following fundamental points. The collaboration criteria were based on common calls for the direct election of the EP, the democratisation of the Communities, the extension of their powers to foreign policy and defence, the coordination of the sMFE and AEF's positions within the EM, the future integration of their respective initiatives and structures, the holding of periodic joint meetings of the two executives, and the future drafting of a document on a common basis. Similar forms of collaboration were foreseen for their respective youth movements (9).

The first joint session of the sMFE and AEF executives was held in Paris on June 26th 1965, nine years after the split. The decision was to contribute together to the creation of the "Europa Aktion 65" (10). Subsequently, starting in 1967, each year, coinciding with the Pente-

(7) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*," 1964, n. 27 and "*Federalismo Europeo*", single February edition 1964, published in view of the sMFE's Montreux Congress by those Italian federalists adhering to the majority of the sMFE and therefore, in opposition to Albertini. Between 1963 and 1966, they published a number of editions of "*Federalismo Europeo*". Starting in 1967, when the "Autonomia Federalista" group had dissolved two years previously, "*Federalismo Europeo*" was published under Albertini's responsibility for three years.

(8) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1964, n. 28.

(9) "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1965, n. 31.

(10) "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1965, n. 32 and *Un note de Karlheinz Koppe sur les rapports entre l'AEF et le MFE*, in "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1965, n. 1.

cost, the two organisations organised together events in order to raise public awareness on numerous border crossings under the name of “Europa Aktion”, with the participation of other pro-European associations (11). In the meantime, Koppe brought the greetings of the AEF to the 11th sMFE Congress, held in Turin between October 30th and November 1st 1966.

The following year, the EUD recognised the double membership in Germany (EUD and the German Commission of the sMFE) and augured increasingly close cooperation and an ongoing common commitment in the EM (12). Finally, on January 18th and 19th 1969, Venice was the venue for a rather fruitful meeting between the representatives of the EUD and the Italian Commission of the sMFE; then on the occasion of the sMFE’s Trieste Congress between April 11th and 13th, the secretary general of the EUD Gerhard Eickhorn proposed the immediate association of his organisation with the sMFE (13).

Coming now to the actions carried out by the sMFE and the AEF between 1964 and 1969, it can generally be observed that the perseverance in calling for the democratisation and the federalisation of the Communities, and therefore the direct election of the EP as a strategic step forward in this direction, against the confederal line personified by De Gaulle (which was also a screen behind which the other governments hid their ill will), was associated with an increasing commitment to raising awareness and mobilising public opinion. After the eschaustion of the CEP, the direct appeal to the citizens as an instrument of pressure on the political classes, which had been the fundamental commitment of the most radical federalist stream, progressively became a common patrimony, albeit with the political adjustments that we have already seen. In the period we are examining, the highlight was the presentation to the Italian parliament in June 1969 of a bill of popular initiative for the direct unilateral election of the Italian members of the European Parliament. However, let us start from the beginning, with the two crucial 1964 congresses, that of the sMFE in Montreux from the 10th to the 12th of April, and that of the EUD in

(11) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

(12) Cfr. “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1967, n. 10.

(13) Cfr. “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1969, nn. 1 and 2.

Frankfurt from the 12th to the 14th of April, which defined the political and programmatic platform for the initiatives of those years.

In Montreux, the Federalist Charter was finally approved after two years of passionate debate (14). The document contained the fundamental theories of integral federalism whose most important theorist within the sMFE was Marc. The idea of the federal society, which was to be constructed together with the federal state, was developed in a highly detailed manner. Indeed, it was claimed that federalism had its own specific and original conception, with respect to the dominant ideologies of the day, of ownership, enterprise, trade unionism, credit, planning and social progress.

In essence, *ownership* — the document argued — must be generalised, purged of parasitic revenues and placed at the service of the common good. *Enterprise* must be an association founded on the participation of autonomous individuals and working groups that operate on an equal footing and that enjoy a “guaranteed social optimum”. This is the only way to create a classless society, and therefore one which abolishes the condition of the workman. The *trade unions* do not limit themselves to defending the corporative interests of their members, but they participate, like the other communities involved, in the management of enterprises and above all in the organisation of economic and planning activities. *Planning* (which must regard economic sectors which produce essential goods) will be democratic and not technocratic. Therefore, its objectives must be formulated progressing from the smallest to the more extended communities, decisions will have to be centralised, and their application and implementation decentralised to all levels. *Credit*, in the long term, will guide public works, urban planning, territorial organisation and economic investment, all in conformance with the plan; in the short term, it will serve to balance consumption levels and to ward off the threat of economic crisis. *Social progress* must in particular: reduce to a minimum the undifferentiated and repetitive part of labour and create a situation where it is no longer performed by a single social category, reduced to

(14) See “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1964, n. 27 and 28. Edition n. 28 contains the text of the Federalist Charter, also published in “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1964, one-off edition dedicated to the Montreux Congress.

slavery, but by the entire social corps (through obligatory community service); organise consumption in such a way as to control the excesses, degrading for human beings, of advertising, blind productivism, technocracy; make freedom, responsibility, initiative, culture and indeed pleasure an undisputable right of every human being, and no longer the prerogative of privileged groups and individuals.

The definition of the fundamental aspects of federal society, which was founded on the teachings of Proudhon and personalist philosophy, was supplemented by a definition of the institutional aspects of the federalism which acknowledged (applying them also to the internal structure of the nation states (15)) the fundamental indications of the Hamiltonian conception (including the concept of the crisis of the nation state and the constituent method), but also repropounded the principle of corporative representation. Indeed, it was stated that the organisation of a European federation would have to include a group of assemblies representing the European population, member communities and social and economic organisations.

The federalist charter was approved with a majority consisting of 52% of the vote. The charter did not satisfy the *Autonomia Federalista* group, led by Albertini and which obtained 33% of the vote. At the moment of voting, the Albertinian delegates left the hall, theatrically displaying their opposition to theories judged to be corporative and to the idea of linking the federalist struggle to a specific philosophical concept (described as “Proudhonian” and “personalist”), which should have been considered as an important contribution and not the quintessence of federalism itself (16). Apart from anything else, the effec-

(15) This is substantially the principle of subsidiarity, which would subsequently be acknowledged, though in rather unclear terms, in the Maastricht Treaty instituting the European Union (1992).

(16) The *Autonomia Federalista* group had proposed, as an alternative to the Federalist Charter, a Manifesto which developed Albertini’s theories, which we mentioned when speaking of his detachment from Spinelli. In the document proposed by Albertini, the limits of the traditional ideologies (liberalism, democracy and socialism were underlined) and federalism was proposed as an ideology in itself — founded on peace as a supreme value — capable of understanding and resolving the fundamental problems of the contemporary world that was characterised by global interdependence. It was therefore hoped that the system of the nation states would be overcome on a worldwide level, starting with Europe, in order to ensure peace, freedom, social

tiveness of federalist actions demanded that all those who wanted a federal Europe be united, not divided by philosophical questions (17). Those in favour of the Federal Party Group — led by Cabella and which obtained 15% of the vote — abstained, judging the federalist charter to be inadequate in order to confront the problems of the modern world.

With regard to concrete action, the most important signal that emerged from the Montreux Congress was the proposal, contained in the majority motion presented by Rifflet, to create on the basis of the Charter committees of federal initiative on all levels (regions, provinces, communes, associations) in order to prepare the formation of a European front for democratic federalist renewal (18). This was intended as the political force that would represent the constituent popular will and the framework within which a solution of the problems could be offered over and above restrictive national, regional and corporative horizons. The committees of initiative would have to gather both the federalist militants and the most active elements of political, economic and

justice and as a basis for structural reforms of society as a whole. In concrete terms, the voluntary census of the federal European people was proposed, as well as a new name for the sMFE: European Federalist Movement - European Section of the World Federalist Movement. In essence, there were prospects for the reunification, after the split which occurred at the beginning of the UEF's life, of European federalists and world federalists. This reunification would actually begin in the 1990s and would lead to the UEF's adhesion to the World Federalist Movement, decided at the UEF's Genoa Congress in 2004. See "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1962, n. 4 (which contains the proposal for the Federalist Charter as well as that of Albertini's Manifesto) and *Le Fédéraliste*, 1964, n. 1, with regard to the position of Autonomia Federalista at the Montreux Congress. It should be emphasised that Albertini above all reproposed the rejection typical of the Hamiltonian federalist school of certain corporative aspects (economic and social communities put on the same level as territorial entities) of integral federalism. The ideas of a minimum social guarantee and obligatory community service were, on the other hand, appreciated and considered a fundamental contribution to the definition of the specific nature of the European social and economic model. See M. ALBERTINI, *Nazionalismo e federalismo*, cit.; ID., *Proudhon*, cit.

(17) It should be underlined that, after the apparent renaissance of integral federalism at Montreux, the majority of the sMFE and subsequently the reconstituted UEF would settle on the Albertini orientation, conceiving the Federalist Charter as a significant contribution, but not the official doctrine of the federalists.

(18) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1994, nn. 27, 28, 29 and EDMONDO PAOLINI, *Il Fronte democratico europeo, in I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

cultural associations, which due to their isolation were prisoners of the national system, and then formulate clear federalist positions.

The search for alliances was founded on the conviction that political parties, trade unions and associations had been nationalised not by conscious decision, but because the authority to which they were related was national. The same people and the same associations, placed in a different context, may have made different decisions from those that they were pushed to make within a national framework. Therefore, it was necessary to clarify that problems needed to be confronted from a different perspective than that of the nation; to this end, the militant federalists would need to be present everywhere and to permeate society's structures, avoiding both their own nationalisation and sectarian isolation. The sMFE would commit itself, via the committees of initiative, to efforts towards a European territory planning promoting the development of local autonomous authorities; the front would support European economic policy and demand the establishment of a democratic European power. The motion, auguring the realisation of a federal state and a federal society, reiterated therefore their demands for the merging of the Communities' executives, the direct election and the increase in the powers of the EP, the transformation of the Council of Ministers into a Chamber of States deliberating according to majority voting and the entrance into the Community of democratic countries, particularly the United Kingdom (19).

Before examining the concrete performance of such an action, let us look now at the EUD's Frankfurt Congress (20). Its most important result was the approval (with one vote against and four abstentions) of the "Twelve Theses" formulated by honorary president Friedländer. The most important contents of the document were: an

(19) As far as the various roles are concerned, Hirsch was elected president of the central committee, Rifflet was confirmed president of the executive and Giardini secretary general.

(20) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, p. 162 and subsequent (the 12 theses are contained in their entirety in the book's appendix and, in French, in "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1964, n. 30). Von Oppenheim was reconfirmed as president of the EUD. The members of the Presidium were Otto Bach, Wilhelm Beutler, Kurt Birrenbach, Alfred de Chapeaurouge, Charlotte von der Herberg, Hans Kluth, Dieter Roser, W. Kuehner, Arno Krause, Mommer and Rudolf Woller.

indication of the United States of Europe (intended as a federal state in every sense of the word, and therefore with exclusive powers on foreign policy and defence) as the ultimate aim of European unification; the federal state as an irrefutable condition for the creation of an Atlantic partnership, to contribute to world peace, to allow democracy to prevail in the countries of the communist bloc, and therefore, to render their adhesion to a united Europe possible; a policy of aid for the development of poor countries in order to encourage their progress towards democracy; the pursuit of a federal European state through the gradual, but effective development, without continual postponements, of the Communities towards democracy and federation (with fundamental points including an elected EP with substantial powers and the extension of EEC powers to the areas of foreign policy and defence); the opening of the Communities to all those states willing to accept Community law; severe criticism of nationalism (alluding to De Gaulle, without actually mentioning him), i.e. the tendency to consider the nation state as an unsurpassable structure which cannot be incorporated into a larger community.

The theses were presented in a public demonstration in the main hall at the Frankfurt Fair, where the speakers included Chancellor Erhard (who made no commitment), the President of the EEC Commission Hallstein, and the president of the most important German trade union (DGB) Ludwig Rosenberg (both with positive reactions). The document, favourably received by the AEF, sMFE, EM, and other pro-European organisations, was attacked by the Pan-European Union of Coudenhove-Kalergi because of its anti-Gaullist content.

The action which followed the two congresses enjoyed its most significant moment in 1964 with the launch of the experience of the Democratic Front for a Federal Europe, which began with the constitution of a promotional committee (21) in Poigny la Foret (not far from Paris) on the fringes of a meeting promoted by the Centre International de Formation Européenne, and made its first public appearance on the occasion of the General States of the CEMR, held in Rome between

(21) Cfr. J.P. GOUZY, *I movimenti per l'unità europea in Francia*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit., pp. 66-67, The promotion committee included André Philip, Cesare Merlini, Giarini, Gironella, Marc, Paillet, Rifflet, Spinelli and Zagari.

October 15th and 17th 1964 (22). At the congress, attended by 5000 local administrators and 2000 exponents of federalist movements and of numerous French clubs, the two most important interventions were those of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro (in his conclusion, he expressed his wish that the congress could provide “a genuine contribution on the part of the European people to the unity of our continent, helping to give again to the unitary process an impetus adequate to the necessities of these times”) and Hallstein (who identified the development of economic integration, the extension of the Communities’ powers and their democratisation as the way to achieve European federation). The resolution approved by the General States contained the fundamental demands of the Montreux and Frankfurt congresses as well as an appeal to constitute the Democratic Front for a Federal Europe.

Alongside the Front’s initiative, other actions of awareness raising and popular mobilisation were carried out, and those that should be remembered in particular include the continuation of the campaign for the voluntary census of the European federal people, which *Autonomia Federalista* had begun in 1963, and the *Agraraktion* (the distribution of hundreds of thousands of leaflets in numerous German towns and cities organised by young German federalists, in certain cases in collaboration with federalists from other countries) aimed at pressing the German government not to block on the basis of national interests the fixing of a single price for cereals (23). It should also be remembered that in 1964, Mommer presented a bill to the *Bundestag* proposing the direct unilateral election of Germany’s representatives in the EP, and the Italian Foreign Minister Saragat proposed (unsuccessfully) an initiative for European election to the Council of Ministers (24).

(22) Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1965, n. 30 and “*Popolo Europeo*”, 1964, nn. 10-11.

(23) Cfr. K. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, p. 166. On December 15th 1964 it was finally decided to impose on the cereals market, as from July 1st 1967, a European price expressed in currency units. This decision marked the birth of a single agricultural market and had exquisitely political implications, putting the issue of monetary union firmly on the table. Indeed, it was not possible to maintain a European price, and therefore a European market, if the governments, having set such a price, reserved the right to change the value of their own currencies.

(24) These initiatives are documented in *Per l’elezione del Parlamento europeo a suffragio universale diretto*, cit., where the bills for the unilateral elections of MPs, Pedini, Martini and Vedovato of September 29th 1964 and of Santero, Jannuzzi, Zaccari,

The relaunch of the federalist action which began in 1964 seemed to produce concrete effects in the following year regarding the institutional development of the Communities. The proposals put forward by Hallstein in the spring of 1965 were also a response to the appeals of the federalists (the Congress of Rome was crucial in this context), which gave firm support to these proposals, considering them an indivisible minimum if significant progress was to be achieved (25). When the crisis of the 'empty chair' occurred, the federalists were quick to make themselves heard against nationalistic opposition to the federal development of the Communities.

The most sensational action — to which a great deal of attention was given, often with photographic documentation, by the most important European and American daily newspapers — was that carried out by the Italian federalists (26) on July 16th 1965 on the occa-

B. Vittorelli, Bergamasco and Granzotto Basso of February 8th 1965 are also documented.

(25) The action carried out by EUD should be particularly emphasised. Ever since 1963, the Bildungswerk Europäische Politik (a study centre founded by the EUD in 1959, which had to provide training and support to the Houses of Europe, and which in 1964 would be transformed into the Institut für Europäische Politik) had organised, with the patronage of the president of the EP Duviensart, the president of the *Bundestag* Gerstenmaier and the president of the Commission of the EEC Hallstein, a series of seminars, conventions and conferences dedicated to the link between the strengthening of the Commission and the attribution of substantial powers to the EP. In 1965, the Europa Union Verlag published a detailed and comprehensive report by researcher Gerda Zellentin on the Community budget, its control and the problem of the financial autonomy of the Communities (G. ZELLENTIN, *Budgetpolitik und Integration - Europäische Schriften des Bildungswerk Europäische Politik - Heft 8*, Europa Union Verlag, Köln, 1965). At the beginning of May 1965 the secretary general of the EUD organised a study convention in Munich attended by around 500 participants, in which one of the main speakers was the vice-president of the Commission of the EEC and head of agricultural policy Sicco Mansholt. It should also be remembered that the Congress of the EUD, held in Bad Godesberg on May 9th 1965, elected European Commissioner Hans von der Groeben as a member of the Presidium. KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-174.

(26) It should be remembered that in 1965, the split between the majority of the sMFE and the Autonomia Federalista group was overcome. The central committee which gathered in Paris on June 27th 1965 unanimously decided that the actions of the Census and the Front should be carried out jointly, in such a way as to support each other. Albertini joined the executive and the Autonomia Federalista dissolved. The sMFE thus rediscovered the unity necessary to be able to effectively carry out actions

sion of the inauguration of the Mont Blanc tunnel and in the presence of the President of the French Republic, De Gaulle, and the President of the Italian Republic, Saragat. In Courmayeur, there was a procession and thousands of leaflets in both Italian and French were distributed, featuring the following text: “Citizens! With the Mont Blanc tunnel, another barrier dividing the European people has fallen, but the political divisions of the past linger on unchanged. Incapable of achieving the political unification of Europe, the national governments, led by General De Gaulle, are endangering the Common Market, the basis of progress and peace among Europeans. Join the federalists in the fight against nationalism and for a United States of Europe”. At the same time, on the main square in Entrèves, at the end of the speeches given by De Gaulle and Saragat, the vice-secretary of the Piedmontese MFE Sergio Pistone, eluding the strict surveillance cordons of the security services, crossed the barriers and, as four policemen tried in vain to stop him, he jumped onto the presidential platform and delivered directly to the two heads of state a vibrant appeal to proceed “without delay towards European federation” (27).

The EM (within which the sMFE and the AEF acted together playing an increasingly significant role) also made a move, organising an extraordinary congress in Cannes from October 1st to 3rd 1965. During the congress, the defence of the proposals put forward by Hallstein was accompanied: by an invitation to immediately resume the regular meetings of the Council and to make decisions, even in the absence of a member state; by the request to speed up the process of integrating and democratising the institutions in order to create the

of awareness raising and the mobilisation of public opinion. Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1965, n. 32, “*Giornale del Censimento*”, 1965, n. 1 and 2, “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1965, n. 2.

(27) With regard to the federalist demonstration of July 16th, see “*Giornale del Censimento*”, 1965, n. 2 and “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1965, n. 33 (in which the text of the letter sent to De Gaulle and Saragat is published). It should also be remembered that on August 9th 1965, Gianni Ruta, secretary of the European Student Group and member of the leading committee of the Roman section of the sMFE, in the company of a young Roman federalist by the name of Carlo Alberto Graziani (future MEP), climbed Mount Blanc, carrying the federalist flag (the green “E”). This was brought to the summit to commemorate the passing of one year from the death of Michel Mouskhely, former president of the CEP, that tragically occurred on July 11th 1964 in the mountains of the Valle d’Aosta.

United States of Europe; by the commitment to systematically mobilise public opinion. An immediate consequence of the positions taken in Cannes (in the absence of the Gaullists) was the decision of the French government to cancel its financial aid to the French Council of the EM and to transfer it to the French section of the Paneuropean Union. Coudenhove-Kalergi, who had openly become a supporter of De Gaulle's European conception, resigned from the honorary presidency of the EM before it decided to officially strip him of the said title (28).

In the middle of the empty chair crisis, the "Europa Aktion" promoted by the EUD took place between the 20th and 31st of October, designed to mobilise all federalist organisations. This action saw the organisation of over 1500 events, and was opened on October 20th by a presentation in the municipal hall of Bad Godesberg, with contributions by the President of the FRG, Einrich Lübke and Brugmans (29). The development in various countries of the campaign for the census should be emphasised as a contribution to such an action, and which during 1965 reached a total of 100,000 adhesions (30).

The Luxemburg compromise put an end to the federalists' hopes for imminent progress on an institutional level, but not for the continuation of their commitment to fight for such progress as well as to raise awareness and mobilise public opinion. The campaign of the European Democratic Front continued, and during the sMFE's Turin Congress from October 30th to November 1st 1966 (31), a demonstration was organised in one of the city's theatres. After Spinelli's introductory comments, Marc Paillet took the floor as a representative of the French clubs and a number of Italian trade union leaders. It should also be remembered that in preparation of the fifth general assembly of the free trade unions, which was held in Rome in the second half of November, the CISL and the UIL organised a conference (influenced by the actions of the European Democratic Front), in

(28) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1965, n. 33, and KOPPE, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

(29) KOPPE, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

(30) Cfr. "*Giornale del Censimento*", 1965, n. 5.

(31) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1966, n. 37 e "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1966, nn. 2-3-4. The congress appointed Hirsch president of the central committee, Rifflet delegate for the campaign of the European Democratic Front, Albertini president of the executive committee, Giarini secretary general and Moriquand treasurer.

which the secretary general of CISL international Harm G. Buiter, Ludwig Rosenberg for the German trade unions, the secretary general of the UIL Italo Viglianesi and the secretary general of the CISL Bruno Storti for the Italian trade unions, all expressed themselves as being in favour of a European political power. The campaign for the census also continued, and between May 13th and 15th 1967, the first annual frontier action took place with demonstrations at 65 border crossings all over Europe (32).

May's events culminated in the demonstrations (covered by the most important European and American newspapers and television channels) organised in Rome on the 28th and 29th of May 1967, coinciding with the summit meeting of heads of state and governments held to mark the tenth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. On the eve of the summit, a large group of young federalists set up a demonstration of allegiance in front of Hallstein's hotel. The governments had decided, upon the expressed will of De Gaulle, not to appoint Hallstein as president of the Communities' single Commission (which would come into force a few months later). Hallstein came out to meet the federalists, who were carrying flags and banners featuring phrases such as: "President Hallstein, come with the federalists", "Hirsch, Hallstein: two victims of nationalism", "President Hallstein, the Europeans thank you", "Without the support of the people, there will be no Europe", and "No to nationalism, yes to European federation". The day after, in the crowded Capitol square (the summit took place in the building where the Treaties of Rome had been signed), about a hundred federalists demonstrated by distributing leaflets and displaying banners in favour of the constituent and the direct election of the EP. The demonstration was repressed by the police who dragged the federalists into police vans and arrested Sergio Pistone with the false charge of intending to use explosive materials, but in reality to gain revenge for the loss of face on the occasion of the inauguration of the Mont Blanc tunnel. The government was petitioned on the matter also by some MPs. In any case, Pistone was

(32) Cfr. "*Federalismo Europeo*", 1967, n. 3.

cleared of all charges and was released after three days' custody in the Roman judiciary prison of Regina Coeli (33).

In the second half of 1967, the struggle to democratise the European Communities made a qualitative leap promoted by the Italian federalists.

The leader of the Italian Commission of the sMFE had assumed a critical position towards the decision of the majority of the sMFE to support calls for the direct election of the EP. On the one hand, he had recognised that direct election, even if it was not accompanied by the contextual attribution of real powers to the EP, would objectively have a constituent significance. Indeed, it would induce the formation of a European system of parties with supranational political programmes and would make the democratic deficit of European integration particularly acute and evident. In effect, the democratic world in the long term would consider a parliament which was elected directly but with no real power to implement the will of the electors to be unacceptable. Therefore, direct election would push the EP to assume, over and above the provision of the Treaty, a federal constituent role, given that integration was progressing towards a situation in which it would become increasingly difficult to face the problems on the agenda without the creation of a European government. On the other hand, in consideration of the objective constituent meaning of the European election, Albertini believed that conditions were not favourable for persuading the national parties and governments to make such a decision. For this reason, *Autonomia Federalista* had continued, with the census, a campaign aiming to mobilise public opinion based on radical rivendications (an immediate constituent and the denouncement of the illegitimacy of the nation states), convinced that in such a way the creation of an autonomous federalist force would move forward, capable at the appropriate time of fighting effectively for the democratisation of the Communities (34).

So, just like the CEP, the census did not achieve the results that were hoped for (it ran out of steam in 1967), but it did significantly

(33) *Ibid.*

(34) Cfr. M. ALBERTINI, *De l'élection au suffrage universel direct du "Parlement" européen*, in "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1964, n. 1.

strengthen the Italian federalists. In the meantime, the right conditions for returning into game and conducting an effective fight for European elections were beginning to mature. The crucial factor was the institutional block which followed the Luxemburg compromise. This was in fact very clearly demonstrating the weakness of the idea of the automatic transition from economic to political integration and therefore was making a politically effective convergence possible, with regard to European elections, between the Europeanism present in the democratic parties and federalist initiative.

On the other hand, economic integration was making such decisive progress that the transfer of economic decision-making centres to Brussels was being implied. One only needs to think of the decision to complete the customs union by July 1st 1968 and the decision of achieving, by the same date, the free movement of agricultural goods, which in turn implied the fixing of common agricultural prices on a European level. The institution on July 1st 1967 of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund led to a further widening of the Community's powers, allocating it the responsibility of establishing broad guidelines for European economic policy in the agricultural sector, and through this, allowed it to influence to an increasing extent the general decision making of national planners.

In essence, Europe was no longer a historical forecast as it was at the beginning of the federalist struggle, it was an economic reality, a bureaucratic organisation, a political necessity, in face of which there was a parliament with no electoral basis. The democratic parties, who recognised the existence of a European economy, and of a European society, could not refuse European democracy without refusing themselves. This constituted the point of contact between the federalists and the democratic parties. Caught up in the mechanism of the struggle for national power, these parties, although recognising the principle of European democracy, did nothing to try and achieve it. However, they would not have been able to remain neutral if the federalists had forced them, with a patient but tenacious campaign, to respond.

Because of De Gaulle's opposition, any supranational development in the integration process had been blocked and such a situation was harmful because the spread of the belief that it was impossible to

proceed would extinguish pro-European commitment. De Gaulle, however, could prevent a European general election, but not the unilateral elections in other countries. The idea was to undertake an action where it would be easier to achieve results, like in Italy, in the hope of subsequently generating a chain reaction in other nations. One of the consequences would be the strengthening of the opposition to Gaullism, which would then make the general election of the EP possible. Such a design appeared realistic because in many countries bills had already been proposed in this regard, a fact which testified to the existence of a certain will which would have to be strengthened (35).

Once the decision had been taken to commit to European elections, starting with unilateral elections, the Albertini-led Italian federalists carried forward such a commitment with exceptional perseverance and above all they strived to effectuate a more systematic mobilisation of the people in relation to this objective. For this reason, they spearheaded the commitment of the federalist organisations as a whole, which would achieve their objective in the second half of the 1970s. In the period under examination, on January 22nd 1967, an initial decision was taken by the Italian Commission of the sMFE to launch a campaign in favour of the unilateral election of the Italian representatives to the EP. After this, the central committee of the sMFE decided during a meeting held on February 11th and 12th 1967 to approve the action of the Italian federalists (36). The campaign started at the beginning of April with the distribution of a bill to all Italian members of parliament and an invitation to sign a commitment to be presented to the chambers and to request its immediate discussion (37). The number of adhesions gathered by the end of 1967 was 125, including those of five ministers and nine undersecretaries (38).

(35) Cfr. M. ALBERTINI, *La rinascita del nazionalismo e la lotta del MFE*, in “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1967, n. 1 and ID., *Un piano d’azione a medio termine. Il MFE e la lotta per l’Europa*, in “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1967, nn. 7-8.

(36) See “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1967, n. 2.

(37) See “*Federalismo Europeo*,” 1967, n. 3.

(38) See “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1967, nn. 7-8. It should be remembered that, after various meetings which began in 1966 (the most important was that of the young federalists on the occasion of the sMFE’s Turin Congress), the formal constitution of

Reaction in the rest of Europe to the Italian federalists' initiative was not long in coming. On January 25th 1968, the vice president of the *Bundestag* (and vice president of the EUD), Mommer, declared his own commitment to a similar initiative in Germany and stated: "If you are successful, this will ensure our own success, and likewise, our efforts will be useful to you" (39). On March 28th 1968 René Pleven, André Rossi and other members of parliament from the "Progrès et Démocratie Moderne" group presented a bill to the French National Assembly which foresaw, in the absence of an agreement for a direct general election, the direct unilateral election of the French delegates to the EP. An identical bill was deposited by Mitterrand and by the members of the Fédération de la Gauche on April 5th 1968 (40).

The initiative of the Italian MFE, which had found immediate resonance in the Italian Association of the Council of Municipalities

the youth organisation of the sMFE was achieved at the Milan assembly of October 28th-29th 1967. Its statute and internal rules were approved by the central committee of the sMFE which gathered on November 11th-12th 1967. A liaison committee between the young sMFE members and their AEF counterparts was also instituted. The European bureau of the Young of the sMFE was composed of president Massimo Malcovati (Lombardia); vice-president Jean-Claude Sebag (Provence); secretary general Gérard Fuchs (Paris); members Bernard Barthalay (Rhône-Alpes), Giuseppe Canale (Liguria), Furio Di Furia (Veneto), Gérard Maury (Provence), Guido Montani (Lombardia). Cfr. D. PREDA, *Les Jeunesses Fédéralistes Européennes (1948-1969)*, cit.

(39) Cfr. "Federalismo Europeo", 1968, n. 3. This declaration was the consequence of a meeting held in Bonn on January 25th 1968 upon the initiative of the secretary general of the EUD Eickhorn, attended by MPs Mommer, Ernst Majonica (president of the German Council of the EM and president of the foreign commission of parliamentary group CDU-CSU), Ludwig Metzger (SPD-vice-president of the EP), Karl Otto Lenz (an expert from the parliamentary group CDU-CSU regarding the problems of the EP), and federalists Koppe (secretary of the German Council of the EM), Albertini (president of the bureau exécutif of the sMFE) and Rossolillo (member of the same body). The meeting was called to discuss the issue of the unilateral election of EP delegates in Italy and Germany. It should also be remembered that, upon the initiative of Mommer and the EM, a group of 313 pro-European MPs was formed in the *Bundestag* and in April 1968 signed a declaration against the nationalistic tendencies which had emerged in the German government, containing the fundamental federalist demands for the advancement of the integration and democratisation of the EEC's institutions. Cfr. "Federalismo Europeo", 1968, nn. 4-5.

(40) On these initiatives and all those regarding the direct election of the EP which were carried out until 1969 see *Per l'elezione del Parlamento europeo a suffragio universale diretto*, cit.

and Regions of Europe thanks to the commitment of its secretary general Umberto Serafini (41), also enjoyed the support of the CIME. Its president, Giuseppe Petrilli, as an EEC commissioner since its foundation, had believed in functionalistic automatism, but had gradually been convinced that a federation would imply a qualitative leap and had thus converted to federalist constitutionalism (42). Thanks to his determination, a conference of MEPs held on May 3rd and 4th 1968 and which gathered in Bonn a series of distinguished personalities including German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, Lord Chalfont, the Mayor of Marseille Gaston Deferre, Hallstein (who had been elected president of the EM in Rome in January 20th 1968), Mommer and Duncan Sandys, examined the question and approved a motion which invited “the national parliaments of the Community’s member countries to establish that the elections of their delegates to the European Parliament be carried out, separately if necessary, according to the principle of universal suffrage” (43).

The dramatic events of 1968, particularly the French May and the repression of the Prague Spring, were perceived by the federalists as a strong incentive to redouble their efforts (44). Thus, on July 1st they sent all the Italian MPs (excluding the newfascists and their monarchic allies) an appeal which announced the decision, taken by the

(41) Cfr. E. PAOLINI, *Il Consiglio dei Comuni d’Europa*, in *I movimenti per l’unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

(42) Petrilli left the Commission of the EEC to manage the Istituto di Ricostruzione Industriale, became president of the CIME in 1964, was co-opted in the central committee of the sMFE and was president of the EM from 1980 to 1984. He contributed decisively to restoring of a fruitful collaborative relationship between the Italian federalists (the Italian Commission of the sMFE joined the CIME in 1966) and the political class and he provided a highly significant contribution to the fight for the direct election of the EP. See: G. PETRILLI, *Il mattino d’Europa. Scritti e discorsi 1959-1979*, Milan, F. Angeli, 1980; ID., *Europa necessaria e possibile*, Manduria, Lacaïta, 1986; P. CARAFFINI, *Il Consiglio Italiano del Movimento Europeo*, cit., where the fundamental contribution to Petrilli’s pro-European activities provided by his close collaborator Carlo Meriano, who would also become secretary of the CIME from 1986 to 1991, is brought to light.

(43) “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1968, nn. 4-5.

(44) It should be remembered that the “Europa Aktion” 1968 was dedicated to the issue of monetary union and that a symbolic European currency called “Euro” began to circulate, minted by the MFE of Bologna. *Ibid.*

Italian Commission of the sMFE in Milan on June 23rd, to gather the signatures necessary for the presentation of a bill of popular initiative for the direct election of Italy's MEPs. On August 27th, in the twenty-fifth year of the foundation of the Italian MFE, Milan saw the beginning of the process which gathered the 50,000 authenticated signatures necessary for the presentation of a bill of popular initiative in accordance with art. 71 of the Constitution (45).

In Milan on February 15th 1969, a demonstration promoted by the EM was held in order to publicise the achievement of obtaining the aforementioned 50,000 signatures, and which saw the participation of Albertini, Petrilli, Maurice Faure, Hirsch and Hallstein. The latter effectively highlighted the link between the Italian initiative, the problems of the relaunch of Europe and the ultimate objective of federation, and also emphasised how the deep significance of the Italian unilateral election lay in the fact that it was a first step towards the mobilisation of the European people (46).

At the decisive moment of the gathering of signatures for the bill of popular initiative, the 12th Congress of the sMFE was held in Trieste from April 11th to 13th. The congress identified the campaign for direct unilateral elections in each country and the reunification of the federalist organisations as the fundamental objectives of the federalist struggle. The central committee, which gathered in Paris on May 17th and 18th 1969, confirmed the positions of Hirsch, Rifflet and Albertini, appointed Belgian Ludo Dierickx as the new secretary general, and decided to transfer the headquarters of the central secretariat from Paris to Brussels in consideration of the importance assumed by the Belgian capital in the integration process and to better organise the fight for the democratisation of the European Communities (47).

In the meantime, a corner of fundamental importance had been turned with regard to European politics. On April 28th 1969 De

(45) "Federalismo Europeo", 1968, nn. 6-7. Also L.V. MAJOCCHI, *L'azione per il riconoscimento del diritto di voto europeo*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit.

(46) Cfr. "Federalismo Europeo", 1969, n. 1. The gathering of the 50,000 signatures favoured the presentation of two motions in the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg on April 24th requesting the direct election of its representatives to the EP. Cfr. *Per l'elezione del Parlamento europeo a suffragio universale diretto*, cit.

(47) See "Federalismo Europeo", 1969, n. 2, and "Le Fédéraliste", 1969, n. 2.

Gaulle resigned from the Presidency of the Republic following the negative result of a referendum which he himself had called on the regional reform of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. In the following paragraphs we will see the development of the federalist action within the context of the post-Gaullist period. First, let us examine the federalist presence in the general political debate over the period from 1964 to 1969.

If the common actions of the sMFE and the AEF in favour of the democratisation of the Communities represents the most important aspect of their conduct in the five-year period from 1964 to 1969, neither should their active participation in the general political debate during those years be forgotten, including their analyses and stances on the basic questions that emerged in the context in which the European integration process was taking place.

The evolution of the German question represented a crucial problem within the framework of East-West détente. The détente generated a difficult situation regarding the relationship between the FRG and the European and western partners with regard to the official German line on national reunification. There were two fundamental aspects in this line proposed by Adenauer. Firstly, the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was disputed and its international isolation was pursued. This policy was implemented with the application of the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine" (48), which foresaw the automatic breakdown of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the states that diplomatically recognised the GDR. Secondly, the German borders fixed by the Allies at the end of the war were rejected (the Oder-Neisse line between GDR and Poland). That is to say, the FRG officially supported demands for a return to the borders of 1937 as a basis of the future conclusion of a peace treaty between Germany and the winner powers.

This was an extremely assertive and rigid claim of national unity. But it was structurally inserted into a wider context of foreign policy which in effect eliminated any kind of nationalistic demands and led

(48) It had been formulated by Hallstein when he was undersecretary to the foreign office.

to the elimination of the problem of national reunification at the root. On the one hand, the German national reunification policy had been conceived and promoted as a unitary policy of the west towards the eastern bloc, and consequently excluded any kind of isolated approach to the German problem and as such the resumption of the fatal wavering between east and west carried out by the Republic of Weimar. On the other hand, the most significant commitment of Adenauer's foreign policy concerned the insertion of the FRG into a western European political community of a federal nature, which would modify the fundamental elements of the German problem. It would, in other words, eliminate at the root the problem of the reconstitution of the German sovereign national state and therefore the danger of German nationalism which was the logical consequence of it (49).

After the fall of the EDC, the German choice in favour of the bond with the western world and European integration remained firm, but had set back the prospect of European political unification, and, therefore, of a relatively short-term and radical solution to the German problem. As a consequence, remained in the foreground the link between the Adenauer line and the politics of the cold war, and particularly the rather rigid principle according to which national unification could only be achieved after a western victory in its antagonistic confrontation with the communist bloc. This consequently implied that a détente between the two blocs might be achieved only after the acceptance on the part of the eastern side to acknowledge the right of East Germans (and also of the people of the other eastern European countries) to self-determination. Indeed, the Hallstein doctrine had been acknowledged in the Treaty of Paris that had restored sovereignty to the FRG and instituted the WEU.

This constitutive aspect of the Adenauer line was plunged into crisis with the advent of the détente process. The opening of a new phase of development in the relationship between the two blocs (50)

(49) Cf. KARL KAISER, *German Foreign Policy in Transition. Bonn between East and West*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968 (Italian translation *La Germania fra Est e Ovest*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1969); ALFRED GROSSER, *Deutschlandbilanz. Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945*, München, Hanser, 1972.

(50) Cf. WILFRIED LOTH, *Ost-West Konflikt und deutsche Frage*, München,

meant that in effect, as far as the German problem was concerned, the allies of the FRG, first and foremost the USA, renounced the pursuit of German reunification through a policy of actively disputing the Soviet system, and thus of continuous and high-level tension with the USSR. They consequently put forward as an inspiring principle of their policy the completely different hypothesis according to which the unification of Germany would not be an indispensable premise of the détente process, but rather a desirable consequence, in the long term, of this process, which in the short term would bring the stabilisation of the *statu quo*.

The new international situation put the German ruling class ahead of the problem of implementing a radical change of direction, especially so as not to compromise the arduous progress of European integration. This was a rather difficult problem, since accepting the policy of détente meant putting to one side dogmas and myths that had long been consolidated, and which had been the necessary price to pay for leading the West Germans to a firm decision in favour of Atlantic alliance and European integration. In the troubled debate that led to a significant policy change, the federalists intervened for both effect and clarification. There are two fundamental documents in this regard which should be remembered.

The first is a resolution approved in Munich on September 1st 1963 by the *Autonomia Federalista* group and subsequently adopted by the central committee of the SMFE (51). In this document, the unsustainability of the Hallstein doctrine in the framework of détente was recognised and, at the same time, it was highlighted how the foundation of a federal European state within the context of the western democracies was the only way to resolve the German problem and to restore freedom to the eastern Europeans. With the federal transformation of the Communities, the division of Europe and the lack of freedom in the eastern bloc would be conceived by the entire population of western Europe as a European problem. The issue of the reunification of

Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989; S. PISTONE, *La Germania e l'unità europea*, Naples, Guida, 1978.

(51) See the entire text (and comment) reproduced in "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1963, n. 2; "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1964, n. 26; S. PISTONE, *La Germania e l'unità europea*, cit.

Germany would no longer be presented as a problem of national power, rather it would be incorporated into the European and human problem of how to ensure the self-determination of those on the other side of the iron curtain. For the Europeans of the eastern bloc, fear towards the Germans would be replaced by the attraction of a federal European state. If the economic integration of the EEC made the economic strength of western Europe more evident, political integration would demonstrate Europe's political strength and, guaranteeing its independence in foreign policy, would increase the rest of the world's confidence in western democracy. The construction of the European federation would also develop the financial and spiritual capabilities necessary for an organic rather than a schematic union between eastern and western Europe from a social and economic point of view.

The second document is a declaration entitled "The Way Towards the Complete Union of Europe", prepared by Friedländer, Katharina Focke (who was Friedländer's daughter) and Heinrich Schneider. It was approved by the EUD's Baden-Baden Congress held from 20th to 22nd 1966 (52), at the very moment in which, after the fall of the Ehrhard government, a great coalition which would later initiate the *Ostpolitik* was beginning to take shape. This declaration was generally set out like that of 1963 and reaffirmed that the possibility for those European countries bordering the USSR to join a future European federation was an objective which, however far away, should never be forgotten. Above all, it affirmed, prefiguring the essential elements of the new *Ostpolitik* (53), that the German government would have to overcome a number of positions which had up to then been considered untouchable in order to enable real progress in pan-European approaching, which was seen as an indispensable

(52) See the entire text (and comment) reproduced in K. KOPPE, *op. cit.* and in S. PISTONE (edited by), *La Germania e l'unità europea*, cit.

(53) Cfr. W. LOTH, *I movimenti per l'unità europea nella Repubblica Federale di Germania*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit. It should be remembered that the new *Ostpolitik* has been pre-empted in many ways by Altiero Spinelli in *Tedeschi al bivio*, Rome, Opere Nuove, 1960 and even more clearly by KARL JASPERS, in *Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung (Über Aufgaben deutscher Politik)*, München, Oldenbourg, 1960 (Italian translation: *La Germania fra libertà e riunificazione*, with an introduction by Spinelli, Milan, Comunità, 1961).

framework for bringing the two Germanys back together. The requests of the EUD are summarised here below:

1. The formal declaration of the non-validity of the Munich Agreement of 1938 in relation to the Sudeten Germans;
2. The priority of reconciliation with Poland with respect to the revision of the Oder-Neisse line, which at the appropriate time would have to be recognised as the necessary price to pay for reconciliation;
3. The renouncement of any form of German participation in the possession of atomic weapons;
4. Appropriate application of the Hallstein doctrine in order to be able to establish diplomatic relations with the eastern European states and thus contribute more actively to an *Ostpolitik* of western Europe, without giving up the German people's right to unity and freedom;
5. Utilisation of all the possibilities of contact between the two German entities that, without reaching the diplomatic recognition of the GDR, would promote the freedom and well-being of its population (54).

As well as the crucial issue of the relationship between détente and the German question, the federalists systematically intervened on the limits of détente which were particularly highlighted by the establishment of a dictatorship of colonels in Greece in 1967, the repression of the Czechoslovakian spring in 1968 and the war in Vietnam. Here follows a brief summary highlighting the common thread linking the various positions taken on this issue (55).

(54) It should be underlined that the position expressed by the EUD in 1966 and adopted by all federalists found substantial confirmation in the actual historical development. In effect, the progress of European integration, although still some way short of a complete federal unification, contributed decisively to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. In such a way, the path towards the peaceful reunification of Germany and of the whole of Europe was opened. Cfr. S. PISTONE, *L'unificazione europea e la pace nel mondo*, in U. MORELLI (edited by), *L'Unione europea e le sfide del XXI secolo*, published by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont, Turin, Celid, 2000.

(55) For an overview of these stances, see: L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo*, cit.; *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit.; H. BRUGMANS, *L'idée européenne*, cit.; ID., *A travers le siècle*, Brussels, Presses Universitaires Européennes, 1993; *Geschäftsbericht 1964-1966* and *Geschäftsbericht 1967-1969*, reports on the activities of the

According to the federalist vision, the détente was linked to the achievement of nuclear parity and to the strengthening of the intermediate powers within the two blocs — namely China and the European Community — that were forcing the superpowers to quell the rivalry between them, also in order to focus more on efforts to restore discipline to their respective spheres of influence (56). The increasingly conservative position of the *statu quo* assumed by the USA and the USSR highlighted the serious responsibility of western Europe. With the customs union and the CAP, it had become an economic power capable of exerting a decisive influence on the world market, but, due to its lack of political unity, incapable of wielding a similar influence in international politics. With a serious move towards the creation of a federal European state, Europe, transforming from protectorate to a status of equal partnership with the USA, would be able to negotiate with the superpowers on an equal footing, impose a world détente without imperialistic aspects, fight for the freedom and social emancipation of all nations, give Europe back to the Europeans and prepare to welcome all brother countries into a system capable of conciliating freedom and social justice (57).

One matter of huge importance during the years under examination was the student rebellion, one which had its epicentre in the French crisis of 1968 (58). The federalists saw a link between this movement, characterised by an interweaving of a great desire for social and political renewal and anarchistic impulses, and the contradictory situation linked to the incompleteness of European integration. On the one hand, an economy and a society of European dimensions

EUD during the period 1964–1969, published by the EUD secretariat (they contain a continuation of the reconstruction illustrated in Koppe's book).

(56) Cfr. ANDRÉ FONTAINE, *Un seul lit pour deux rêves, Histoire de la "détente". 1962-1981*, Paris, Seuil, 1982.

(57) See in particular the common declaration adopted by the sMFE and AEF in Paris on June 5th 1966, entitled "Pa de détente sans Europe unie", in which, among other things, the French decision to withdraw from NATO is judged to be a wishful thinking. Cfr. "Fédéralisme Européen", 1966, n. 36. Also M. ALBERTINI, *La révision de la politique atlantique*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1967, n. 4.

(58) It should be remembered that one of the leaders of the Parisian May, Daniel Kohn-Bendit, would become in the 1990s a leading exponent of the Federalist Intergroup of the EP.

had been formed, capable of generating great economic growth and great expectations of progress in all areas. On the other hand, given the substantially confederal nature of European integration, the political system had remained within a national framework and therefore was structurally incapable of making decisions that corresponded to the will of the citizens. This gave rise to either a tendency towards political apathy, or the exact opposite, rebellion leaning towards anarchy, i.e. phenomena that led to a regression in democracy, and to which the only effective response was the creation of a federal outlet for the crisis of the nation states (59).

The federalists, however, did not limit themselves to analysis, they actively intervened in matters of that which was then defined as a general objection towards the existing political and social system, striving to channel the most valid demands in the direction of an internal and supranational federalism. In particular, it should be remembered that on May 26th 1968 the sMFE invited all the federalist militants to declare themselves in favour of the initiatives that were intended to undertake in various countries, above all in France, the principles (typical of federalism) of autonomy and participation in the factories, in the field of agriculture, in the Universities and in the regions. Therefore, during the month of May 1968, Gérard Fuchs, secretary of the French Commission of the sMFE, Henri Cartan, president of the AEDE in France, and Guy Michaud, professor of the University of Nanterre and secretary general of the CIFE, launched an “Appeal for Federalist Action”, which was published in the press with the adhesion of André Jeanson, president of the CFDT trade union and writer, as well as some of the leading names in French higher education. Federalism was presented as a radical transformation of society, in opposition to centralism and nationalism, thanks to the practice of transferring sovereignty to European democratic bodies as “first stage” (60). Later, these ideas were at the origin of the constitution of the Liaison Committee for federalist action, which was an extension

(59) Cfr. F. ROSSOLILLO, *Le problème de la démocratie à l'école*, in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1969, n. 2 and, more generally, L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo*, cit., pp. 85-87.

(60) Cfr. A. GREILSAMMER, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-109.

of the French MFE and which gathered those that had participated in the European Democratic Front in France.

An important extension of federalist intervention in France in May was the position adopted on French regional reforms. On October 6th 1968, the French Commission of the sMFE expressed itself in favour of profound regional reform, requesting a universal suffrage election of an assembly for each region equipped with financial powers and also a social and economic assembly entrusted with the formulation of a regional plan (61). On December 15th of the same year, the French Commission, rejecting all proposals for half-baked reforms, condemned “a Gaullist power that set itself a double mission: to dedicate to the French state a sovereignty which no longer makes sense if not on a European level, and prerogatives which must be taken closer to the people”. These issues were taken up by the sMFE’s Trieste Congress. In the motion approved by the congress, the struggle for the democratisation of the Communities, and therefore for European elections, was linked to the fight for a federal society founded on autonomy at all levels, and a commitment was taken to further investigate the themes relating to the construction of Europe while maintaining contact with the groups that contested the structure and powers of society (62).

If one considers that De Gaulle’s disappearance from the scene was provoked by his defeat in the referendum of April 1969, it must be stated that the federalists contributed to the said defeat by disputing the Gaullist theories on the regional reform of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle’s defeat, it should be highlighted, was also a demonstration of the structural weakness of the French nation state, which was evidently unable to pursue to any great effect the international role desired by the General. Gaullist rejection of supranational integration was effectively translated into the impotence of Europe and into the pursuit of an unrealistic national grandeur which was hard contested in France.

(61) Cfr. J.-P. GOUZY, *I movimenti per l’unità europea in Francia*, in *I movimenti per l’unità europea 1954-1969*, cit., pp. 67-69.

(62) It should be remembered that, on the occasion of the Trieste Congress, the youth organisation of the sMFE adopted a resolution against obligatory military service and in favour of conscientious objection and community service. Cfr. “*Federalismo Europeo*”, 1969, n. 2.

4.2. *The events marking European integration from the Hague Summit in 1969 to the Paris Summit in December 1974.*

The phase of the European integration process that stretches from De Gaulle's exit until the Summit of Heads of State and Government held in December 1974 is characterised by three crucial moments: the programme launched by the Hague Summit, December 1st-2nd 1969; the failure of the Werner Plan for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); the commitment assumed by the governments in December 1974 in favour of the election of the EP (63).

The Hague Summit was summoned up, under the initiative of De Gaulle's successor Georges Pompidou, who was more pragmatic and who had replaced, at the *Quai d'Orsay*, the hard core Gaullist Michel Debré with the decidedly more Europeanist Maurice Schumann. With the new president, the narrow-mindedness of the General was relaxed as agreement was reached regarding a relaunch based on the triptych of completion, enlargement and strengthening of integration.

Completion was substantially translated into the decision to introduce — in connection with the creation of the common market organisations that were still lacking for the full implementation of the CAP — a Community financing system based on its own resources which De Gaulle had previously blocked. These resources were supposed to derive from the customs duties charged by the common external tariff, from the tax burdens imposed on imported agricultural products (so as to render Community prices equal to those beyond its borders) and from the introduction of a uniform value added tax throughout the Community, from whose yield a portion equal to 1% of taxable income would be assigned to the Community budget. The transition to this system would be accompanied by the designation to the EP of a codecision power (but not, however, on equal terms) with the Council of Ministers on budget matters. However, the Community was not given the autonomous power to increase revenue,

(63) For a reconstruction of the development of European integration in the period from 1969-1974, see: P. GERBET, *La construction de l'Europe*, cit.; L. LEVI and U. MORELLI, *L'unificazione europea*, cit.; S. PISTONE, *L'integrazione europea*, cit.; L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo*, cit.

with all changes regarding its own resources requiring a new treaty to be approved by an intergovernmental conference and unanimously ratified on the part of the member states.

As far as enlargement is concerned, now that the veto imposed by De Gaulle was a thing of the past, the road was clear for the adhesion of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark (Norway did not enter because a negative referendum result prevented its adhesion from being ratified), which came into force on December 1st 1973. It should be underlined that British adhesion was accepted by Pompidou's France also, if not essentially, with the aim of counterbalancing — within the logic of the balancing linked to the indefinite postponement of the surpassing of a fundamentally confederal system — the weight of Germany. Germany, in effect, as well as having strengthened on an economic level, assumed with the new *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Willy Brandt an even more advanced attitude towards the problem of national reunification with respect to that of the great coalition (recognising the GDR), but at the same time it began to translate its economic weight into greater international political activism (64). With the entrance of the United Kingdom, the Community certainly acquired a partner of fundamental importance, but one which would also systematically hinder the furthering of integration.

As far as strengthening was concerned, essentially thanks to the initiative of the Italian government chaired by Mariano Rumor, there was a slight opening with regard to the election of the EP. Indeed, a task to examine the problem was committed to the Council. The question of political union was also reopened, which had previously been swept under the carpet with the hushing-up of the Fouchet Plan. The implementation of a common trade policy, connected to the customs union, imposed a commitment to harmonise foreign policies. In reality, it was difficult to stipulate important commercial agreements in the presence of serious differences between the member countries towards the external entities with whom they had to nego-

(64) Cf. WALTER LIPGENS, *Die europäische Integration*, in RICHARD LOWENTHAL and HANS PETER SCHWARZ (edited by), *Die zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland-eine Bilanz*, Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1974 (Italian translation., *L'integrazione europea*, in S. PISTONE (edited by), *La Germania e l'unità europea*, cit.).

tiate. Consequently, it was decided to introduce the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was a structure of intergovernmental cooperation external to the Community system and founded on a simple agreement rather than a treaty. In essence, it amounted to regular consultation between the foreign ministries that aimed to harmonise their foreign policies, but it strictly excluded the problems of defence, and could not make binding decisions. The only result of any significance achieved by the EPC in this period was the positive role that the governments of the Community played in the birth and development of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, particularly favouring the commitments assumed in relation to human rights (which would carry considerable weight in the dismantling process of the Soviet Union).

That said, the centrepiece of the strengthening process was the decision to construct the EMU in stages starting from 1970. This commitment was set against the backdrop of the creeping crisis of the gold exchange standard and, therefore, of international monetary stability in the framework of which European economic integration had developed in the 1960s. The decision taken in March 1968 (linked to the dwindling of the reserves in Fort Knox) to accept the convertibility of the dollar into gold only in negotiations between central banks, and only on the condition that the USA could ascertain the non-speculative motives of such transactions, undermined the credibility of the system of guaranteed convertibility. The effects of this phenomenon, together with the social upheaval (with its epicentre in May 1968) which shook the countries of the Community, soon plunged the recently announced customs union and the about to be completed CAP into crisis. The distorting provisions of the common market introduced at the end of 1968 by France and by the German federal government were followed in 1969 by the devaluation of the French Franc and the revaluation of the German Mark. The questioning of monetary stability (the last modifications to exchange rate parity, with the revaluation of the German Mark and the Dutch Guilder, had taken place in March 1961) had immediate repercussions on the CAP. Indeed, exceptions began to be introduced to the single prices mechanism which was structurally linked to exchange rate stability.

In this situation, if the level of economic integration achieved was to be maintained and increased, it would not be possible to shirk the issue of monetary union and the governing of an integrated economy. The answer was the Werner Plan that, after a year of work, was approved by the Council of Ministers on March 21st 1971. It foresaw the realisation in stages of EMU, progressively restricting the margins of fluctuation between the currencies and implementing a gradual harmonisation of economic and budgetary policies and the gradual introduction of common economic policies. These policies would in turn have to be accompanied by a strengthening of the institutions eventually leading to, at the end of the process indicated for 1980, of a genuine European government, answerable to an elected parliament and equipped with full power. As far as the institutional aspects were concerned however, there were no real commitments undertaken either in relation to content or procedure.

Soon after the approval of the Werner Plan monetary instability took a frightening turn for the worse. If in May the FRG and the Netherlands had already decided to allow their currencies to fluctuate freely, the final blow was delivered on August 15th 1971 when the American President Nixon definitively suspended the dollar's convertibility into gold, declaring free fluctuation on the international markets and introducing a surcharge of 10% on imports. This historical decision brought an end to the system of international monetary stability founded at Bretton Woods, and on which the liberalisation of trade between free market countries had been built, as well as the much deeper liberalisation between the countries of the EEC (65).

In this context, which generalised the fluctuation of the currencies, the governments of the EEC reacted on April 24th 1972 with a

(65) Nixon's decision was a clear demonstration of a historical crisis of American leadership with reference to western European countries. Leadership on a political and military level still remained, but efficient leadership on an economic and financial level was lacking. This placed the Europeans ahead of the pressing problem of simultaneously confronting the problems of the internal construction of Europe and those of facing up to the situation beyond the EEC's borders, which had been kept separate by the highly efficient American protectorate. The response to this challenge, with the European Political Cooperation and the Werner Plan, was clearly inadequate.

decision to institute the so-called “monetary snake”, a system which limited fluctuation between its currencies to 2.25% above or below parity, which therefore established the joint fluctuation of the said currencies in relation to those from outside the Community. Subsequently, in the Paris Summit of October 19th-20th 1972, the Heads of State and Governments reiterated their will to achieve economic and monetary union by the deadline set for December 31st 1980 and to transform their relationships as a whole into a European Union by the end of the decade (66). It was also decided that, in order to tackle the regional imbalances existing within the Community (and accentuated by the economic crisis), the Community’s institutions should be invited to create a Regional Fund. The constitution of a European Fund of Monetary Cooperation was also foreseen.

The concrete developments contradicted the commitments undertaken by the governments. After the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland decided to allow their currencies to fluctuate on June 13th 1972, Italy also left the monetary snake on February 13th 1973. Within this context, which was rather problematic in itself, Europe was hit by the oil crisis in the last quarter of 1973. The four-fold increase in the price of oil (together with the increase in the prices of raw materials exported by the producing countries that had been able to create cartels similar to that of the oil exporter) generated a situation of acute inflation and recession which brought twenty years of economic expansion in industrialised countries to an abrupt end.

When on February 19th 1974 the French Franc also left the monetary snake to join the rest of the fluctuating currencies, the failure of the Werner Plan was clear for all to see. The Community plunged into dramatic crisis, the most worrying aspect of which was represented by the emergence of protectionist phenomena which began to cast doubt on the economic integration achieved in the 1960s.

(66) It was the first time that this word had been used in relation to the Community. The word “union”, which appears to have been proposed by the vice-secretary general of the French Presidency and future head of government Eduard Balladur, was deliberately vague so as not to have to make a direct choice between confederation, dear to Pompidou but rejected by the federal Chancellor Brandt, and federation, favoured by the latter. Cfr. P. GERBET, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

The competitive devaluations in particular had a clear protectionist value. In a context of increasingly serious economic crisis, where sovereignty remained in the hands of national governments and adequate mechanisms of intercommunity solidarity had yet to be installed, the countries with the greatest difficulties were forced to give priority to the immediate need to bring back to balance the accounts with foreign countries and to gain internal stability over and above that of maintaining fixed exchange rates, and they attempted to regain competitiveness through devaluation, triggering a reaction similar to that set in motion, with catastrophic consequences, in the crisis of 1929. Other significant protectionist measures included exchange rate controls, the multiplication of national laws which impeded the commercialisation of goods produced in other countries (non-tariff protectionism), monetary compensatory imports (aimed at maintaining the system of common agricultural prices and implying thorough and expensive controls at the Community's internal borders). Also the gaps between stronger and weaker countries within the Community intensified, hence the so-called "Two Speed Europe" (67).

The spectre, which the governments saw quite clearly, of the dissolution of the Community and the awareness, present in the clearer-thinking sectors of the political classes, of the lack of any serious historical prospect for the nation states outside the design of European unification (the "unite or perish" factor which comes into play above all in the most critical situations the nation states find themselves in as well as the adventure of their unification) at this stage produced a sudden surge of willingness. This materialised in the Summit of the Heads of State and Governments held in Paris on December 9th and 10th 1974, in which President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, not belonging, unlike Pompidou, to the Gaullist party, played a decisive role. The French head of state, as well as being able to count on the

(67) In the Tindemands Report on the European Union (see *L'Union européenne*, published by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1976, Collection *Idées et Études*, n. 306), this expression would be used to indicate the possibility that certain member states may advance more rapidly than others on an institutional level and with regard to common policies. The expression, however, had already been used to indicate the gap between the economically stronger and weaker states.

active support of Italy and the Benelux countries, found a partner in German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with whom the traditional role of Community leadership exercised by the French-German axis could be carried forward in a particularly dynamic manner. Therefore, in Paris started a reversing of the trend regarding economic integration and above all institutional development.

With regard to the former, the fundamental decisions to be remembered are: the effective implementation, after the postponements of the previous two years, of the common regional policy, which meant the beginning of the concrete assumption of responsibility ahead of the problem of regional imbalances within the Community; the creation, with the Convention of Lomé (which started life as the Regional Fund in 1975) of the first embryos of a new approach to the problems of Third World Development and the creation of a fairer international economic order (68). However, it was from the institutional aspect that the choices of greater impact emerged, namely the regularisation of the Summits of the Heads of States and Governments through the institution of the European Council, and the initiation of a procedure for the direct election of the EP, for which 1978 was the indicated date.

The mind behind the European Council was Monnet (supported by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe), who conceived it as a “Provisional European Government” (69). In essence, the stable and visible involvement, even if it was in an entity of a confederal nature, of the very top levels of national governments in European unification policy would produce a stimulus towards actively working for such an objective. Meeting frequently and putting themselves on the front line, the national governments (especially those officially more sympathetic to the unification cause) would find it harder not to come up with concrete results, particularly ahead of critical sit-

(68) From the second half of the 1970s onwards, European commitment to development aid would be consistently superior to that of the USA.

(69) Cfr. A. VARSORI, *Dal Vertice dell’Aia al Vertice di Parigi: le ultime grandi occasioni del Comitato d’Azione per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa*, in ARIANE LANDUYT and DANIELA PREDA (edited by), *I movimenti per l’unità europea 1970-1986*, 2 tomi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000.

uations. It can be recognised that this expectation found fulfilment in an increase in the decisional capabilities of the Community.

If the institution of the European Council remained within a confederal framework, albeit a more dynamic one, the beginning of the procedure for European elections on the other hand opened up prospects of development in a decidedly federal sense. This would automatically give rise to the strengthening of the representative body of the European people. It was also evoked in the bulletin from the Paris Summit which spoke of an association of the EP with the development of European construction and the widening of its powers, particularly with the allocation of certain powers in the Community's legislative process. A European Parliament equipped with democratic legitimacy would clearly introduce a dynamics towards the institutional strengthening of the Community system (because otherwise the democratic deficit of the system would be exasperated) and would therefore favour the relaunch of the integration process. The situation therefore provided a genuine qualitative leap, whose basic motivation can be identified in the recognition of the need to involve political parties in the important decisions regarding the development of European integration. This motivation was also present in the decision of the Paris Summit to entrust Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans with the task of drafting a report on the European Union, consulting "sectors representing public opinion".

In essence, the governments (especially of those countries which were more advanced in terms of European integration) realised in the light of the failure of the Werner Plan that the transition from the customs union to monetary union and to the common policies necessary to govern the European economy (practically to positive economic integration) would not be successful without the fundamental agreement of the social and economic players on European level with regard to certain strategic options. One had to think, for example, of an acceptable level of inflation, ways to fight unemployment, the extent of resource transfers from the stronger regions to the weaker regions of the Community, industrial reorganisation and relations with the Third World. A similar social pact on a European level would not, on the other hand, be able to emerge without a qualitatively new commit-

ment in the area of the European integration of the entities with the institutional task of mediating the consensus of society towards political power, or rather the political parties. They in turn would only have been driven to such a commitment by the necessity of gathering European consensus within the framework of the direct election of the EP and in view of surpassing its essentially advisory role (70).

The orientation of the governments, which emerged in connection with the failure of the Werner Plan and the serious crisis of European integration, would not be enough however if it was not combined with the actions carried out by the federalists. Without their constant initiative on grass-roots level in favour of the direct election of the EP (in the framework of the struggle for European federation), this issue would have effectively disappeared from the political agenda and the political classes would have not been able to ground, at the right moment, their decision on the existence of a concrete demand present in public opinion. The federalists therefore played an invaluable role in the qualitative leap that occurred in the Paris Summit in December 1974. We will now examine the concrete events during the period from 1969 to 1974.

4.3. *The reunification of the federalists.*

Let us begin with a reminder of the developments in the process of federalist reunification which in those very years reached its conclusion. After the sMFE congress held in Trieste from April 11th to 13th 1969, reconciliation between the two arms of federalism proceeded rapidly, especially under the stimulus of the Italian MFE and the EUD, the two principle movements within their respective European organisations (71). The joint participation in the meetings of the direc-

(70) Cfr. WOLFRAM KAISER, *Due tecnocrati: Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt e l'Europa negli anni Settanta*, in A. LANDUYT and D. PREDA (edited by), *op. cit.*

(71) It should be remembered in particular the protocol prepared by the secretaries general of the sMFE and the EUD and unanimously approved by the central committee of the sMFE held in Milan on October 4th-5th 1969. The document considered the association of the EUD to the sMFE, proposed by Eickhorn at the Trieste Congress and formally implemented by the central committee of Milan, as the first

tive and executive bodies of the sMFE and the AEF (72) was accompanied by increasingly intense collaboration in terms of political action, the most important aspects of which we will see later on.

The decisive development occurred in 1972. On March 25th and 26th of that year, the congress of unification was held in Luxemburg between the sMFE's youth organisation (Jeunes du MFE) and the JEF, which had links, albeit rather elastic, with the EUD and the AEF (73). Soon afterwards, Nancy was the venue for the 13th Congress of the sMFE on April 7th and 8th, preceded on the 7th by the meeting of the federal committee of the AEF. In these meetings, the two associations decided separately in favour of the reunification of the federalists (74).

The congress of the sMFE approved a declaration (75) which summarised its historical and cultural heritage and represented its ideal contribution to reunification. It was actually among the fundamental acts of the federalist experience recalled by the preamble of the new UEF statute approved by the Brussels Congress of 1973. In this docu-

step towards complete unification. It was therefore deemed useless to maintain the German section of the sMFE, which dissolved and whose members subsequently joined the EUD. Cfr. "*Federalismo Europeo*", 1969, n. 5.

(72) The central committee of the sMFE which gathered in Paris on February 7th-8th 1970 saw the unofficial presence of Koppe and Dumont du Voitel, representing the EUD. Moreover, the central committee approved the association to sMFE of the British federalists from the Campaign for Europe. Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1970, n. 8 and J. PINDER, *I federalisti e la loro rete conducono gli inglesi verso la Comunità*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, cit. The following central committee (Brussels, May 23rd-24th 1970) saw for the first time the official attendance of delegates from both the EUD and the Campaign for Europe. Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1970, n. 9.

(73) Cfr. "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1972, n. 3 and GUIDO LEVI, *Il ruolo della Jeunesse Fédéraliste Européenne nella lotta per l'unità europea. Dalla rifondazione all'Atto unico*, in A. LANDUYT and D. PREDA (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1986*, cit., vol. II.

(74) The proceedings of the Nancy Congress and of the meeting of the federal committee of the AEF can be found in: "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1972, n. 4; "*Comuni d'Europa*", 1973, n. 2; "*Milano federalista*", 1972, n. 3 (periodical published by the Milan section of the Italian MFE between 1970 and 1973; in 1974, publication was resumed of "*L'Unità Europea*", the official publication of the Italian MFE); "*Europa Foederata*", 1972, n. 6 (periodical published by the Bologna section of the Italian MFE between 1970 and 1976; certain editions were also published in French and German).

(75) The declaration is also presented in *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit.

ment, it was stated that the reasons for the split had now been overcome and that the positions assumed by the two organizations were now complementary. Having recalled the liberal, democratic and socialist premises of federalism and the values of European and world solidarity, peace, the protection of the environment, the subordination of the economy to freedom, equality and the happiness of all men, European unity was declared to be an unquestionable fact. Its cultural roots lay in the very history of Europe, its material roots in economic interdependence, its political roots in the end of the European system of states and in the advent of a bipolar system. The choice to be made was not between the unity or division of Europe, but between different types of unity. Such a decision was of an institutional, and therefore political nature, rather than technical and neutral. The federal institutions, unlike the confederal ones, were capable of providing an effective political framework for the economic unification (already underway, but only on a capitalistic and technocratic level), of bringing western and eastern Europe closer together and of emancipating the European countries from Russian and American hegemony, as far as the dissolution of the Atlantic and Warsaw Pacts.

The federation presupposed a constitution. Given that constituent power belonged to the people, some of the federalists had always demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly. It was recognised on the other hand that the achievement of a constitution could only be the final result of a struggle leading to the conquest of more advanced European positions. In other words, it was essential for the federal organisations to achieve intermediate objectives, with the support of public opinion, and also together with political parties and governments. These objectives would create a pre-constituent climate which would provide favourable conditions for the stipulation of a federal pact, one which would also have a double objective. Its stipulation would give a central role to the sovereign will of the states, but once stipulated it would give life to a new sovereign will: that of a new federal entity. With such awareness, the SMFE considered that the threshold of the irreversibility of the integration process would only be crossed with the direct election of the EP and the direct participation of the people in the construction of

Europe. As such, it indicated the recognition of the right to a European vote for the citizens of every European country as a fundamental strategic objective.

A European federation was considered a means for the realisation of historical, political, social and economic aims. The historical aim was the establishment, within the culture of mankind, of the principle of democratic and organised collaboration between nations leading ultimately to a world federation. The political aim was to go beyond the exclusive nation state as a means of division and the achievement of European autonomy as a necessary condition for its contribution to world peace. The social aim was to equip workers' associations so that they could negotiate on an even playing field at European level with employers who already operated on such a level. The economic aim was European planning, focussing on the regions and the ability of Europe to compete on a world level in terms of productive progress and avant-garde technology.

The sMFE and the AEF approved a unification agreement that contained a declaration in favour of a European federal government equipped with limited but real powers, able to impose itself on all states with no veto available to any of them. This government would have to be democratically appointed and controlled by a federal European parliament founded on the direct suffrage of all European citizens. They had the right to freely make decisions regarding their own destinies on every level and therefore they would have to relentlessly demand such a right in order to force governments to accept the direct election of the EP.

The declaration on European federation was completed by the enunciation of the principles that were supposed to preside over reunification and by the organisational directives for its implementation. Within a year a constitutive congress would be summoned giving rise to the new organisation. A common committee, a provisional bureau and a provisional secretariat were entrusted with the task of preparing the congress and defining the political and statutory conditions for reunification (76).

(76) The joint MFE-AEF committee was composed of 25 members elected at

After the common committee had prepared the statute of the new organisation, the preface to the statute and the political declaration, approved in Paris on December 17th 1972, the first congress of the new UEF (VII linking up again with the VI congress of 1956 that had preceded the split) was held in Brussels from April 13th to 15th 1973 (77). The preamble of the statute, that the congress unanimously approved, recalled the UEF's fundamental inspiring elements. Kant, Hamilton and Proudhon were defined as the fathers of federalism, as they were among the first to develop the idea of unity within diversity, founded on common democratic law. The following were indicated as starting points for the political actions of the time: the 1939 directives of the Federal Union; the principles for a new Europe expressed by the Swiss EU in February 1940; the Ventotene Manifesto of July 1941; the declarations of the European resisters in Geneva, May 1944; the Hertenstein programme of September 1946; the declaration of the first Montreux Congress in 1947; the political resolution of the first EUD Congress in May 1949; the federalist charter voted by the Montreux Congress of 1964; the document approved by the Nancy Congress in 1972.

The new statute began with a specification, so that it would not be identified with integral federalism, that the new organisation, despite keeping the name UEF common to the various languages, was

the sMFE's Nancy Congress, of 25 members appointed by the national organisations adhering to the AEF, of 10 young members appointed by the constituent congress of the JEF in Luxembourg in March 1972. The co-presidency of the MFE-AEF was guaranteed by Hirsch and Molenaar, while Caterina Chizzola (who in 1971 had replaced Dierickx as secretary general of the sMFE) was appointed secretary general of the joint MFE-AEF committee. Cfr. "*Milano Federalista*", 1972, n. 4 and "*Europa Federata*", 1972, n. 6.

(77) With regard to the Brussels Congress, see "*Le Fédéraliste*", 1973, n. 1-2 and "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1973, nn. 3 and 4. There were delegations from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, representing around 25,000 members. Regardless of the procedures governing their election, 10% of the total number of delegates was shared equally between all countries, the rest proportionately. It can be noted that with respect to the Montreux Congress of 1947, the UEF had only a quarter of its previous membership. It should also be underlined, on the other hand, that in 1973 the number of active militants in the UEF's sections had at least doubled.

intended as the Union of European Federalists and not as a European Union of Federalists. It was therefore stated that UEF was, unlike its previous incarnation, a supranational association whose aim was to create a European federation equipped with supranational institutions and limited but real powers, i.e. a federal government, an assembly elected by direct universal suffrage, a federal senate representing the member states and possible the regions and a court of justice. Its orientation, determined by the political situation at the time of reunification, was outlined in the attached political declaration and binded all member movements and the individuals enrolled with them.

The UEF was composed of private individuals, who were direct members and who adhered to it through its basic organisations. The European bodies (federal committee, bureau, secretary general, arbitration council) were elected by the European congress. The statute thus accepted the principles, which were irrevocable for the sMFE, of the supranational nature of the organisation and its internal democracy. Nevertheless, unlike the sMFE, the statute defined national organisations as autonomous units with the freedom to implement their own tactics as long as they respected the general political line defined by the organisation as a whole on a European level. With the aim of strengthening the supranationality of the UEF and safeguarding its cohesion, the congress recommended that the national organisations invited the federalists of other countries to their congresses.

The political declaration, approved almost unanimously by the Brussels Congress, repropounded the political objectives and values of federalism as well as the commitment to pursue them through the claim of the people's right to participate in the construction of Europe. The federalists' common position with regard to the world situation and Europe's place in it was expressed, underlining the need for Europe to speak with a single voice and to act with a single will on an international level. The United States of America remained a military and economic superpower, but it was no longer able to guarantee exchange rate stability. Furthermore, although its military presence was still crucial for European security, it was beginning to look uncertain. China was beginning to emerge as a world power and international relations between the major players were being governed

without the Europeans. Moreover, tension between industrialised nations and developing countries was increasing. Ahead of these new developments, and despite the fact that the EEC's foreign trade was greater than that of the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe continued to behave as it had done in the previous century in the areas of foreign policy, defence and currency.

European federation appeared to be the only valid response to the challenges of contemporary history. According to the federalists, it was necessary to: accelerate economic and social development in Europe; reduce the existing disparity between different European regions; develop research and technology in order to avoid dependence on other states; create a European currency; organise a common security system in Europe as a contribution to world peace and justice among peoples; establish relationships between Europe and other major players on an equal footing; increase EEC aid to developing countries. These objectives required a federal system with limited but real powers, founded on the principle of subsidiarity and which would safeguard the powers of small organisations and avoid a centralised state, protecting the historical regions and nations of Europe with all their diversities and wealth (78).

On the basis of the common platform represented by the general political declaration and the statutes, the congress confronted the problem of defining the UEF's political line (79). The strategy reports were presented by Albertini and Molenaar. The debate, involving, among others, Brugmans, Koppe and members of the Communities Commission Mansholt and Spinelli, concluded with the approval of its political resolution by a large majority. Later on, illustrating the po-

(78) The issue of protecting the regions in the context of a European federal multilevel structure (from municipalities to Europe itself) was the subject of systematic study among the European federalists. In particular, the following have to be cited: GUY HERAUD, *L'Europe de ethnies*, Paris-Nice, Presses d'Europe, 1974; DENIS DE ROUGEMONT, *Rapporto al popolo europeo*, Milan, Pan Editrice, 1979.

(79) As far as the various positions are concerned, the leading structure emerging from the Brussels Congress was the following: Hirsch president; Molenaar vice-president; Caterina Chizzola secretary general; Ota Adler (United Kingdom) treasurer; members of the executive: Henk Aben (Netherlands), Erwan Fouéré (France), Gouzy, Eickhorn, Meriano, Mommer, Van Schendel, Spinelli, Ernest Wistrich (United Kingdom).

litical action (essentially coinciding with the commitment in favour of the direct election of the EP) carried out by the federalists in the period we are examining, we will return to the concrete aspects of the political line defined by the Brussels Congress. Here it is necessary to specify the general aspects of the strategy of the new UEF.

In essence, a synthesis was created between the prevailing orientation in the AEF (which favoured “small steps” and the role of federalists as advisers of the ruling class) and that prevailing in the sMFE, particularly in the Italian section (according to which integration could only make genuine progress on the basis of institutional developments of a federal nature, and these could not be achieved without a systematic and continuous mobilisation of the European people). The strategy which emerged from the convergence between the sMFE and the AEF, as defined by Albertini, was that of constitutional gradualism. A gradualistic framework meant that full federation and the constituent, i.e. the fundamental objectives of the federalist struggle, would have to be pursued through gradual institutional modifications of the Community system which would permit gradual progress towards the achievement of the ultimate objective.

From this prospective, the partial objectives, such as the direct election of the EP, the formation of European political parties, monetary union and the strengthening of the EP’s powers, were intended as the stepping stones of a constitutional process that would eventually lead to the constituent. In such a way, direct elections, the demand for which had an objective basis in the transformations undergone by European society in the 1950s and 1960s, had become an effectively pursuable political objective on which alliances could be formed with the most advanced sectors of the national political classes. A directly elected parliament would permit the continuation of the fight for the constituent on a more advanced basis. In the same way, the single currency, rendered necessary by market integration and monetary instability, would imply a transfer of sovereign power to Europe, reinforcing the need for a federal government. Support for a single currency would thus not turn out to be a functionalistic stage of economic integration, but an essential step towards the constituent.

Certain aspects of this strategy reflected Monnet’s method: the

selection of priorities and the carrying out of concrete and resolute actions based on them, hinging on a limited but decisive point, that would provoke a fundamental change regarding the said point and, step by step, modify the terms of the problems as a whole. There were however clear differences with respect to the method employed by the inventor of the Community system. The pursuit of the partial objectives was incorporated into an overall strategy which clearly culminated in the European constituent and had to be carried out simultaneously from the top down, in order to influence the political classes and the Community's institutions, and from the bottom up, through systematic and continuous initiatives to involve public opinion. The necessary conditions in order to be able to effectively conduct such an initiative were both unity among federalists and their autonomy with respect to national power centres (80).

4.4. *The federalists obtain the commitment of the governments for the direct election of the European Parliament.*

Let us now examine the crucial aspects of the political actions that the federalists jointly carried out from De Gaulle's resignation on April 28th 1969 to the decisions made at the Paris Summit in December 1974, notwithstanding the fact that formal reunification occurred in 1973. The common thread was the commitment to the direct election of the EP, which was linked to the criticism of the plan to implement the EMU without foreseeing a parallel and substantial strengthening of the Community's institutions.

On the very day that De Gaulle announced his resignation, Spinelli, who was an adviser of the Italian Foreign Minister Nenni and had become a member of the central committee of the SMFE after the Trieste Congress, had obtained an important Anglo-Italian declaration signed by Nenni and the British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart at the Foreign Office. In the document it was stated, among

(80) Cfr. S. PISTONE, *I movimenti per l'unità europea in Italia* e U. MORELLI, *Il Movimento Federalista Europeo sopranazionale e l'Unione Europea dei Federalisti*, in A. LANDUYT e D. PREDA (edited by), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1987*, cit.

other things, that “Europe must be firmly founded on democratic institutions and the European Communities must be based on an elective parliament according to the Treaties of Rome “ (81). Soon afterwards, from May 24th to 26th 1969, border actions were carried out at forty-three stations with the participation of all the federalist organisations and the demand for the democratisation of the European Communities. This was followed by the grandiose initiative of the Italian federalists aimed at presenting a bill of popular initiative for the direct unilateral election of the Italian representatives to the EP. The bill, signed by 65,000 citizens was presented on June 11th 1969 to the president of the Italian Senate Amintore Fanfani by a delegation led by president of the CIME Petrilli (82).

This initiative on the part of the Italian federalists had immediate repercussions on a European level. The initiative of the two young members of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Nothomb and Chabert, is to be considered tightly linked to the aforementioned action. On June 27th 1969, they presented a bill for the direct election of the Belgian delegates to the EP. Illustrating this proposal, the two members of parliament made explicit reference to the bill of popular initiative presented to the Italian Senate, whose essential elements were reproduced in their own (83). It is also important to highlight an important action on the part of the EUD. At the end of July 1969, it proposed to a group of German personalities that the Italian initiative should be supported, with the aim of aiding its success and to witness the European implications. The people questioned decided to comply in the most direct of ways and immediately sent a letter to the Italian Members of Parliament inviting them, in the spirit of the common European ideal, to quickly approve the aforementioned bill. The signatories included: Walter Scheel (future foreign minister); Otto Brenner, president of the metallurgic union; Walter Hallstein; Ernest Majonica;

(81) Cfr. J. PINDER, *I federalisti e la loro rete conducono gli inglesi verso la Comunità*, cit.; R. MAYNE and J. PINDER, *Federal Union: the Pioneers*, cit., p. 181 and subsequent.

(82) See *Una elezione per l'Europa*, supplement to n. 2, 1969 of “*Le Fédéraliste*” and L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo*, cit.

(83) See *Elezioni del Parlamento europeo a suffragio universale diretto*, cit., pp. 287-288.

Heinz Oskar Vetter, president of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; Karl Mommer; Helmut Wagner, secretary general of the German Industry Confederation; and other illustrious figures (84). Finally, it should be remembered that on September 13th the French Member of Parliament André Chazalon presented a written question to the government regarding the general election of the EP or the unilateral election of the French representatives, in the event that agreement could not be reached in the Community's Council of Ministers (85).

Starting from October 1969, the federalists' commitment focused on the objective of influencing the Summit Conference at the Hague. There are five fundamental initiatives that should be remembered in this regard.

— On October 4th-5th, a meeting of the central committee of the sMFE was held in Milan, attended by the Head of the Italian Government, Mariano Rumor. He expressed his support for the Italian unilateral election and promised to bring up at the Hague the problem of strengthening the supranational institutions and of realizing the general election of the EP. In effect, the decision of the Hague to examine the issue of European elections was fundamentally due to the urging of the Italian government (86).

— Immediately afterwards, upon a mandate from the central committee, president Hirsch sent a letter to the Heads of State and Government which outlined the objectives that, according to the federalists, had to be urgently achieved given the current European situation. The summit conference would have to: give an immediate mandate to the Commission to open negotiations with the countries ap-

(84) Cfr. *Una elezione per l'Europa*, cit. It should be remembered that on June 10th 1970 the Dutch MP Westerterp presented to the lower chamber a bill for the direct election of dutch delegates to the EP and informed the Italian federalists of his action.

(85) Cfr. "*Federalismo Europeo*", 1969, n. 5.

(86) *Ibid.* Despite the commitment expressed on the part of the majority of the Italian parliamentary groups, the bill of popular initiative for unilateral European elections failed to be approved due to the serious government instability that afflicted Italy during the 1960s and 1970s. The problem was subsequently overcome when prospects for a general election came into view. The fact remains that the initiative of the Italian federalists was the most effective, thanks to public involvement, in keeping claims for direct EP elections alive.

plying to join the Community; initiate monetary cooperation; equip the Community with its own resources starting from 1970; proceed with the direct election of the EP; institute the European University of Florence; summon a conference of government representatives of the member states, candidate countries and the Commission in order to formulate a treaty for the creation of a European federation. Such a project would have to indicate institutions, how they would be designated and the transitory staggered measures to be implemented in a period no longer than ten years (87).

— On October 31st and November 1st, a conference of the federalist movements was held in London thanks to the initiative of Campaign for Europe, the organisation of the British federalists (88). On this occasion, minister George Brown publicly adopted a position in favour of the direct election of the EP and of allocating new and far-reaching powers to it. The presentation of a bill of popular initiative to the Italian Parliament was also received with enthusiasm, and its rapid approval was hoped for. An appeal was sent to the Hague Summit with a request to move quickly towards the political construction of Europe. The appeal reiterated Hirsch's proposal to form a committee of experts from ten member and candidate countries, affirming that such a committee should be chaired by an eminent European figure in accordance with the model of the Spaak Committee of 1955.

— Between the 23rd and 25th of November, the EUD held its ordinary congress in Saarbrücken which was attended by many important political figures such as Hallstein, the president of the National French Assembly Alain Poher, Bruno Pitterman and numerous members of the *Bundestag*. The slogan of the congress was "More Democracy for Europe" and therefore the direct election of the EP was at the forefront of the debate and of the final resolution on this theme. Signatures were also gathered in parallel with the congress, with excellent results (89).

— Finally, at the opening of the Hague Summit, on December

(87) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1970, n. 7.

(88) *Ibid.*

(89) Cfr. "*Federalismo Europeo*", 1969, n. 6.

1st 1969, a large demonstration was held, organised mainly by the SMFE, the EUD and the JEF, and which saw the participation of 2,500 federalists from various European cities. Among the banners and placards carried by the demonstrators in a procession towards the Summit's headquarters, the fundamental demands were for the direct election of the EP. Such demands and the request for the surpassing of tensions between a growing technocracy and increasingly strong aspirations of democracy were the essential points of a leaflet of which thousands of copies were distributed. There were also incidents involving the police, who attempted to prevent a sit-in opposite Summit HQ. The large presence of federalists in the Hague was echoed by the press. In particular, the "Times" of London dedicated an entire front-page column to the event (90).

After the Hague Summit, a new phase of action for direct elections began to develop. It based its moves on the contradictory nature of the decisions taken by the governments in the Hague. On that occasion, as we have seen, the EMU project got underway, i.e. the attempt to face the enormous problems that the European integration process was causing after the creation of the customs union and the CAP, without introducing any real changes in the Community's political or institutional mechanisms. The federalists proposed a clear alternative to this approach.

On the one hand, it was clearly stated that the transition from the mere dismantling of customs to truly positive economic integration — of which the CAP, the European Investment Bank and the Social Fund were rather modest forerunners — and monetary union was structurally impossible unless it involved a democratic and federal transformation of the Community's institutions. Entities of a technocratic and/or diplomatic nature were objectively unable to: — decide the content of economic policies, since that would involve huge conflicts of interest in which only a strong political and democratically legitimate power would be able to mediate effectively; — pursue economic and social cohesion on a European level (which would require a considerable European budget independent of national

(90) *Ibid.* and "Fédéralisme Européen", 1970, n. 7.

governments) and therefore defeat the extremely strong resistance of the national governments against the prospect of foregoing their freedom to intervene in exchange rates and budget policies; — speak with a single voice on the world stage, which would imperatively require a link between the internal construction of Europe with the ability to deal with the outside world. The institutional question, namely the overcoming of deficits with regard to democracy and efficiency, and the extension of powers not only on an economic and monetary level, but also to foreign policy and defence, was therefore a priority, given the current political situation, with respect to further developments in the integration process via a purely functionalistic approach (91).

On the other hand, the federalists did not limit their action to a doctrinarian criticism of the EMU project proposing a European fed-

(91) As far as the Italian MFE was concerned, the first significant intervention with regard to the problem of monetary union was provided by the essay written by Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi, *Pour un système européen de réserve*, in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1968 (actually published in 1969), n. 2. It became the introductory document of a convention of the same name, organised in Turin by the European Centre of Studies and Information (a secondary structure of the Turin MFE) on June 20th 1970, featuring reports by Raymond Barre (vice-president of the European Commission), Robert Triffin (who at the time was in constant contact with the federalists — see R. TRIFFIN, *Dollaro, Euro e moneta mondiale*, foreword by A. Iozzo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998), Rinaldo Ossola (vice chief executive of the Bank of Italy), M. Albertini, and with the participation of F. Rota (co-chief executive of FIAT and honorary chief executive of the Istituto Bancario S. Paolo di Torino) and Silvio Golzio (president of Credito Italiano). The main reports were published in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1971, n. 1, while the proceedings of the convention were gathered in a volume edited by the INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, *Verso una moneta europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1971. See also: M. ALBERTINI, *Le problème monétaire et le problème politique européen*, in “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1972, n. 3; CIME, *Verso l'Europa economica e monetaria*, with reports by G. Petrilli and P. Werner, Rome, 1972; GIANFRANCO MARTINI, HERIBERT GIERSCHE, R. RIFFLET, G. PETRILLI, *Per una politica regionale comunitaria*, Rome, CIME, 1972; the one-off 1974 edition of “*Le Fédéraliste*” completely dedicated to economic and monetary union and to international monetary order, with essays by Dario Velo, Alberto Majocchi, Domenico Moro and Guido Montani. With regard to the EUD, one should remember that it was the main organiser of the border actions of 1968 dedicated to the European currency and the reader is referred to the official EUD periodical “*Europa Union*” for the positions assumed in that period in relation to EMU. For a survey of the federalist debate on the Werner Plan, see L.V. MAJOCCHI and F. ROSSOLILLO, *Il Parlamento europeo*, cit.

eration and the democratic constituent method necessary to achieve it, but they also pursued a choice that would be able to trigger a gradual but concrete development process in a democratic and federal direction and, within such a framework, to make the relaunch and progress of the integration process possible. The said choice was the direct election of the EP, the chances of which had been strengthened by the contradictory situation the governments had found themselves in. Such a situation forced the governments to put EMU on the agenda, as well as cooperation in the area of foreign policy in order to avoid compromising what had already been achieved with regard to economic integration. The idea of transferring increasingly important decisions to a supranational level without a corresponding supranationalisation of the democratic mechanisms was however destined to exasperate the problem of the democratic deficit and to reinforce the demand for the democratisation, through European elections, of the Community system. The predictable failure of the EMU project and the subsequent frustration of the expectations generated by it, together with the deterioration of the current state of economic integration, would also weaken opposition to European elections, also because the need to involve political forces in the difficult decisions that the creation of EMU would bring would become increasingly evident.

These considerations regarding the possibility of fighting for European elections with a realistic chance of success strengthened the commitment of the federalists to continue pursuing this objective. Now, let us consider the important aspects of this commitment from the Hague Summit up to the Paris Summit of 1974.

For 1970 — apart from the border initiatives which were systematically carried out every year during the Pentecost, mobilising a large number of militants and numerous members of the public — the most important event to be highlighted here was the Strasbourg meeting of September 26th-27th gathering the sMFE's central committee, with the participation of AEF federalists and those of the Campaign for Europe. On this occasion, a document — inspired by Spinelli, who since June 29th 1970 was a member of the Commission of the Communities — entitled "Action plan for the democratisation

of the European Parliament, for the direct through universal suffrage election of its members and for the establishment of its missions and powers” was adopted (92).

The document, known as the “Spinelli Plan”, contained a project for political action aimed at achieving the direct election and the attribution of real powers to the EP, and it was forwarded to political, social and economic organisations. The reasons why the federalists proposed that the struggle be focused on the democratisation of the EP were summarised as follows: despite its weaknesses, the advantage of the EP was that it already existed; the national governments were committed to electing the EP through universal suffrage; the United Kingdom, which had presented its application to join, had declared itself to be in favour of the democratisation of the Communities various bodies; the Communities were preparing themselves for the birth of EMU. This meant that a series of decisions regarding social, economic and financial sectors would have to be taken by the Council of Ministers, thus evading both European and national controls and aggravating the democratic deficit and the imbalance between the importance of the tasks to be completed and the weakness of the institutions.

The direct election of the EP would be decisive if its powers were to be extended and it was inserted into the more general campaign for the defence of democracy and the search for new forms of participation that would bring decision-making power and control closer to the people. The democratisation of the EP would bring European federation closer, a fundamental step on the road to world federation. Failure in Europe, where Europeans were already engaged in economic collaboration, would mean that it would be impossible to break nationalism on a world level, to go beyond the concept of the nation state and to replace diplomatic relations with federal democratic regulations. Parliament was not the business of diplomats, it was up to the people to decide how it should be constituted and

(92) The document is reproduced in *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit. and in “*Europa Foederata*”, 1971, n. 4.

what powers it should have. For this reason, the federalists invited the European citizens to prepare to actively participate in a campaign for direct elections.

The document also contained a plan, known as the “European Parliament Action”, which had been drafted by a study group formed by the central committee of the sMFE which gathered in Paris on February 7th-8th (93), and which foresaw an initiative which would continue over a number of years. In the first part a work was foreseen aimed at defining with precision the powers of a directly elected EP and an electoral law. Without clarification of the objectives, any action would be plagued with uncertainty and as such there would be a danger that governments, incapable of adopting supranational solutions, would yet again take inadequate decisions. The second part regarded the mobilisation campaign which would be invaluable if effective pressure was to be exerted on the governments, in order to arrive at a decision. The campaign, which was intended to last until the states accepted the treaty on the democratisation of the EP, boasted the slogan “Europe for the Europeans, and with the Europeans”. It would be conducted in all countries and would involve the European Commission, the EP and the national parliaments, the political parties, trade unions, local authorities and pressure groups.

The Spinelli Plan represented the general framework within which federalist actions developed up to 1974. In 1971, other than the border actions conducted with the slogan “The borders can fall if you want them to”, the most spectacular initiative was the publication on May 5th of one-page inserts in two of the most important Italian daily newspapers, Milan’s “Il Corriere della Sera” and Turin’s “La Stampa” (and in smaller formats in numerous other daily and periodic newspapers) in favour of the unilateral election of the Italian members of the European Parliament (94). The campaign grew rapidly in 1972, when various initiatives were undertaken.

(93) The group was composed of Dierickx, Gouzy, Koppe, Pinder, Rifflet, Spinelli. Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1970, n. 8.

(94) See S. PISTONE, *I movimenti per l’unità europea in Italia*, in A. LANDUYT and D. PREDA (edited by), *I movimenti per l’unità europea 1970-1986*, cit., p. 68.

As far as bottom-up action was concerned, two particularly important demonstrations should be highlighted.

The first was organised following an appeal on the part of the president of the EP, Walter Bherendt, for the EM to intervene on the occasion of the plenary session on July 5th 1972 in Strasburg, which was due to hold a debate in view of the Paris Summit, to be held the following October. On this occasion, the EP approved a resolution which demanded, apart from the creation of EMU, the allocation to it of co-decisional power together with the Council of Ministers. Initially, this power was supposed to regard decisions of a constitutional nature, i.e. the revision of treaties, the extension of Community powers necessary for the functioning of the common market, but not foreseen by the treaties (implicit powers), the admission of new members and the stipulation of international agreements. In a subsequent phase, the co-decisional power would be extended to legislative spheres (95). On July 5th, about 500 federalists, organised by the joint bodies of the sMFE and AEF and coming from the six founding countries as well as the United Kingdom and Ireland, in front of the seat of the EP, asked not only for direct election but also a more combative attitude on the part of the MEPs. According to the federalists, they should not limit themselves to asking governments to make decisions, but they themselves should exploit all the possibilities offered by the treaties and also undertake unforeseen initiatives with a view to develop the political role and powers of the EP. In relation to these requests — on closer examination, they proposed the self-assumption on the part of the EP of a constituent role which would effectively occur, upon impetus from Spinelli, after the first direct election of the EP (96) — there was an exchange of ideas between

(95) Cfr. “*Europa Foederata*”, 1972, n. 10. The EP resolution partly repropounded the fundamental points of the *Relazione del gruppo ad hoc per l’esame dell’ampliamento delle competenze del Parlamento europeo*, drafted by a group of jurists presided by Georges Vedel, entrusted by the European Commission, thanks above all to the will of commissioner Spinelli. The *Vedel Report* went further than the EP resolution but it was not approved by the Commission. Cfr. *Bollettino delle Comunità europee*, 1972, suppl. 4. Also L. LEVI, *Crisi della Comunità europea e riforma delle istituzioni*, cit., pp. 42-44.

(96) Here I refer to the Treaty of European Union, approved by the EP under the impetus of Spinelli on February 14th 1984. Cfr. PIER VIRGILIO DASTOLI-ANDREA

the organisers of the federalist demonstration, President Bherendt and Commissioner Sicco Mansholt (97).

The second and even more important popular federalist demonstration was the Counter-Summit of the popular, democratic and progressive movements organised in Paris on October 20th 1972, which coincided with the Summit held at the same time.

First of all, it should be remembered that on October 14th Molenaar and Hirsch, co-presidents of the common committee of the European Federalists (which Spinelli also belonged to), had reiterated requests regarding the democratisation of the Communities and an increase in their powers and responsibilities in a letter to the heads of state and government (98). The imminent enlargement process would make the already complex Community decision-making mechanisms

PIERUCCI, *Verso una costituzione per l'Europa. Guida al Trattato di Unione Europea*, foreword by Mauro Ferri, introduction by A. Spinelli, Casale Monferrato, Marietti, 1984.

(97) Cfr. "Fédéralisme Européen", 1972, n. 1.

(98) Cfr. "Fédéralisme Européen", 1972, n. 2 and "Europa Foederata", 1972, n. 13.

The federalist position on the democratisation of European integration formed part of a wider and more detailed analysis of the crisis of democracy. The fundamental root of this crisis was identified in the emptying of national democratic systems produced by the development of supranational interdependence and integration which was not accompanied by an effective supranational democratic system, which would only be possible on the basis of federal institutions. It was in this context that the conflict between the utopian thought present in the rebellion of youth and the state showed itself in all its drama, a state whose inadequacy in allowing the coherent feasibility of values was becoming increasingly evident. This is where the anarchic elements present in the 1968 movement derived from (alongside aspects which in contrast were somewhat positive and innovative) as well as the extremist and terrorist tendencies of the 1970s, complemented by political apathy and the degeneration of the political parties. With respect to the latter phenomenon, it was particularly underlined how it was the crisis of the nation states that plunged the parties into crisis, and not the other way round.

For the vision of the federalist struggle as a way to overcome such contradictions, the reader is referred in particular to: F. ROSSOLILLO, *L'Europe pour quoi faire?*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1970, n. 1; ALESSANDRO CAVALLI and LUCIO LEVI, *Le mouvement étudiant*, *ibid.*; GRAZIA BORGNA, ALFONSO IOZZO, LUCIO LEVI, SERGIO PISTONE, *Perspectives de la politique internationale du mouvement syndical*, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1971, n. 2; *Atti della Tavola rotonda su "Il servizio militare obbligatorio e l'obiezione di coscienza nella prospettiva di un'Europa federale"*, with contributions from Carlo Meriano, Andrea Chiti-Batelli, Enzo Forcella, Ernesto Balducci, Gianfranco Draghi and Mario Albertini, in "Le Fédéraliste", 1971, nn. 3-4; THOMAS JANSEN and WERNER WEIDENFELD, *Europa-Bilanz und Perspektive, Ein Handbuch*, Mainz, Hass and Koehler Verlag, 1973; CLAUD SCHÖNDUBE (edited by), *Parlamentarismus und europäische Integration*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1975.

— where the search for unanimity at all costs led either to complete paralysis or solutions of compromise which were a far cry from common interests — even more difficult. The issues high on the agenda of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (in which eastern European countries would waste no time in forming a bloc with the USSR) required the Community to speak with a single voice, overcoming the illusory system of concerted action. The federalists therefore asked the Summit: to set a deadline for the direct election of the EP; to immediately grant the EP effective power of control over Community and budget decisions; to invite the EP to contribute to the decisive evolution of the Communities, formulating within a year a project for the constitution of a European federation.

The countersummit of October 20th, to which the JEF made a decisive contribution, saw the attendance of, as well as federalists from all member and candidate countries, representatives of political parties, political movements of a non-party nature (ecologists for example), trade unions, local authorities and the democratic oppositions of Greece, Spain and Portugal (99). Among the most important contributions, those of Spinelli, Enrique Tierno Galvan (the best-known opponent of Franco's dictatorship) (100), Henri Jeanson (French trade union leader), Hirsch, Robert Van Schendel (secretary general of the EM) and Serafini (representing the CEMR) should be remembered in particular. The discussion focused on the two issues on the summit's

(99) With regard to the Countersummit, see: "*Milano Federalista*", 1972, nn. 9-10; "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1972, n. 2; "*Europa Foederata*", 1972, n. 15; *Trent'anni di vita del MFE*, cit.; texts by U. MORELLI and J.-M. PALAYRET, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1986*, cit.

(100) As well as Tierno Galvan, Andreas Papandreu (future Head of the Greek government) and Mario Soares (future President of the Portuguese Republic and of the EM), who were then opponents of the dictatorships in Greece and Portugal, were often invited to federalist demonstrations. By Tierno Galvan, the reader is referred to *Spagna Memorandum*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1972. See also M. SOARES, *Le Portugal bâilloné. Témoignage*, Paris, Calman-Levy, 1972. It should also be remembered that the political resolution approved by the Brussels Congress for the refoundation of the UEF contained a commitment on the part of the federalists to act systematically in favour of the reestablishment of democratic freedom in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, so that these countries could become part of a federal Europe.

agenda: EMU and the institutions. The slogans of the counter-summit were “European Elections Now” and “Against a Confederal Europe of States and Capital, and For a Federal Europe of Citizens and Workers”. In essence, the aim was to underline that the heads of state and government had no legitimate right to represent the people of Europe and to give a voice to the political and social spheres that were most clearly hit by the contradiction between the supranational dimensions of fundamental problems and the inadequacy, in terms of efficiency and democracy, of the European institutions. As such, the aim was to mobilise those who carried the weight of an integration which tended to strengthen, given its technocratic nature, the power of the socially, economically and politically dominant groups. The official, diplomatic and confederal Europe was to be opposed by a democratic and federal Europe and the involvement of the European people in its construction. At the conclusion of the demonstration, a resolution was approved with which the federalists promised to continue the struggle for European elections, starting with unilateral elections pending a European agreement, and to systematically express their demands in conjunction with the official summits.

The Spinelli Plan foresaw, as well as popular mobilisation, work on institutional reforms and particularly on the powers of the EP. In 1972, there were two important contributions in this area, two projects for the constitution of the European Union formulated by federalist exponents with a federal content, albeit a little vague on certain points. The first was that presented by Cristoph Sasse at the European Congress organised by the EM in the hall of the *Bundestag* in Bonn on May 12th and 13th, and in which the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel intervened in favour of the strengthening of the Commission of the Communities and an increase in the EP’s powers. The second was the work of Hans von der Groeben, who had been a member of the Spaak Committee and the Commission of the EEC, and who was at this point an exponent of the EUD (101).

(101) The two texts are analysed in A. CHITI-BATELLI, *L’Unione politica europea. Proposte - Sviluppi istituzionali - Elezioni dirette*, published by the Senate of the Italian Republic, Rome, 1978, and in S. PISTONE, *I progetti di costituzione per una Unione europea nel secondo dopoguerra*, in “*Il Federalista*”, 1982, n. 1.

During the course of 1973–1974, the action of the UEF provided a counterpoint to the demonstration of the inadequacy of the EMU project and the integration crisis which had been dramatically accentuated by the energy shock. In this context, the political resolution approved by the UEF refoundation congress held in Brussels identified the obstacles to the development of the integration process as lying in the deterioration of the functioning of Community mechanisms, the veto paralysing the Council of Ministers, and the refusal to set a date for the direct election of the EP. A European election was considered a means to kick-start such a situation of stalemate and as such the Commission was asked to formally propose, in the report for the next summit, to summon elections for 1977. Meanwhile, in Italy pressure continued for the approval of a bill of popular initiative for the unilateral election of the Italian representatives to the EP. While Senator Giuseppe Bartolomei — designated as the proposer of the bill — presented his report to the competent commissions of the Senate, a number of Italian regions intervened to reinforce federalist pressure (102). The Chambers were presented with bills of regional initiative, identical to that presented by the federalists to the Senate, by the Regional Authorities of Piedmont (May 3rd 1973), Umbria (November 23rd 1973) and Abruzzo (December 19th 1973). Moreover, resolutions were approved in favour of European elections by numerous municipal and provincial councils (103).

After the UEF congress in April, 1973 saw another federalist initiative of great importance. From May 11th to 13th, London's Guildhall hosted a congress of the EM to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Hague Congress. The London conference was attended by extremely important politicians such as British Prime Minister Edward

(102) Cfr. “*Le Fédéraliste*”, 1973, nn. 1–2.

(103) Cfr. “*Europa Foederata*”, nn. 10, 15, 16. It should also be remembered that on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the MFE in Milan on October 20th–21st 1973, political philosopher Norberto Bobbio gave a speech of great value on *Federalism in the Political and Cultural Debate of the Resistance*, which provided authoritative support to the federalist fight for the direct election of the EP. The speech is published in S. PISTONE (edited by), *L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale*, cit. and in the anastatic reprint, previously mentioned, of the *Manifesto di Ventotene*, edited by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont.

Heath, and some of federalism's most prestigious exponents, including Monnet, Marc, de Rougemont, Spinelli, Hirsch and Jean Rey (former president of the European Commission and president of the EM). The conference approved a political declaration, whose most significant section, dedicated to the direct election of the EP, indicated the leadership provided by the new UEF within the framework of the EM (104). Indeed, the document affirmed with reference to the European Union — that the Paris Summit of October 1972 had promised to create by 1980 — that such a Union would only become reality if it was equipped with a federal government and a federal parliament. This required the institution of European citizenship and the rapid elimination of all the barriers that prevented the free circulation of the European people. The Community would have to be responsible for economic, monetary, foreign and security policies, while respecting the autonomy of regional and local authorities, which had to be provided with adequate financial resources. The first direct election was supposed to be organised in 1975 and the EP would have the mission to formulate a project for the constitution of the Union to be submitted directly to the national parliaments for ratification.

Finally, on November 17th and 18th 1973, the federal committee of the UEF decided on a vigorous relaunch of the campaign for a European Union, an objective solemnly indicated by the governments but which had remained dead in the water. A study commission was therefore founded, consisting of Hirsch, Meriano, Mommer, Van Schendel and Wistrich. A delegation of the UEF bureau would ask the Political Commission of the EP, which was formulating the project for Union at the time, to be received in order to discuss it. The federal committee therefore invited the regional committees of the UEF to organise a campaign to persuade Europeans to sign a petition to be sent to the EP, requesting that it be entrusted with the task of drafting the project of European Union (105).

(104) Cfr. "Fédéralisme Européen", 1973, n. 5. Also J. PINDER, *Campagne di adesione alla CEE, idee ed iniziative federaliste: una strategia monnettista in Inghilterra*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1986*, cit.

(105) The proposal of a petition had been put forward by John Priestley. The federal committee appointed a work group composed of H. Baker, Chizzola and

The initiative for the petition was begun in May 1974 when the failure of EMU, after the French Franc had left the monetary snake, was a matter of fact and the integration crisis was becoming increasingly alarming. The text of the petition stated that without a democratic power it would not be possible to achieve economic, monetary and political union. It underlined the gravity of the crisis that was undermining the extent of the European unity that had already been achieved and that, if it was not stopped in time, it would lead to the disintegration of the Community. It also reminded its readers that the declarations of the Paris and Copenhagen Summits (106) on European Union had remained largely ineffective. It asked the EP to formulate, by the end of 1974, a report on the concept of Union in the form of a statute establishing a government accountable to a directly elected assembly and capable of achieving the political, economic and monetary union of Europe (107). On June 11th 1974, Hirsch presented the petition to the president of the EP Cornelis Berkhouwer with the first 26,000 signatures (108). Subsequently Hirsch, accompanied by a delegation from the UEF Bureau, composed of Meriano, Mommer, Wis-trich and Chizzola, delivered the memorandum prepared by the UEF to the president of the Political Commission of the EP Giovanni Gir-

Priestley which would have to draft the text of the petition, and take into account the conclusions of the imminent Copenhagen Summit. Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1974, n. 8 and “*Europa Foederata*”, 1973, nn. 17-18.

(106) In view of the Copenhagen Summit of September 14th-15th 1973, president of the UEF Hirsch and president of the EM Hallstein sent a common appeal to the heads of state and government of the countries of the EEC containing the fundamental federalist requests regarding the democratisation and strengthening of the Community. Cfr. *Europa Foederata*, 1973, nn. 17-18.

(107) Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1974, n. 8 and “*Europa Foederata*”, 1974, n. 4.

(108) Cfr. “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1974, nn. 5 and 6-7. The gathering of signatures proceeded until the end of the year, collecting another few thousand, and the petition was also presented to the national parliaments. The French MFE participated in collecting adhesions to the petition only in the second half of 1974 because it had been occupied in a presidential campaign in April and May, lending support to the federalist candidate Jean-Claude Sebag, secretary general of the French MFE for the election of the President of the republic (subsequently Héraud would also stand). The federalist candidature had symbolic value and aimed to exploit television time (offered to all candidates) for federalist propaganda, but was looked upon with perplexity by the bureau of the UEF.

audó, who was in turn accompanied by Alfred Bertrand (109) (entrusted by the Political Commission to prepare the report on European Union), Lord Gladwyn and Lucien Radoux.

The memorandum highlighted how the crises afflicting the Community demonstrated the illusory nature of the automatic evolution from economic to political integration. In order to improve the functioning of the institutions, it was necessary in the short term to: overcome the Luxemburg compromise, switching to majority voting in the Council; increase the powers of the EP and set a date for its direct election; extend the powers of Community institutions, avoiding the juxtaposition of new bodies with the existing structures; strengthen the role of the Commission in the area of foreign policy coordination, entrusting it to present proposals to the Council, which would then have to deliberate within a pre-established period of time.

These urgent measures would have to be incorporated into a wider-reaching and longer-term framework. The UEF therefore hoped that the EP would formulate a treaty instituting European Union to be submitted to the national parliaments for ratification. According to the UEF, the project would have to: contain a declaration of the foundation of the United States of Europe; establish a transitional period within which a minimal level of institutional infrastructure must be completed; contain a declaration of rights, not just individual rights of liberal tradition and economic and social rights of socialist tradition, but also the universal right to peace, international equality, quality of life and the protection of the environment; indicate the exclusive (foreign policy, defence, currency and foreign trade) and concurrent (economic and social planning, fiscality) powers of the federal bodies. The common executive would be inspired by the Swiss model: a collective body with a rotating presidency, collectively accountable to the EP. The parliament would be a bicameral one: a chamber of the people of the nations of Europe, elected by universal suffrage in proportion to population according to the electoral system

(109) The memorandum is published in “*L’Unità Europea*”, 1974, nn. 4-5 and in “*Fédéralisme Européen*”, 1974, n. 8. The rapporteur of the political commission of the EP Bertrand decided to meet federalists from various countries for an exchange of opinions on various options regarding the European Union.

of each state, and a senate, elected on a national level or designated by the national parliaments, composed by a minimum number of members which would be the same for every state, increased by a number of supplementary members according to population brackets. The UEF proposed the creation of a third chamber, representing local communities, to rule on questions regarding the quality of life, resources, the environment and territory. The memorandum concluded by urging the EP to assume a constituent role.

While the actions in relation to the EP were being carried out, initiatives in favour of unilateral elections continued. In this regard, two proposed bills deserve a mention, one British and one Belgian (110). The first was presented by British MEP Lord O'Hagan to the House of Lords on May 1st 1974, and foresaw that the direct election of the British representatives to the EP should take place on the same day as the general elections in the United Kingdom. The second bill was proposed on May 5th 1974 to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives by Nothomb and Martens, presidents of the christian democrat and socialist groups, and foresaw that the election of the Belgian representatives to the EP should take place on October 10th 1976, in conjunction with the local elections.

Before the Paris Summit on December 9th and 10th 1974, there were another three important appeals on the part of the federalists in favour of the democratisation and the strengthening of the Community's institutions and, therefore, in favour of the direct election of the EP. The first was launched by the federal committee of the UEF, held in Paris on September 7th-8th (111); the second during the congress of the EUD in Saarbrücken on December 7th-8th (112), and finally, the heads of state and government received a declaration from the president of the EM, Rey (113). In this document, which in many respects reflected the demands contained in the memorandum of the UEF issued the previous May, the following requests were made: the organisation of the fight against inflation on a Community basis; the realisa-

(110) Cfr. "*Europa Foederata*", 1974, nn. 6-7.

(111) Cfr. "*Fédéralisme Européen*", 1974, n. 8.

(112) Cfr. "*Europa Union*", 1974, n. 12.

(113) Cfr. "*Europa Foederata*", 1974, n. 8.

tion of a common energy policy that would put the Community in a position to speak with a single voice in this sector; the urgent implementation of a European regional policy, which had been proposed by the Commission as early as 1969 and accepted by the Paris Summit in 1972. As far as European elections were concerned, the declaration expressed great pleasure in the fact that the French government had finally removed the veto that it had used for fifteen years to oppose the solution of this problem, and the Summit was asked to take decisions without further delay.

When the decisions of the Summit of December 9th-10th were made public and it was learned in particular that the governments had decided to initiate procedures for the direct election of the EP as from 1978, the UEF was legitimately able to claim a great victory (114). Demands for a directly elected European Parliament as a fundamental element for European unification had been present ever since the beginning of the UEF action. It had then become the object of a specific battle during the period of the launch and development of the EEC. Initially, only some of the federalists were committed to a European election, but from 1964 onwards it became a strategic objective of all federalists and was pursued through a pressure on the ruling class which was organically linked to a systematic action of popular mobilisation. This action — in the pursuit of which the reunification of the federalists was achieved — involved individual citizens, political parties, trade unions, non-political organisations and local authorities. The long federalist struggle made sure that demands for a European election were kept alive and actively present in the political scene, and therefore constituted a decisive factor, in connection with the acute crisis of European integration, in the turning point which was reached in December 1974.

4.5. *Considerations on the role and nature of the UEF.*

In conclusion of this first phase of the history of the UEF, I believe it is necessary to make two considerations in order to fully

(114) Cfr. “*Europa Foederata*”, 1974, n. 9; “*L’Unità Europea*”, 1974, nn. 11-12.

understand the role and nature of this organisation of militants for European federation.

The first consideration regards the importance, in the history of European integration, of the decision taken in relation to the direct election of the EP on December 1974. It is difficult not to recognise in hindsight that this decision — to which the UEF, as we have seen, provided a decisive contribution — unleashed a powerful dynamising effect on the European integration process. If today the European Constitution is top of the agenda, it is because a chain reaction of developments was set in motion starting with the Summit of 1974 (and federalist actions have always constituted an active and essential factor in each one of them (115)), which has brought the achievement of a European federation, indicated by the Schuman Declaration, within reach, although it is by no means a foregone conclusion. Let us take a schematic look at this sequence of events.

Even before the achievement of the direct election of the EP, called for the period between the 7th and 10th of June 1979, the expectations of this deadline favoured two particularly relevant developments. First of all, in 1978 the institution of the European Monetary System (EMS) was decided thanks in particular to the input of Giscard d'Estaing and Schmidt, and came into being in March 1979. Once the date of the European elections had been fixed, the more pro-European governments (with the support of the supranational parties confederations formed in view of the European elections) realized that it was not possible to mobilize the European electorate showing the image of a Community that, rather than progressing, was moving backwards. The decision was therefore taken to create within the context of the Community an area of monetary stability that, by strongly lim-

(115) See: S. PISTONE, *Sessant'anni di vita dell'Unione Europea dei Federalisti*, in "Piemonteuropa", 2006, n. 4 (English translation in "UEF Newsletter", Special Edition, January 2007); ID., *L'Europa e la sua integrazione*, in *Grande dizionario enciclopedico UTET. Appendice La Nuova Europa*, Turin, Utet, 2000; ID., *Europeismo*, in *Eredità del Novecento*, Roma, Istituto Italiano dell'Enciclopedia, 2000; ID., *Europeismo*, in ANGELO D'ORSI (edited by), *Gli ismi della politica*, edito dal Dipartimento di Studi Politici dell'Università di Torino, 2008; U. MORELLI (edited by), *L'Unione europea e le sfide del XXI secolo*, cit.; ID. (edited by), *A Constitution for the European Union*, published by the Centre for Studies on Federalism, Milan, Giuffrè, 2005.

iting exchange rate risks, would restore the effective functioning of the customs union and the CAP, therefore laying the foundations for further economic integration and a revival of the project for EMU. The monetary stability was entrusted to a more effective mechanism than the monetary snake conceived by the Werner Plan, given that a stronger credit system was activated in order to support those currencies in difficulty and a European currency unit was created, the ECU, based on a basket of EEC currencies instead of the dollar. In effect, the relative monetary stability between the countries of the Community guaranteed by the EMS was an invaluable condition for the great relaunch of the economic integration which took place in the 1980s.

Within the context of positive expectations and the desire for relaunch produced by the approach of the first European elections, we must also consider the sentence pronounced by the European Court of Justice on February 20th 1979 with regard to the *cassis de Dijon* issue. The fundamental objective of this historic sentence was the fight against the non-tariff protectionism that had developed within the context of the economic crisis of the 1970s, and which was increasingly making a mockery of the common market in important areas of manufacturing. Indeed, the Court of Justice made a significant contribution, with its sentence of February 20th 1979 (which was confirmed and fine-tuned by subsequent sentences), to opening the way for the Single European Act (SEA), and therefore the creation of the single market. The fact that right at the beginning of 1979 the Luxembourg judges decided to act in such an innovative and brave fashion, on an issue on which Community activity (both on the part of the Council and the Commission) had stagnated for years, was clearly linked to the consideration that the decisions regarding European elections and the EMS would weaken nationalistic resistance to the furthering of economic integration.

After the first direct election of the EP, the most immediate development was the self-assumption on the part of this assembly of a constituent role — exactly the function in view of which the federalists had fought for a direct election. Thanks to the input of Spinelli (who after having been a Euro-Commissioner, had become a MEP in 1976, and remained so until his death in 1986), and with the valiant support

of the federalists, the EP, after a long and complex procedure that required more than three years of work, was able to approve with a huge majority a project for the revision of the Community treaties on February 14th 1984, the Constitutive Treaty of the European Union (TUE), which was sent to the governments and to the national parliaments with a request for ratification. The TUE contained in essence a federal constitution — although for the federalisation of foreign, security and defence policies a gradual process was established which required further constituent acts — and above all foresaw the implementation of the treaty among the ratifying states as soon as it was ratified by a majority of the member states whose population constituted 2/3 of the the entire population of the Community (116).

The constituent initiative of the EP did not find sufficient consensus among the governments to bring about radical institutional reform in a federal sense, but it was undoubtedly one of the fundamental factors that contributed to the launching of the SEA. The president of the European Commission Jacques Delors — he was the main artificer of the new treaty, with the support of the governments of the six founding states — was in fact able to take advantage of two fundamental factors in order to obtain the approval of a treaty which was decidedly more limited with respect to that proposed by the EP, but which nonetheless made the pursuit of the crucial objective of the single market possible, also because it introduced a number of the institutional reforms foreseen by the TUE, particularly with regard to the

(116) See: P.V. DASTOLI and A. PIERUCCI, *Verso una costituzione democratica per l'Europa*, cit.; A. SPINELLI, *Una strategia per gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, cit.; A. SPINELLI, *Discorsi al Parlamento europeo 1976-1986*, edited by P.V. Dastoli, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987 (a French version also exists, as well as an English edition published by the Communist and Allies Group of the EP); *L'ultima battaglia federalista di Altiero Spinelli*, with an introduction by S. Pistone, published by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont, Torino, Celid, 2008 (it contains also the anastatic reprint of "Crocodile-Letter to the members of the European Parliament"). It can be observed that, beyond the approval of Spinelli's proposal, following its direct election the EP constantly strived to provide a stimulus in favour of institutional reforms. On the other hand, the fact that European elections are held every five years provides the governments and parties, who put themselves to the test ahead of public opinion, with an impetus to pursue further European integration.

extension of majority voting on the part of the Council of Ministers and the strengthening of the EP's powers.

If one of these levers was represented by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice with regard to non-tariff protectionism, the other was, as Delors himself acknowledged on a number of occasions (117), the constituent initiative of the EP. The governments themselves (above all, Margaret Thatcher's British Government, but in essence, also others) were initially orientated towards a conception of the single market project as a simple declaration of intent just like the EMU first project. But it was the very need to satisfy, at least in part, the demands for radical reforms contained in the TUE project approved by the EP that contributed decisively to the transformation of the single market project from a declaration of intent to a genuine treaty, equipped with a significant chance of success. In effect the SEA (for which a majority decision was reached to summon an intergovernmental conference adopted by the European Council of Milan in June 1985, in the presence of a federalist demonstration with the participation of 100,000 people) indicated a precise deadline, introduced a number of reforms of the Community's decision-making mechanisms and subjected the member states to well-defined obligations so as to raise expectations among economic and social entities, citizens and the political class which would be able to generate further periods of development (118).

In a certain sense, the scenario of the transition from the projects of the EDC and the Political Community to the Treaties of Rome was repeated. As we have seen, after the negative vote of August 30th 1954, the governments of the six member states of the ECSC implemented the more limited project of the treaty on the common market, but one which was however able to significantly further the

(117) Cfr. J. DELORS, *Mémoires*, Paris, Plon, 2004.

(118) Cfr. ROCCO ANTONIO CANGELOSI, *Dal progetto di trattato Spinelli all'Atto Unico Europeo*, Milan, F. Angeli, 1987; Luciano ANGELINO, *Le forme dell'Europa. Spinelli o della federazione*, Genoa, Il Melangolo, 2003 (in which it is highlighted how Spinelli's project for the TUE represented an agenda for subsequent European institutional reforms); P.V. DASTOLI, *1992: Europa senza frontiere?*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989; CINZIA ROGNONI VERCELLI, *L'Europa a Milano. La manifestazione federalista del 28-29 giugno 1985*, in *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1970-1986*, cit.

integration process, also in order to satisfy at least in part the expectations raised by the projects of the EDC and the Political Community. If at that time the proposal of the ad hoc Assembly was born following a mandate issued by the governments, in the case of the TUE it was the dynamics set in motion by the European elections that allowed the EP to take upon itself a constituent role that contributed to the advancement of the integration process.

The subsequent link in the chain that I am schematically illustrating is represented by the Maastricht Treaty which instituted the European Union (MT). If the most important aspect of the MT is constituted by the re-launch of EMU, its link with the creation of the SEA is clear. A fundamental objective of the programme for the single market was indeed the free circulation of capital, foreseen for 1990 and which was effectively implemented in that year. This implied progress towards monetary union, since a system of fixed exchange rates between national currencies such as the EMS (without the institution of which economic integration could not be maintained) would not be able to resist speculative movements which would be significantly favoured by the free circulation of capital (119).

This factor within the logic of economic integration was linked to the external factor represented by the end of the cold war (120) and by the consequent reunification of Germany, which lent significant weight in a particularly intense fashion to the need (ever present in the construction of the Community) to organically connect the strengthening of Germany with the furthering of European integration. Therefore, with the MT, a relaunch of the EMU project was achieved on the basis of institutional reinforcement which acknowledged further aspects of the proposals of the EP (121), and which

(119) Cf. TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, *La lunga via per l'euro*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004.

(120) On the link between the development of European integration and the end of the cold war, see S. PISTONE, *L'unificazione europea e la pace nel mondo*, in U. MORELLI (edited by), *L'Unione europea e le sfide del XX secolo*, cit.; M. ALBERTINI-S. PISTONE, *Federalism, Raison d'Etat and Peace*, The Ventotene Papers, n. 4, published by the Altiero Spinelli Institute of Federalist Studies, 2001 (there are also Italian and French editions).

(121) See: P.V. DASTOLI and GIANCARLO VILELLA, *La nuova Europa*, Bologna,

therefore succeeded in effectively implementing monetary union. The MT, which proclaimed the European Union (EU), also initiated the extension, albeit on an intergovernmental basis, of European integration to sectors of foreign policy, security, defence and internal security — an extension put at the top of the agenda by the challenges emerging from the post-bipolar world.

The last link in the chain is constituted by the process currently underway which is concentrating on the European Constitution. The European governments have had to put the issue of the European Constitution at the top of the agenda because the process of European unification had found itself faced with three existential challenges. They can only find an adequate response in rapid and decisive progress towards the full federalisation of the EU, i.e. towards the final objective indicated by the Schuman Declaration.

The first challenge is constituted by the necessity to implement, after the single market and monetary union, economic union. This fundamentally means: effective European policies in strategic sectors (energy, aerospace, research); strong European policies for economic and social cohesion, also to avoid competitiveness on a European level corroding the welfare state; the strengthening of the common budget with a European power of taxation and the possibility of issuing euro-bonds. In essence, the impossibility of implementing effective macro-economic policies on a national level, induced by the supranational dimension of fundamental problems and by economic and monetary integration, must be compensated by the creation of a genuine European economic government and, therefore, by a corresponding strengthening of the European institutions in a federal sense.

The second challenge is connected to the issues of enlargement of the EU and the stabilisation of their neighbouring areas. Enlargement has represented, and still represents, an enormously effective pol-

Il Mulino, 1992; P.V. DASTOLI, A. MAJOCCHI, ROBERTO SANTANIELLO, *Prospettiva Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996. The role played by the federalists in favour of strengthening the EP should also be remembered. In this context, the most important initiative was the referendum on the constituent role of the EP, requested by the federalists with a bill of popular initiative (with 120,000 authenticated signatures) and held in Italy in conjunction with the European elections on June 18th 1989 (88% voted yes, with an 82% turnout).

icy of economic and social modernisation and pacification, as well as encouraging the spread of democracy. It is therefore crucial that it continues and involves particularly in the Balkans region and Turkey, whose modernisation and democratisation is, given all the evidence, of vital interest to the EU. As far as the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States are concerned, as well as those of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, the necessary choice is one promoting an incisive “neighbourhood” policy which pursues the modernisation, pacification, through a European model of regional integration, and the democratisation of these areas, and which connects them organically to the EU with mechanisms of a confederal nature. It is clear that this challenge makes the overcoming of deficits of democracy and efficiency on the part of the European institutions even more urgent, in order to be able to achieve adequate economic and social cohesion, the effectiveness of the supranational juridical system, internal security and the ability to act on an international level.

The third challenge derives from the absolutely fundamental necessity for the EU to become an effective global player through federal mechanisms regarding foreign, security and defence policies. Only on this basis would the EU be capable of: — effectively pushing politics towards a fairer and more peaceful world (the spreading of democracy, the fight against poverty, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the pursuit of sustainable development, regional integration in other parts of the world and the strengthening of the UN) outlined in the document “Secure Europe in a Better World” drafted by the High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, and approved by the European Council in December 2003; — implementing this policy (which is in the vital interest of the great democracies) within a context of *equal partnership* with the United States of America; — obtaining a unitary representation, instead of France and the United Kingdom individually, in the UN Security Council, initiating its transformation into the Council of the great regions of the world.

The response of the governments ahead of such challenges was the activation of a constituent process in which the governments monopoly over the revision of the treaties regarding European unifica-

tion, i.e. the constituent function, was overcome for the first time. The European Convention, which operated during 2002 and 2003, saw the participation of European and national members of parliament as well as the European Commission and the governments, and political parties, economic and social organisations, local authorities and civil society as a whole were systematically consulted. The demands of the EP and the federalists for a fully democratic constituent procedure were however only partially acknowledged because the governments reserved the right to decide as a last resort and on a unanimous basis with regard to the constitution project, and they maintained the principle of unanimous ratification on the part of the member states.

The project for the European Constitution, underwritten in Rome on October 29th 2004, despite not foreseeing the full federalisation of the EU, contained extremely important steps forward in that direction and its implementation would have constituted a decidedly more advanced basis for the fight for a European federation. The ratification process was however blocked by the negative results of the referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, despite the fact that eighteen states out of twenty-seven had ratified.

After that the governments rejected the UEF proposal to introduce a majority ratification procedure through a European-wide ballot. They therefore decided to approve a treaty (the Treaty of Lisbon) that maintains the substance of institutional reforms foreseen by the Constitutional Treaty, but eliminates every reference to the idea of constitution, which would have given a strong evolutive dynamics to these reforms. The federalists are therefore committed to relaunch the fight for a federal constitution, starting from the more advanced situation foreseen with the Lisbon Treaty and pursuing a completely democratic constituent procedure. This is the point at which the fight led by the UEF for European federation, in the period following the decision in 1974 regarding the direct election of the EP (122), has arrived.

(122) Regarding the Convention, the project of European Constitution and the campaign for a European referendum, see: S. PISTONE, *La Convenzione europea*, published by the European Committee of the Regional Council of Piedmont, Turin, Celid, 2002; GIAN PIERO ORSELLO (edited by), *La Costituzione dell'Europa*, Rome,

Having clarified the importance, from a historical perspective, of the victory achieved by the UEF in 1974, I come to the second consideration which will concentrate on the general role played by federalist action with respect to the process of European unification. In light of the reconstruction relating to the period up to 1974, and also considering a bird's eye view over the subsequent developments, it seems that one can distinguish between the influence of the federalists on the European integration process, which essentially consists of invaluable testimony, and a concrete and effective influence which became evident at precise moments during the said process.

With regard to the first aspect, it can be observed that the thought and action of the UEF, as a component of and launch pad for European federalist initiative as a whole, has contributed decisively to laying the crucial foundations in order to commence the European unification process and therefore to keeping alive demands for European federation in the course of this process. This naturally implies a democratic constituent procedure to realize it and, consequently, the participation of the people in the construction of Europe. Without the active presence, on a practical and theoretical level, of a constantly and exclusively committed movement, without motives of power, in favour of the federal unity of Europe, and being evident that the political parties cannot help but dedicate to this goal only superficial and discontinuous attention (being so busy with the management of the existing political power), it is obvious that the European federalists' demands would have disappeared from the political and cultural debate. As a consequence, the prospect of the democratic and federal completion of the European integration process would have lost any practical relevance.

Apart from this form of influence, linked to the very existence of organised federalism, there was a more incisive and concrete influ-

Datanews, 2003; *Un governo federale per l'Europa*, proceedings of the XXII national congress of the MFE (Forlì March 11th-13th 2005), Pavia, 2005; *Un referendum europeo per la Costituzione europea*, proceedings of the XXIII national congress of the MFE (Rome March 2nd-4th 2007), Pavia, 2007; EMILIO R. PAPA, *Storia dell'unificazione europea. Dall'idea di Europa al Trattato per una nuova Costituzione europea*, Milan, RCS, 2006.

ence which was able to manifest itself in certain precise moments of the European unification process. More specifically, these were moments in which the historical situation forced the national governments to confront — with their European integration policies — problems and situations which could not be dealt with without the introduction of democratic and federal elements in the European institutions or without a genuine transfer of sovereign powers. In such moments European integration — imposed by the “unite or perish” alternative, but held back by the tendency to conserve national power — puts governments on a kind of inclined plane towards supranationality and therefore opens the way for a significant influence to be exerted by the federalists, which also requires an adequate capacity for political action and above all mobilisation from the bottom up in order to be exploited to the full.

In the period of the UEF under examination here there were two moments of this kind.

The first of these moments was that in which the action of the UEF played a decisive role in the transformation of the project for a European army into a project of military, economic and political union based on essentially federal institutions. It has already been underlined how, beyond the defeat in 1954, the project for the European Political Community exerted a great influence on the progress of European unification. In effect, the frustration of the expectations raised by the EDC and by the EPC pushed the governments to fill the gap which had thus been created and this was a factor of no little importance in the Messina relaunch. This brings us to underline another aspect. Federalists must always aim high in their battles, not only because they must be faithful to an ambitious objective, but also because only in glorious defeats, which presume great battles and not the mere pursuit of survival, can they dialectically concur in order to take the European integration process forward. This would also be evident on the occasion of the project for the European Constitution approved by the EP, thanks to the impetus of Spinelli, in 1984.

The second moment of incisive influence on the part of federalist actions over the European integration process coincided with the fight for the direct election of the EP. The decision of the 1974 Sum-

mit was obtained by the federalists in a period in which economic integration was crumbling due to the fact that the European institutions were too inadequate in terms of efficiency and democracy. The constant denouncement of the limits of the integration pursued by the governments, the systematic mobilisation of public opinion and the clear forecast of the critical situation which would inevitably be reached on the part of the federalists was thus decisive.

Staying with the issue of the federalist influence on the progress of integration, there is another aspect to be highlighted. We have seen how the constant and common thread of the actions of the UEF was the commitment to favouring the democratic constituent alternative, according to the model of the Philadelphia Convention, over and above the procedure of the intergovernmental conference. The Philadelphia model means that the governments assign a constituent mandate to an assembly of representatives of the people, deliberating according to the majority principle and with complete transparency, and that majority ratification is foreseen. Only in this way can a fully federal constitution be achieved, while secret decisions and the right to national veto are destined to impede federal and democratic development. Well, if one looks at the experience of European integration, it is difficult not to observe how the decisive steps forward were achieved precisely when certain aspects of the constituent method modified pure intergovernmental procedures and therefore limited the dominant role of national diplomacy.

Let us begin with the Council of Europe, whose importance is linked to the fact of having inserted for the first time in an international organisation an assembly of a parliamentary nature and of having rendered the Court of Human Rights directly accessible to the citizens of Europe. Two fundamental precedents with respect to the construction of the community system. So, if it is true that the Institute Treaty of the Council of Europe was formulated by an intergovernmental conference, it is also true, as we have seen, that the procedure was initiated by the Hague Congress and that the EM systematically followed and influenced the negotiations, especially with regard to the two aforementioned precedents.

Moving onto the birth of the ECSC, there are two aspects to be

underlined. First of all, the crucial decision — indicated by the UEF in the Campaign for the Federal Pact — was made to proceed with those member states of the Council of Europe willing to do so, breaking away from the restrictive principle of unanimity. Secondly, it is significant that Schuman, in order to overcome the predictable resistance of French diplomacy, involved it only after his plan (formulated by Monnet, who had received pre-emptive agreement on the part of Adenauer) had been approved by the French Council of Ministers and solemnly presented to the public on May 9th 1950, obtaining consensus from political, economic and social fields as well as public opinion, all of which tied Quai d'Orsay's hands.

After the ad hoc Assembly, which brought to the verge of federation, the Messina Conference was held. With the institution of and the decisive role played by the Spaak Committee in the procedure which led to the signing of the Treaties of Rome, a part of the purview contained in article 38 of the EDC was acknowledged. Not only was the direct election of the EP foreseen, but the said EP was entrusted with the task of presenting the project regarding its own direct election. While the more radical section of the federalist movement, led by Spinelli, demanded with the Campaign for the Congress of the European People a constituent assembly directly elected by the citizens of Europe, part of such demand was satisfied in the Treaties of Rome.

The direct election of the EP, from which the above mentioned stimulus for the progress of European integration is derived, is clearly part of the Philadelphia logic. However, other moments should be remembered which were influenced by elements of the Philadelphia model, enabling substantial progress in the European unification process.

Certain crucial decisions taken according to the majority principle on the part of the governments are of particular importance: the decision of the European Council of Rome in December 1975 to proceed with the direct election of the EP despite the reservations of the United Kingdom and Denmark; the majority convocations of the intergovernmental conferences which formulated the SEA and the MT; the majority decision on the part of the European Council of Rome in October 1990 to approve the report of the Delors Commit-

tee on EMU (a body similar to the Spaak Committee) as the agenda for the intergovernmental conference which gave rise to the MT. Finally, the European Constitutional Convention in 2002–2003 had a predominantly parliamentary composition, a transparent working method which implied a systematic consultation of society as a whole, and it was as such impossible for the intergovernmental conference to go back on the more advanced proposals it had presented.

Clearly, a fully democratic constituent procedure has not yet been established. However, the problem is becoming impossible to ignore, because if the complete federalisation of the EU is not achieved within a reasonable timeframe, and therefore the procedure necessary to achieve it which includes as an indispensable element the option of federalisation for those who want it, European integration is destined to suffer a fatal regression.

The union of european federalists

From the foundation to the decision on
direct election of the european parliament
(1946-1974)

Sergio Pistone